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Thesis Summary 
This doctoral thesis introduces compulsivity as an empirical, conceptual 
and theoretical phenomenon to human geography. Compulsivity as 
mobilised here is associated with the Tourette syndrome diagnosis, and 
can be understood as the performance of unwanted and unprecedented 
interactions that are experienced to be purposeless and meaningless in 
their response to unqualified urges.  
Drawing on and contributing to medical and clinical sciences of Tourette 
syndrome, geographies of medicalised performances and perception, as 
well poststructural and postphenomenological theories in cultural 
geography, it focuses on the performativity of compulsive interactions 
between affected bodies and their material environments.  
As urge-driven compulsions have received little to no scholarly attention, 
the study seeks to identify if and how a spatial approach could help 
understand these engagements. In turn, it explores how compulsivity as a 
principle could develop geography’s conceptualisations of person-place 
relations.  
The study then examines the ways in which bodily environments affect 
compulsive interactions, and how they are negotiated. It does so through 
in-depth semi-structured interviews, participant observations, and mobile 
eye-tracking in close collaboration with 15 participants. The study took 
place in the homes of the participants, shops, cars, public transport, natural 
areas, and schools in the Netherlands over an 8-month period.  
The outcomes reimagine compulsivity as choreographies between human 
bodies, objects and spaces that configure towards each other and form 
systems through dimensions they then come to share. Compulsive 
interactions constitute, affirm, and (re)stabilise these systems by elongating 
their durations in order for those affected to thrive. In their anticipation and 
performance of compulsions, they apply a plethora of spatial negotiation 
techniques.  
In addition to carving out a space for a compulsive approach to body-world 
formation beyond the Tourette syndrome diagnosis, this study develops a 
vitalist ethics for human geography to study medicalised performances. 
Furthermore, it proposes new ways for capacity building for, and integration 
in, academic research of those affected. 
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By Wislawa Szymborska (1923-2012) 
From “Poems New and Collected 1957-1997”, 
Translated by Stanislaw Baranczak and Clare Cavanagh 
 
 
Under one small star 
My apologies to chance for calling it necessity. 
My apologies to necessity if I'm mistaken, after all. 
Please, don't be angry, happiness, that I take you as my due. 
May my dead be patient with the way my memories fade. 
My apologies to time for all the world I overlook each second. 
My apologies to past loves for thinking that the latest is the first. 
Forgive me, distant wars, for bringing flowers home. 
Forgive me, open wounds, for pricking my finger. 
I apologize for my record of minuets to those who cry from the depths. 
I apologize to those who wait in railway stations for being asleep today at five a.m. 
Pardon me, hounded hope, for laughing from time to time. 
Pardon me, deserts, that I don't rush to you bearing a spoonful of water.  
And you, falcon, unchanging year after year, always in the same cage, 
your gaze always fixed on the same point in space, 
forgive me, even if it turns out you were stuffed. 
My apologies to the felled tree for the table's four legs. 
My apologies to great questions for small answers. 
Truth, please don't pay me much attention. 
Dignity, please be magnanimous. 
Bear with me, O mystery of existence, as I pluck the occasional thread from your train. 
Soul, don't take offense that I've only got you now and then. 
My apologies to everything that I can't be everywhere at once. 
My apologies to everyone that I can't be each woman and each man. 
I know I won't be justified as long as I live, 
since I myself stand in my own way. 
Don't bear me ill will, speech, that I borrow weighty words, 
then labor heavily so that they may seem light.  
  
XII 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 COMPULSIVITY? 
 
It is some 16 years ago. My family and me have just finished supper. As always, my 
father, mother, sister and me get up from our chairs, pick up the glasses, empty pots 
and pans, and bring them to the kitchen. We all know that my sister, Laura, will not 
pick up the plates with the cutlery on top, because she just can’t. Albeit with some 
reluctance, it had made its way into the family psyche. In the kitchen she puts the 
condiments she had picked up instead on the counter so that they align with each 
other and the edge of the counter perfectly. Before turning around to go back, her 
hand goes towards the bottom left corner of a cupboard door and pushes her thumb 
firmly in its tip. She then notices a drawer that had not shut entirely, upon which she 
has to close it despite my mother using it. With every step she takes, she measures 
where she puts her feet as to not interrupt the lines coming from the corners of the 
kitchen, kitchen table, and lines between the tiles. I had seen it a thousand times, 
and would see it a thousand times more; Laura had explained not knowing why she 
did it, and simultaneously unable to not do it a thousand times, and would repeat 
this a million times more.  
 
‘Compulsions’ (e.g. Robertson and Cavanna 2007; Shapiro and Shapiro 1992; 
Shapiro et al. 1988). ‘obsessive/compulsive symptoms’ (e.g. Cavanna et al. 2009; 
Eapen et al. 1994), ‘repetitive behaviour’ (e.g. Leckman et al. 1994; Miguel et al. 
2000; Neal and Cavanna 2013), ‘repetitive phenomena’ (e.g. Cath et al. 2001), 
‘Complex motor tics’ (e.g. Verdellen et al. 2008) and ‘compulsive-like tics’ (e.g. 
Robertson et al. 2008). These are the clinical concepts attempting to capture 
Laura’s acts. They take place following unqualified bodily sensations and anxiety 
and are associated with the Tourette syndrome (TS) diagnosis. These unqualified 
‘premonitory urges’ become increasingly uncomfortable with time passing when not 
acted upon (e.g. see Banaschewsky et al. 2003; Capriotti et al. 2013; Leckman, et 
al. 1993; Woods et al. 2005). Because of these urges, Laura and those who share 
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her experiences feel compelled to interact with certain objects in a very particular – 
and often routine – fashion (Comings et al.1990).  
Compulsive interactions have been conceptualised as ‘behaviour’ inciting touch, 
order and symmetry (e.g. Cath et al. 2001; Worbe et al. 2010). To date, these acts 
remain a ‘fringe phenomenon’ in scientific research, as it revolves around the 
diagnostic criteria of motor and vocal tics of Tourette syndrome. These tics are 
understood as “sudden, rapid, involuntary, nonrhythmic, and repetitive movements 
or vocalizations” (Singer 2013, pp. 23). As compulsive interactions are vastly more 
idiosyncratic than tics, they are difficult to capture by the positivist research 
traditions of medical and clinical sciences. This has often rendered them either 
absent from, or indistinctively present in, such research. Therefore, to date, 
compulsive interactions have only made appearance in debates on how to 
conceptualise them in relation to tics, and engagement with their performance rare. 
Whilst carrying a family resemblance with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), 
they differ as compulsions associated with the latter are understood to take place in 
response to obsessions and connote fear. 
 
Before she knew about these medical conceptualisations, Laura had rendered 
herself abnormal as her body urged her into the unwanted and unprecedented 
interactions with certain objects and elements of spaces in ‘peculiar’ ways. 
Seemingly unable to control her own body, Laura’s engagements did not fit any 
category, and apart from the physical pain, not being able to make sense of them 
caused her great distress. All the structures normally employed to regard embodied 
life proved obsolete; her body did things that she and others around her could not 
understand through existing systems of logic which normally explained bodily 
performativity. Apparently, something needed to be ‘wrong’ with her. After having 
sought medical help on the basis of her movements and utterings, she was 
diagnosed with Tourette syndrome. The diagnosis assured her and others around 
her that it was not her fault. Her brain malfunctioned, and with medication and 
behavioural therapy, the interactions would become more ‘controllable’. As such, the 
interactions had become rendered a structural problem of her brain, and she did not 
need to make sense of every individual ‘symptom’, as what they had come to be 
known as anew. It was all in her head, and it was her nervous system that needed to 
be fixed.  
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This thesis comes at a time when our knowledge about the human body and what it 
is capable of evolves at breath-taking pace through advances in the sciences. Our 
bodily existence seems to harbour very few secrets anymore, as differences can be 
measured with increasing scope and detail. As such, the confidence in our 
understanding of human bodily existence has never been stronger, and what it does 
is under ever more scrutiny. Diagnostics capture more aspects of human life with 
every new publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM), and accordingly, Laura’s compulsive interactions have been categorised as 
‘deviant’, defined by and assigned to the realm of neurosciences and psychiatry. As 
we will see, these Western medical sciences conceptualise all bodily engagements 
as originating in the brain (Davies, 2016)  
Neuropsychiatric conceptualisations of the body and its performativity have 
undoubtedly helped to provide relief from suffering in many ways. Indeed, they have 
become so successful that they are increasingly becoming influential in Western 
political ideology. Nonetheless, the dominance of these approaches that centre the 
brain in understanding human performativity permits the dismissal of others, despite 
an absence of definitive biological proof, especially with regards to compulsivity. 
Then, as reflected in Laura’s experiences, conceptualising compulsive interactions 
exclusively in terms of the brain and nervous system requires an articulation of 
detectible difference in structures, fluids, and processes from non-compulsive 
‘normal’ brains. This difference renders compulsivity an epistemological constant, 
which assumes compulsive bodily performance expressions of an underlying 
neuropsychiatric problem (see Davies, 2016; Pykett 2017). This renders an 
ontological dispersal of Tourette’s beyond the brain, or body, obsolete. Therefore, 
looking at what the body actually does, when it does it, and how therefore becomes 
entirely superfluous. However, such understanding cannot explain why certain 
engagements always happen in particular situations, with particular body parts, and 
with particular objects.  
 
1.2 COMPULSIVE GEOGRAPHIES? 
This study also comes at a time in human geography in which the interest in bodily 
performativity has firmly established as central to the “extraordinary sets of relations 
between people and places” (Holloway and Hubbard 2000, pp. 6). The humanist 
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approaches upon which such relational understanding of bodily performativity is 
based mobilises the body in structures of meaning and willpower (e.g. Tuan 1974, 
Relph 1976; Buttimer and Seamon 1980), in which the body is a ‘recipient’ of spatial 
forces. In response to the inherent passivity and universality of such conceptions of 
the body, its performativity has become rendered actively productive of spatial 
knowledge (Butler 1993; Longhurst 2001; Teather 1999). Such notions thus activate 
the body, and place more emphasis on the unfolding of the momentary and in situ 
performance of its spatial relations, which gave rise to more vitalist considerations of 
bodily performativity. The pervading idea that the human has (full) control over, or 
can grasp their bodily environment then challenged the increasing dominance of 
cognition as metaphysics for human performativity. The body became repositioned 
as intimately entangled with its constituencies (Anderson and Harrison 2010). 
Conceptions of bodily performativity thus required expansion beyond structures and 
beyond the human. Such considerations gave rise to post-structural (e.g. Doel 1999; 
Murdoch 2006; Thrift 2004), post-humanist (e.g. Coyle 2006; Whatmore 2002) and 
postphenomenological1 (e.g. Ash 2015; Simpson 2009; Wylie 2005) approaches. 
They seek to conceptualise bodily performativity from a less anthropocentric stance, 
and consider its constitution to take place through human and nonhuman agency, as 
well as corporeal and extracorporeal affects. The co-constitution of human 
performativity with non-humans such as objects and spaces then challenges the 
subject-object divide in favour of subjectification processes (see Lea 2009; Ash and 
Simpson 2016). Experience of embodied life then articulates in the felt rather than is 
articulated in the known (Dewsbury 2003; Harrison 2008; Anderson 2014). 
At the time this thesis comes to fruition, bodily performance that has been 
medicalised is being reconceived along more vitalist lines as well. Medicalised 
aspects of bodily performativity have traditionally been understood as an exclusively 
human affair in which the environment is articulated as a barrier (e.g. Gleeson 
1999). Currently, geographical sub disciplines disability and health geography have 
recently started to explore human (dis)ability, (ill)health, impairment and 
(ab)normalcy as co-constituted beyond the human (e.g. Andrews et al. 2014; 2017; 
Hansen and Philo 2007, MacPherson 2010, Colls 2012, Gorman 2017; Bissell 2009; 
Hall and Wilton 2017; Hinchliffe et al. 2018). With its focus on bodily performativity, 
sensitivity to and activation of the corporeal environment, human geography offered 
                                               
1 Although the premise of this philosophical tradition is shared with neo-phenomenology and 
technoscience, I refer to it this body of thought as postphenomenology in line with its uptake in 
geography. 
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an ethics that could help engage with Laura’s compulsive interactions. By 
reconceiving them through a performative geographical approach, their unfolding 
could potentially be understood in terms sensitive to the ongoing bodily situation. It 
is also to these approaches that this thesis is envisioned to make the most 
contribution. 
This thesis adds to the movement in geography away from the human as ontological 
centre to the embedding of the human in relationalities with non-humans, and as 
always mobilised in the realm of the more-than human. It adds to the debate a 
fundamental question about what constitutes the human. Western sciences ascribe 
to the human inherent qualities of rationality (even when found emotional), 
intentionality, reflectiveness and consciousness of action. In these ideas these 
values seem to count as epitome of humanity, that which separates us from non-
human animals and objects. This is a notion of humanity that puts us as a species 
on a pedestal, and is mobilised to commit all kinds of acts to other organisms, as 
well as to human beings who do not openly commit to these. As such, it sustains 
current critiques of anthropocentrism in geography and the wider social sciences.  
Developing compulsivity as a set of conditions that also underpins human life then 
helps blur the modern categories of the human and non-human. Indeed, in 
presenting a humanity that differs from these celebrated values, this thesis shakes 
their well-established fundaments. As such, it demands a revision of the Western 
principles of the human condition, as well as the legal system that is underpinned by 
these principles, as it directly challenges the location of responsibility over action 
seemingly initiated by the human. Doing so then helps tackle the notion of normality 
that seems to regulate societal norms and values regarding the place of those 
deemed not to fit with the idea of what constitutes an abled society. With this thesis 
coming to fruition in an age of rising fascism, more stringent legal systems, and 
increased surveillance, it also hopes to help counter the tendency to use 
neuropsychiatric knowledge, and the diagnostic system on which it is based as 
method of policing people. 
 
1.3 STUDYING A MEDICALISED PHENOMENON AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
The study thus sets off from the premise that a performative geographical enquiry 
could develop our understanding of compulsive interactions, and help Laura and 
others like her to better cope with them. Human geography could be therapeutic in 
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this instance, as it has been in so many others. To date, however, human 
geographers have had no interest in compulsive interactions in particular and 
potentially unwanted engagements more generally. The only compulsions that had 
found their way into geographical literature are those based on fear by Segrott and 
Doel (2004), and motor and vocal tics driven by urges by Davis et al. (2004). As 
such, compulsive interactions, and unqualified compulsivity more broadly are 
introduced into human geography as a new empirical phenomenon. 
In this context then, how to study a phenomenon that has been claimed entirely by 
medical sciences, a set of logics that adhere to vastly different philosophical values 
and operate under vastly different circumstances to a performative geography? 
Perhaps it is showing of my initial naivety to believe that a medical concept could be 
adopted into a geographical enquiry without redefining it. Indeed, with the 
progression of the literature review, making a geographical approach fit with a 
medical concept would prove less productive and confusing every day. The 
discrepancies between what I knew of Laura’s compulsive interactions, the medical 
rendition of these acts, and geography’s capacity to make sense of embodied 
performativity, were astounding. Even more than expected, the medical and clinical 
sciences and human geography proved hostile to each other; the sciences 
disregarded considerations of the spatial and experiential in their concepts and 
methods, and geography refused a compulsive humanity.  
For a while, it seemed impossible that human geography with an interest in 
performativity and the medical and clinical sciences concerned with Tourette 
syndrome could come together in a productive manner. Exploring a geographical 
rendition of compulsive interactions that would be beneficial to both disciplines, as 
well as those afflicted was easier said than done. The study could have created a 
spatial distribution of compulsive interactions, or a merely descriptive account of the 
bodily context if the medical scientific ontologies and epistemologies had been 
adopted uncritically. However, as this would forego capturing the richness and depth 
of the phenomenon I knew so well, this was not satisfactory. Therefore it required a 
re-imagination and reconceptualization of compulsive interactions as well as the 
bodily and spatial conditions enveloping them. The study ended up developing 
compulsivity as a productive spatial principle that renders people and places 
susceptible to these interactions.  
In the medial and clinical sciences concerned with Tourette’s, the spatiality of 
compulsive interactions had not been considered as an important enough aspect to 
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articulate beyond ‘environmental influences’. It had spiked some interest in the years 
prior to the study (e.g. Woods et al 2009; Capriotti et al. 2013), and it was on this 
premise that Cara Verdellen, PhD had become interested in the project. As clinical 
psychologist with a specialisation in Tourette syndrome she hoped that the project 
could help improve the effectiveness of behavioural therapies beyond the treatment 
rooms. In the capacity of external advisor, she provided oversight and insight to the 
directions clinical considerations of TS research had been developing in. As I do not 
have any medical training, her presence worked as a confirmation of relevance for 
those who were unsure what to expect of the project. Her addition proved especially 
important for the recruitment of participants and the emergence of trusting relations 
with them, as she has been a familiar face within the Dutch Tourette's community. 
Nonetheless, with the development of the methodology, it became clear how 
fundamentally different the social scientific ethics that this study had adopted were 
in comparison to the medical and clinical scientific ethics. This had several 
implications for how the study is set up.  
Firstly, the study refrains from prioritising the premise upon which the compulsive 
interactions have been medicalised. Indeed, as the geographical element articulates 
in the interactions, and not in the diagnosis, the Tourette syndrome as such is not 
the central focus of this study. The diagnosis is only invoked as context within which 
understanding of the interactions has been developed; both academically and 
experientially. The diagnosis also imposes an artificial separation between bodily 
performativity that has been medicalised – and thus denormalised – for which a 
different set of expectations become mobilised. Prioritising the medicalisation would 
have troubled grasping the fluidity with which compulsions slip in ongoing life. Also, 
focussing on the interactions themselves prevents the TS diagnosis to become 
mobilised as a self-referential explanation. In line with this, participants are not 
referred to on their potential capacity as ‘patients’, as this study does not take place 
in a medical context. 
Secondly, and by extension, this research refrains from studying compulsive 
interactions first and foremost on their capacity to cause suffering. The interactions 
are mostly regarded a negative aspect of life, and the outcomes of this study have 
been envisioned to be therapeutic. Nonetheless, Laura and many others I have 
spoken about their compulsive interactions with, refuse to see themselves 
necessarily as victims of their own condition (see also Hollenbeck 2003). According 
to Springer (2013), the potential ambiguity stems from the experience of the 
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premonitory urge; whilst those affected have no control over its emergence, they do 
over their response to them. In other words: they feel compelled to act out what their 
body urges them to do, but as they can suppress the urges to varying extents, most 
people insist on the compulsive interactions to be their decision. Allowing for a 
variety of personal stances about this, the study does not start off with the premise 
of aiming to erase the compulsions, or ‘fix’ the afflicted body. As such, the study 
does not conceive of the compulsions as a priori signs of (dis)ability, (ill)health, 
impairment, or as affirmation of abnormality. In turn, this allows for a fluid and 
situational emergence of suffering, without denial and in full awareness of its 
potential to burden. On this basis, the study adopts a pre-personal ethics of 
unpicking this bodily performance.  
Thirdly, this study aims to open up a space in which those affected can express the 
“affective force” of their experiences, as Callard (2006, pp. 875) articulates it. 
Therefore, the study aims to go beyond raising awareness of the condition’s 
existence, and explanation of what it is. It is hoped that the study facilitates a 
discussion that is heard beyond their community and carries to other realms that can 
be of assistance in coping with the compulsive interactions, and the Tourette’s 
condition more broadly. Instead of necessarily translating their experiences into 
medical language, the study hopes to contribute to the development of an 
experiential vocabulary that captures the richness of individual sense-making 
processes. To this end, the study is geared towards giving those afflicted a platform 
to do it for themselves for a new audience that I think should be aware of them and 
their condition.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The overall aim of this thesis is to enquire in what ways human geography and the 
concept of compulsivity co-emerge, interact, and interrelate. In other words, this 
thesis identifies what can be learned from a spatial perspective of compulsive 
interactions. It intends to reveal how bodies, objects and spaces permit, allow and 
even induce such interactions, as well as the spatial ways those affected negotiate 
the effects by adopting measures that tackle the relations between bodies, objects 
and spaces. Furthermore, the study aims to gives those affected a voice in research 
on and treatment of their condition, and break compulsivity out of medicalised 
spaces and into the realms of the everyday. In turn, the study intends to uncover 
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what compulsivity can uncover about relations between human bodies, objects, and 
spaces when engaging in purposeless, irrational and meaningless ways. As such, it 
aims to unsettle the category of the human in geographical research that does not 
permit such relations. The study also aims to open up geographical enquiry into 
medicalised phenomena without the necessity of adopting medical and clinical 
renditions of the phenomenon. Ultimately, the project intends to demonstrate how 
both geography and compulsivity can be a method rather than only a subject to 
interrogate each other. With these goals in mind, the thesis asks the following 
questions. 
 
Research question 1: How are compulsive interactions, performed by people 
with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis, affected by the bodily environment? 
This question aims to uncover what aspects of the bodily environment are 
responded to during compulsive interactions performed by people with a Tourette 
syndrome diagnosis, and in what circumstances they become ‘interesting’ for those 
afflicted. What kind of compulsive interactions take place with what kind of materials 
and with what body parts? What are the circumstances under which they are 
performed, suppressed, or adapted to better suit a situation? What are the attributes 
of the objects and spaces, and how do these evoke compulsive performativity? 
What do compulsive interactions accomplish, and for how long? Under what 
circumstances do they recur, if at all? This question aims to establish compulsive 
relations between bodies and their environments, and the ways in which the urge 
mediates these relations. 
 
Research question 2: How do people with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis 
negotiate performing compulsive interactions? 
This question seeks to identify spatial elements to the management of performing 
compulsive interactions, and if these can teach us something about the kind or their 
origin. It asks if these negotiations could say anything about the nature of objects, 
spaces, or even the body with which compulsive interactions take place. Looking 
more closely at these negotiations might reflect harmful aspects of the compulsive 
relation between the person and place. Placing negotiations in relation to 
compulsive interactions could also reveal more about the complexity of the way 
those affected anticipate and sustain their involvement in compulsive interactions 
and compulsivity more broadly. 
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Research question 3: What can be learned about the relations between people 
and place from compulsive interactions performed by people with a Tourette 
syndrome diagnosis with and the negotiation of affective environments? 
This question explores what compulsive interactions reveal about personal 
geographies that geographers had not yet considered, and if this could be helpful in 
conceiving aspects of person-place relations that sustain human thriving and 
deterioration. Also, it seeks to address the ways in which compulsivity as so far 
removed from human geography’s long-standing, comfortable attendance to 
meaning, rationality, and intentionality can teach us something about humanity? 
Furthermore, this question also aims to examine human geography’s engagements 
with medicalised performances. As such, the outcomes of this question offer not 
only an interrogation of geography’s acceptance of a stretching of or a challenge to 
the way the category of the human is currently conceptualised, but one with an 
aspect that has been medicalised. 
 
1.5 CAPTURING COMPULSIVE GEOGRAPHIES 
Understanding the spatiality of the performance of compulsivity requires a situational 
onto-epistemology. The study focussed on documenting the unfolding of individual 
compulsive acts. This unfolding then provided information about the circumstances 
upon which the compulsions emerged, and what elements of situations played a 
specific role (e.g. body parts, objects, place aspect). In order to capture this 
unfolding, I kept the situation of the study as open as possible, and left it up to the 
participants to decide with what situations they felt comfortable in performing their 
compulsions. In line with my expectations that were based on having witnessed 
Laura performing compulsivity, and having spoken to others and Cara Verdellen, 
most places with a deep familiarity to the participants became the most prevalent 
research sites. As chosen by the participants, these included the home, car and 
different modes of public transport, supermarkets and shops, natural areas and 
streets, a university building, a café, and a pharmacy. The data collection then 
enveloped a multi-method study carried out over a period of 8 months in various 
places in the Netherlands. Capitalising on Laura’s extensive networks, developed 
through her ongoing involvement with the Dutch Tourette’s foundation (Stichting 
Gilles de la Tourette), I was able to work with 15 people for up to 12 hours per one 
participant, which formed the empirical basis of this study. The study is based on 48 
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meetings and roughly produced 48 hours of interview material, 248 registered and 
observed compulsions, and 10 hours of mobile eye-tracking recording) (see Chapter 
3 Methodology). 
The capturing of the spatiality of the compulsive interactions took place in three 
ways; each method offered documentation of different aspects. They include semi-
structured interviews, participant-observations, and mobile eye-tracking, although 
participants decided how, where, when and for how long they took place. The 
interviews captured the experience of performing compulsions and the urge to do 
so. They proved challenging in some instances; how can you communicate an act 
you have to do but do not want to do or know why you do them? I had anticipated 
participants struggling for the formulation of answers, but was taken aback with the 
vastness of the difficulties it presented. As such, instead of being able to ‘explain’ 
compulsivity on an experiential basis, the study offers the delineations of experience 
in compulsive processes. In turn, this clarified the ways in which and the extent to 
which a person can and does take responsibility over their compulsive acts.  
The participant-observations captured what body parts, objects, and spaces directly 
became involved in the compulsion. They also demonstrated how these interactions 
took place in real-time in between other-than-compulsive2 life, how the presence of 
other people was negotiated, and if and how they camouflaged performing them in 
any way. With this method it became most clear how strong compulsive processes 
unfolded differently between people. Activities had me walking 7 dogs for 2 hours, 
crouched on the floor felting, hanging out in a charity shop, and having lunch with 
partners or children. On two occasions where participants had promised themselves 
and me to not ‘hold back’, they were so disappointed with the amount that ‘came 
out’ that they recorded themselves during an activity that invoked many compulsions 
and sent me the file afterward. On the basis of these recordings and the 
observations, it dawned on me how elusive these interactions are, and that they are 
anything but clear-cut and different from non-compulsive interactions. Despite 
having developed a keen eye for compulsivity through the years of living with my 
sister, on many occasions I had to ask the participant ‘if that was one’. And to my 
astonishment, they were not always sure about the compulsivity of particular acts. 
Compulsions turned out to be more fluid than they were described in the scientific 
literature, as well as in the interviews with the participants themselves. 
                                               
2 In not wanting to invoke a dichotomy, as compulsivity does not have a distinguishable, stable 
‘Other’, I use other-than-compulsivity where a difference needs to be made. 
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Although mobile eye-tracking had been a desired method since the development of 
the research proposal two years prior to the start of the study, it had not been 
planned as comfortable and high quality systems were very expensive. Six months 
into the data collection with the interviews and observations, one of the newest 
systems had been made available to me for two months (see Section 3.3.3). This 
was the Tobii Eye-Tracking Glasses 2, which is a pair of glasses that traces the 
gaze of the wearer and records it against what they are looking at. Therefore I 
consider myself extremely lucky that all people I had worked with before, and those 
becoming involved after were happy - and frankly quite curious! – to do some eye-
tracking sessions with me. As this method captured the unfolding of compulsive 
interactions in real-time and from the first person perspective, it provided invaluable 
information about the circumstances that led up to them. In combination with the 
interviews on the basis of the recordings that allowed participants to recall the 
moment’s sensations and appeal, and decision not to suppress it, this method 
opened up new dimensions of access to the compulsive situation. The 9.5 hours of 
recording this produced captured the intricacies of compulsive engagement with 
amazing depth, which I feel I only have been able to scratch the surface of in this 
research.  
Indeed, as mobile eye-tracking is a relatively new method both in human 
geographical research and on urge-driven compulsivity and Tourette syndrome 
research, this study opens up new methodological possibilities for future research 
that combines them. The qualitative analysis this study conducted of the recordings, 
which had been developed for quantitative analysis might speak to new audiences, 
and contributes to attempts to make manufacturers consider developing software for 
qualitative research. Also, with the combination of the three methods in the 
collaborative social environment shaped, the study offers a new way of conducting 
research based on performative philosophies. As such, it offers a new performative 
methodology on research into medicalised human conditions which is currently 
dominated by narrative methods (e.g. Davidson 2010; Davidson and Henderson 
2010; Donovan 2014; de Leeuw et al. 2017). 
 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is set up to be constructive of finding ways forward between medical and 
clinical sciences of Tourette syndrome and compulsivity and human geography. To 
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this end, it does not study the differences between the approaches to compulsive 
interactions in exhaustive fashion. Rather, it acknowledges the situatedness and 
cultures of the production of medical knowledge (see Philo 2007).  
Chapter 2 on the literature review then starts with an exploration of the medical and 
clinical literature on compulsive interactions that are driven by unqualified urges. 
Rather than uncritically adopting the results, the chapter filters out the general 
tendencies and suggestions of spatial and experiential pronunciation of 
compulsivity. Thereafter, geographies of medicalised performances are explored to 
understand how geographical sub disciplines have rendered the bodily 
performances in accordance with suffering that bares similarities to that produced by 
compulsivity. The third and final section of the literature review establishes 
productive conceptualisations of the relations between human bodies and their 
environments in compulsive interactions.  
Chapter 3 elaborates on the methodology of the study by explaining the research 
ethics, collaboration with the participants, and the application of the methods 
mentioned above. The chapter explains how the focus on the compulsive interaction 
has become embedded within social and material histories. It finishes with 
elaborating on the analysis of all data and in what ways it feeds into the results 
chapter. 
The analysis is presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Chapter 4 elaborates on the 
analysis of the data. It contains a reflection on the ways the medicalisation of the 
participants influenced the study, and an establishment of the compulsive condition 
as experienced to conceptualise it as a geographical phenomenon. Chapter 5 
elaborates on how a geographical conception understands how the body and the 
extracorporeal are rendered by their mutual configuration towards the compulsive 
situation, and how these configurations are negotiated. Chapter 6 analyses how 
compulsive interactions constitute an ecology of particular body-object-space 
configurations that require compulsive interactions for particular kinds of 
stabilisations that have particular durations. These ecologies are explored on their 
effects on negotiations of compulsions and on human thriving beyond them. 
Chapter 7 concludes the study by providing answers to the research questions, 
listing contributions to, and implications for, various aspects of geographies of 
medicalised performances, post-structural and postphenomenological approaches in 
geography, as well as for the medical and clinical sciences of Tourette syndrome. 
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The thesis finishes with offering a research agenda for future research on 
compulsivity. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study aims to reveal how bodies, objects and spaces permit, allow and even 
induce compulsive interactions, and how they are negotiated. In turn, it considers how 
spatial configurations of these elements as constituted by compulsivity may inform 
human spatial relations. In exploring these notions, the thesis turns to academic 
scholarship that provides insights in the performance and spatialities of compulsivity, 
perceptions and similar engagements with bodily environments. It does so by bringing 
together literature from a range of academic disciplines, whilst drawing mostly from a 
number of geographical sub disciplines. The chapter first turns to the medical and 
clinical sciences of Tourette syndrome (Section 2.1), and reviews its engagement with 
urge-driven compulsivity. This broad set of literatures, consisting of neuroscientific, 
psychiatric, and clinical psychological work, provides scientific insights into compulsive 
interactions and negotiations to date. Drawing on these literatures helps to establish 
what is known about compulsive acts, the urges that drive them, as well as in what 
ways bodily performativity and environments have been considered to affect 
compulsive interactions and their negations.  
In the recognition that urge-driven compulsive interactions have not been considered 
outside these medical and clinical contexts, the next section (Section 2.2) explores 
these accounts with geographical literature on medicalised performances that bear 
similarities to compulsive interactions. The section develops the understanding of 
compulsive interactions and their negotiations by considering how these pathologized 
interactions have been rendered spatial, and in what ways bodily environments affect 
their constitution and negotiation. In addition to this body of literature, also literature on 
processes of perception is briefly explored to broaden the understanding of the ways in 
which modes of perception can inform how compulsivity may articulate in body-world 
encounters.  
These findings feed into an engagement with more theoretical geographical work in 
Section 2.3 that allows exploring the spatialities of the performative and non-
representational aspects of the compulsive interaction. Building mostly on post-
structural and postphenomenological literature, the understanding of compulsive 
interactions is developed on its resonance with the bodily environment as mediated 
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through the flesh. To this end, this literature helps to establish the ways in which the 
bodily environment could be understood as affecting compulsions by decentring the 
human. All sections are laced with experiential accounts of compulsive interactions 
provided as scientific publications (Joseph Bliss, Micheal Kane, and Lance Turtle), in 
scientific publications (e.g. Eapen et al. 1994; Miguel et al. 2000), through 
autoethnographic work (Amy Wilensky, Nick van Bloss, and Peter Hollenbeck), and in 
short documentaries (Shane Fistell). This allows measuring the development of the 
argument against the lived experiences of those affected. 
 
2.1 MEDICAL AND CLINICAL RENDITIONS OF COMPULSIVE INTERACTIONS 
 
THERE IS SO LITTLE OF THE GRAND OR NOBLE ABOUT MY CONDITION THAT, WERE IT IN 
MY POWER TO WAVE A WAND AND BANISH TOURETTE FROM HUMANKIND, I WOULD BE 
TEMPTED TO DO SO. YET, I HAVE TO WONDER WHETHER THIS ACTION WOULD TAKE 
SOMETHING OUT OF THE WORLD. 
- HOLLENBECK 2003, NP 
As set out in the Introduction, this thesis aims to unearth how bodily environments 
affect compulsive interactions, how these interactions are negotiated, and what 
implications this understanding has for person-place relations. In order to formulate 
answers to these questions, literature on urge-driven compulsivity needs to be 
reviewed. To date, this phenomenon has only been studied in the medical and clinical 
sciences concerned with the Tourette syndrome diagnosis. However, as stated in the 
Introduction, this is problematic. Indeed, medical and clinical sciences are underpinned 
by positivist onto-epistemologies that produce knowledge of compulsions in terms of 
difference in degree, not kind. As such, these scientific renditions do not centre the 
performance of compulsive interactions, and do not necessarily engage with the lived 
experience, nor the spatiality of compulsive interactions. Therefore, this section reviews 
the medical and clinical literature in ways that helps establish compulsive interactions 
and their negotiations. This literature mainly consists of neuroscientific, psychiatric, and 
(clinical) psychological scholarship. It does so by presenting the rigid conceptual 
framework through which the sciences have captured compulsive interactions before 
turning to the first subsection. This contextualises, and highlights the problems this 
causes for, understanding the relevance of the findings in the medical and clinical 
literature. 
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Medical and clinical conceptualisations frame compulsions in line with the diagnostic 
system, which has major consequences as to what bodily acts are considered to be 
compulsive. The discourse guiding diagnostics involves a categorisation exercise of 
grouping collections of different acts commensurate with particular motivations in 
diagnoses. In turn, these collections are ‘stabilised’ as symptoms, and become 
associated with similar diagnoses. This categorisation exercise is exclusionary in 
essence, hence, what symptoms the Tourette syndrome diagnosis consists of cannot 
overlap with those consigned to the OCD diagnosis. As such, this framework provides 
direction for the approach medical and clinical research undertaken. Therefore, urge-
driven compulsions tends to be part of scientific research on Tourette syndrome. The 
TS diagnosis currently consists of “hav[ing] two or more ‘motor tics’ (for example, 
blinking or shrugging the shoulders) and at least one vocal tic (for example, humming, 
clearing the throat, or yelling out a word or phrase), although they might not always 
happen at the same time” (DSM-5)3. As elaborated on in the Introduction, compulsive 
interactions have then mainly become rendered ‘complex motor tics’. As such, already 
in these reductive conceptualisations, to date, the development of a richer 
understanding of compulsive interactions has been omitted (after Pilgrim 2007; 2013; 
Callard 2014). 
First, Subsection 2.1.1 explores the medical and clinical literature on the current 
understanding of compulsive interactions with the bodily environment, as well as of 
their constitution from the perspective of the person performing them. Thereafter, 
Subsection 2.1.2 explores this literature in terms of the considerations of the effects of 
the bodily environment on these interactions, and identifies different kinds of 
negotiations. As such, this section establishes what it currently known about 
compulsive interactions, attending to Research Question 1, and what knowledge is 
available about the negotiations of compulsive interactions, which helps formulating 
answers to Research Question 2. 
 
2.1.1 Acts / Urges 
In order to understand the spatiality of compulsive acts, this subsection explores the 
medical and clinical literature, which is most relevant for this thesis, on its 
understanding of compulsive interactions and the ways in which they are constituted. It 
                                               
3 The DSM-5 is the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fifth Edition. 
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does so by providing an overview of what aspects of compulsive interaction have been 
studied, and in what ways the findings help construct a performative conceptualisation 
of compulsive interactions. In short, the medical and clinical literature conceive of 
compulsive interactions in the same way as it does simple tics that are shared across 
many people (e.g. eye-blinking and frowning).  
An onto-epistemology with a lack of sensitivity towards difference in kind evokes 
medical and clinical literature to render compulsions ‘highly idiosyncratic’, in recognition 
that they vary strongly over time and between people (e.g. O’Connor et al. 1994; 
Verdellen 2007). Attempts to capture this idiosyncrasy expresses in broad categories; 
touching (e.g. pressing one’s finger into the corner of a table, or clasping a mug), 
ordering (e.g. grouping similar objects, or repositioning objects into a new composition), 
and symmetry and evening-up performances (e.g. arranging objects and bodies in 
such a way that it brings balance, or continues lines in spaces) (Cath et al. 1992; 2001; 
Alsobrook and Pauls 2002; Mansueto and Keuler 2005; Palumbo and Kurlan 2007; 
Robertson and Cavanna 2007; Worbe et al. 2010; Neal and Cavanna 2013; Huisman-
van Dijk et al. 2016; Sambrani et al. 2016). These categories are regarded to take 
place because of the specific material presence of the objects and space. Compulsive 
interactions can also involve counting (Alsobrook and Pauls 2002), ‘self-injurious 
behaviours’ (e.g. burning or cutting one’s own body parts) (Robertson and Cavanna 
2007; Robertson et al. 2008), and ‘mental play’ (e.g. visually aligning objects and 
people, and finger tapping on music) (Cath et al. 2001; Worbe et al. 2010). An example 
of the latter involves Shane Fistell compulsively blowing air close to Oliver Sacks’ 
mouth because he had to ‘touch’ Oliver Sacks’ breath with his own (Rawlence 1996). 
Beste and Münschau (2017) argue that compulsivity does not articulate as a problem 
of the movements that constitute these unanticipated and unwanted interactions, but 
the very experience that they are unanticipated and unwanted. Compulsivity then 
differs from impulsivity (see Shapiro et al. 1988; Cath et al. 1992) and fidgeting (see 
Barash 1974; Farley et al. 2013; Mohiyeddini and Semple 2013; Mohiyeddini et al. 
2013) which are closely related dispositions, but are fundamentally enjoyable when 
incited (Dalley et al. 2011; Voon et al. 2015). Furthermore, urge-driven compulsive 
interactions are suggested to occur alongside compulsions driven by obsessive 
thoughts, fear and anxiety on the basis of portending disaster (George et al. 1993; 
Miguel et al. 2000; Ferrão et al. 2012; Sambrani et al. 2016). Compulsive interactions 
that seek to instate a symmetry or a particular order also seem to be urge-driven only 
(Cath et al. 1992; 2004; Pietrefesa and Coles 2008; Worbe et al. 2010; Neal and 
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Cavanna 2013). The clinical literature thus suggests that these compulsions are 
distinctive experiences (see Mansueto and Keuler 2005). 
The medical and clinical literature distinguish between three kinds of sensitivities that 
relate to the compulsive interaction; the urge to act, ‘not-just-right feelings’, and a 
heightened sensitivity of the bodily surroundings. These sensitivities seem to be 
creative of the person’s disposition to compulsively interact with their surroundings, and 
with becoming more or less intense, they seem to create the conditions upon which a 
person decides to interact. The following conceptualisations are the result of empirical 
research that is severely dominated by male participants4. The urge to interact, or 
‘premonitory urge’, ‘itch’, or ‘pressure’ (Kwak et al. 2003; Cavanna et al. 2017), have 
been argued to be the most important experiential aspect of compulsivity (See Figure 
1). Joseph Bliss (1980) and Michael Kane (1994) explain that on some occasions, the 
urges are palpable, and that they perform tics for temporal relief from these urges. 
They can locate in the body parts that become involved in the compulsive acts, such as 
finger tips, hands, and lips (Patel et al. 2014), as well as in one’s chest or head. Lance 
Turtle elaborates on his experiences of these urges:  
The sensation is that of something welling up inside my head, or 
rather the premonition of something welling up inside my head, 
starting in the center, moving upward, and then seeming to then fly 
out of the top. The feeling will only fly out of the top of my head if I tic; 
this represents completion of the sensation and relief from it (Turtle 
and Robertson, 2008, pp. 451).  
 
                                               
4 Studies with a higher male participation include 19/22 male participants in Brandt et al. 2016; 16/19 in 
Belluscio et el., 2011; 99/118 in Capriotti et al. 2013; 7/9 in Conelea et al. 2008; 8/10 in Conelea et al. 
2011; 399/672 in Conelea et al. 2013; 24/28 in Cohen & Leckman, 1992; 47/72 in Crossley & Cavanna, 
2013; 288/400 in Eapen & Robertson, 2015; 70/100 in Eddy & Cavanna, 2014; 14/15 in Ganos et al. 
2012; 9/10 in Goetz et al. 2001; 144/225 in Huisman-van Dijk et al. 2016; 34/50 in Kwak et al. 2003; 
8/10 in Meucci et al. 2009; 12/20 in Miguel et al. 2000; 46/71 in Neal & Cavanna 2013; 15/23 in 
O’Connor et al. 2009; 33/54 in O’Connor et al. 2001; 311/410 in Robertson et al. 2008; 796/1032 in 
Sambrani et al. 2016; 10/14 in Silva et al. 1995; 11/12 in Specht et al. 2013; 13/18 in Sutherland Owens 
et al. 2011 
Studies with consistent gender balance over the groups they studied include Cath et al. 2001 with 17/32, 
5/10, 9/21 and 11/29; O’Connor et al. 2003 with 38/76.  
Studies with a higher female participation include Taylor et al. 2014 with 310/534 
Undisclosed in Worbe et al. 2010 
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Figure 1: Kind of urge sensations reported by 46 people. Adapted from Kwak et al. 2003 
 
Also narrating his personal experiences, Kane (1994) argues for understanding these 
urges as ‘attentional tics’, because they signal the location of the next compulsions, 
which also demonstrates in neuroimaging research (Peterson et al. 1998). Cavanna 
and Nani (2013, pp. 2) describe very similar sensations in relation to compulsive acts, 
and add that these are “driven by a force triggered by visual, auditory or tactile 
perceptions felt in the body, as well as feelings of imperfection about action and 
intention until the action is felt to be complete in the absence of any obsession, worry 
or fear” (see also Banaschewsky et al. 2003; Capriotti et al. 2013). However, this urge 
is not experienced by all affected people; 46 out of 50 in Kwak et al.’s (2003) study, 
and varies strongly per person. The same study reports 15 of the 43 to experience the 
urge before all tics, 9 before 75% of all tics, 8 before more than 50% of their tics, and 8 
before more than 25% of all tics, and 3 before less than 25% of their tics. Whilst 
relatively ‘simple’ tics (e.g. eye-blinking) do not always seem to be preceded by urges, 
the relative complexity of compulsive interaction does tend to be urged by these 
sensations (Eapen and Robertson 2015). Delaying acting on the urge, or being teased 
or told to stop is experienced with an increase in discomfort (Leckman, et al. 1993; 
Woods et al. 2005; Conelea and Woods 2008; Conelea et al. 2011; Wang et al. 2011; 
Capriotti et al. 2013). These conceptualisations seem to already place an emphasis on 
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the urge being prompted by elements in the bodily environment. Indeed, according to 
Leckman and Riddle (2000, pp. 349) “[t]he range of these cues5 is enormous but highly 
selective for individual patients – a cough, a particular word, an alignment of angles or 
specific shapes.” These premonitory urges can therefore be regarded as directional 
towards the particular aspect of bodily environment having an influence on the body 
(see e.g. Miguel et al. 2000; Swain and Leckman 2005; Crossley and Cavanna 2013; 
Specht 2013; Cox et al. 2018). 
Another sensory aspect related to the performance of compulsive interactions are 
called ‘not-just-right’ feelings. Claimed as distinctly different from obsession related 
feelings, these not-just-right experiences remain unqualified beyond a sense of 
rightness (Ferrão et al. 2012), or as a participant in Miguel et al.’s study (2000, pp. 153) 
explains, feelings of incompleteness and imperfection;  
Worse than the obsessions is the feeling that there is always 
something missing of myself. Very rarely I get rid of this awful feeling 
that I am not complete, that I need to do something in order to fulfil 
myself. 
Similar to the urges, they tend to be experienced prior to compulsive acts, but are 
especially powerful during the performance, as these are experienced to indicate if the 
act is executed well enough and when it is finished (Leckman et al. 1994; Eapen et al. 
1997; Worbe et al. 2010). As such, compulsions are often repeated until they are 
experienced as being executed just right (Leckman et al. 1993; Neal and Cavanna 
2013). Examples include having to step through a doorway, and stepping on a 
flagstone just right. One of the participants in Miguel et al. (2000, pp. 152) elaborate:  
I do not know why I have to check the door locks. I do not have any 
bad thought, image or fear. I just ‘have to’ come back and check them 
over and over again. 
Thus, contrary to urges that are felt in the skin, muscles, bones and/or viscera, not-just-
right phenomena express as thoughts or feelings that are prone to exacerbate with 
stress and emotional instability (Neal and Cavanna 2013). These experiences then 
seem to signal where in the environment something not just right is located, how 
certain aspects of the environment feel ‘wrong’, and how to engage compulsively to 
make it right again.  
                                               
5 ‘Cues’ refer to extracorporeal elements that coalesce or invoke Tourette symptoms in clinical literature  
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Yet another sensory aspect associated with compulsive interactions, as identified by 
medical and clinical sciences is an overall heightened sensitivity to the extracorporeal. 
Conceptualised as hyperattention (Kane 1994) or hypervigilance (Crossley and 
Cavanna 2013) describing the ‘Tourette state’ of feeling “pathologically ‘itchy’” (Bliss 
1980, pp. 806) it makes the person constantly aware of the sensory information that 
would fade away in less sensitive others. For example, remaining aware of the label of 
a sweater throughout the day, or a distortion in the pattern of the wallpaper, which can 
be highly debilitating (Kurlan et al. 1989; Cohen and Leckman 1992; Karp and Hallett 
1996). Such sensitivity is prone to give rise to not-just-right feelings, and is argued to 
lead to heightened self-awareness and perfectionist styles of personal organisation 
(O’Connor 2002). It also expresses in people being bothered by light touches and 
preferred to be held firmly, with some even purposefully engaging in painful activities 
(e.g. pushing the skin back from under a nail) (Belluscio et al. 2011). Peter Hollenbeck 
(2003) elaborates on the challenges in management this causes: 
Bright, shifting lights against a dark background exacerbate many of 
my other motor tics, so I go to great lengths to avoid driving at night. 
When this event is unavoidable, I stay off main streets where the 
noxious stimuli of streetlights and headlights await me.  
Patel et al. (2014) argue that the heightened sensitivity, or sensory intolerance, does 
not originate in enhanced detection in the sensory tissues, but from altered 
sensorimotor processing systems in the brain (see also Hollenbeck 2001; Leckman et 
al. 2006; Cavanna and Nani 2013, Cohen et al. 2013; Sutherland Owens et al. 2013; 
Houghton et al. 2014; Taylor et al. 2014; Schunke et al. 2016). Whilst debates are 
ongoing (see Cox et al. 2018), neurotransmitters are understood to process the 
intensity of sensory information in such ways that it foregrounds “the motor, somatic, 
and perceptual ‘noise’ that is constantly arising from our bodies and from the world that 
we perceive around us” (Leckman et al. 2006, pp. 646). This noise is filtered out of 
experience in non-heightened sensitive others (Abbruzzese and Berardelli 2003; 
Belluscio et al. 2011). Contrary to the urges, heightened sensitivity cannot be reduced 
by compulsive interactions according to Bliss (1980), but the ways in which people 
manage the sensitivity can provoke urges to emerge (Leckman et al. 1993; O’Connor 
2002; Cohen et al. 2013). Similar to those diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders 
(ASDs), this sensitivity can result in particular environments to ‘overload’ a person 
(caused visually by e.g. flashing and fluorescent lights and rapid colour changes) 
(Belluscio et al. 2011). It troubles the ability to make sense of sensory information, as 
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one or more senses ‘shut down’ (Williams 2005), and evokes one to retract into ‘inner 
worlds’ and become ‘meaning-deaf’ to their surroundings (Gerland 2003).  
Whilst the vast majority of medical and clinical scientific literature understands these 
urges to be part of the body as any other kind of sensation, Karp and Hallett (1996) 
argue against this argument. On the basis of experiential accounts from other studies, 
they relocate these sensations from inside to outside the body (see Figure 2).  
 
Joseph Bliss (1980, pp. 1347) explains this as “a mental projection of sensory 
impressions to other persons and to inanimate or even nonexistent objects.” For 
example, he would perceive a “firm cord running down the center [sic] line of the sheet. 
A need appears to apply pressure to this phantom cord by pulling” (ibid.). Bliss also 
describes feeling, not touching an object:  
At times there is a recurring need while writing to press the pencil 
point hard against the surface of the paper. A ‘feel’ is perceived at the 
end of the pencil; in my mind, the point becomes an extension of the 
body, and the ‘feel’ at the point is translated into a TS-sensitised body 
site that demands even greater pressure until the point is broken. 
(ibid.) 
This phenomenon, conceptualised as exosomesthesia (Dieguez and Blanke 2011) 
resembles feelings arising in phantoms limbs, where the empty space the limb used to 
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Figure 2: Locations of urge emergence mentioned by 41 people.  ‘Other’ represents 
extracorporeal locations. Adapted from Kwak et al. 2003 
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be is not only recognised to belong to the body, but in case of a missing foot, one can 
actually feel the pressure of the floor again the phantom skin (Turtle and Robertson 
2008). In effect, this experience captures a dispersal of sensibilities away from the 
body, in which bodily sensing capacities leave the body and take hold in elements of 
the environment. Bliss’ experiences and that of others thus describe an intricate 
sensory entanglement with the bodily environment that cannot be captured in cognition 
alone (Kushner 1999).  
The processes that constitute experience of the relations between the body and its 
environment are understood to expand on cognition with the plethora ways in which 
consciousness of the body is constructed. This consciousness forms a dynamic 
integration of sensory information with other modalities of perception, including 
proprioception (i.e. the localisation of the body in space), motor information (on its 
movements and posture), visceral information (on changes in its internalities) and 
vestibular information (on identification of its parts as belonging to the self) (Legrand 
2006). This integration forms in effect the corporeal awareness, the body schema and 
coenaesthesia, and determines with desires, beliefs, memories and knowledge about 
bodies in general how a body is perceived (Dieguez and Blanke 2011). Disruptions, for 
instance in the vestibular system, could lead to heightened sense of place (Bonnier 
1905 in Dieguez and Blanke 2011). Compulsivity might then have a biological root in 
this integration, which, in turn, may produce a kind of perception that creates the 
sensitivities for compulsive engagement. 
In conclusion, this subsection provided an overview of the current understanding 
offered by the medical and clinical literature on compulsive interactions. This aided the 
thesis in conceptualising compulsive interactions, as well as their constitution from the 
human perspective. It identified the different categories mobilised in clinical research, 
and the sensory phenomena of the urge, not-just-right feelings and heightened 
sensitivity that are found to incite compulsions. Albeit implicitly, this demonstrates the 
resonance of these categories and sensory phenomena with the bodily environment. 
Therefore, this suggests that these sensory phenomena are of crucial importance in 
the particular unfolding of the performance of compulsive interactions. The next 
subsection develops these findings by highlighting how the medical and clinical 
literature have understood and conceptualised the effects of bodily environments on 
compulsive interactions. It also explores how this scholarship can provide insights in 
the negotiations of compulsions. 
 
37 
 
2.1.2 Environments / Negotiations 
This section explores how bodily environments are recognised in the constitution of 
compulsive interactions. As commensurate with the scientific onto-epistemology that 
underpins medical and clinical research, effects of bodily environment have not been 
explored in depth (but see Cohen and Leckman 1992; Woods et al. 2009). As the 
previous subsection concluded, implicitly, the extracorporeal has been recognised as 
playing a role in the way compulsive interactions are constituted. For example, Conelea 
and Woods (2008) suggest that environments may play a role in the waxing and 
waning of tics and possibly also of compulsions, and Cavanna and Nani (2013) argue 
the extracorporeal works in both conscious and unconscious manners. To date, very 
few attempts have been made to conceptualise the extracorporeal (see Goetz et al. 
2001), which is unfortunate, because experiential narratives of Bliss (1980), Kane 
(1994), and Hollenbeck (2003) explicitly argue the bodily surroundings to be of 
importance in the expression of their urges-driven phenomena. These accounts are 
analysed in the other two sections of the literature review. In these medical and clinical 
sciences, the concept ‘environment’ itself captures anything outside the brain and 
nervous system, and can include food, medication, in addition to the broad categories 
of the social and activities and spaces these are associated with. As the latter two 
instate interactions between the body and its environment, the literature on these 
matters are explored further.  
Activities such as eating, studying, working, and reading are often bound to specific 
places and spatial situations and seem to affect all urge-driven movements and 
utterances (Christenson et al. 1993; Othmer 1996) in addition to cognitive processes 
(O’Connor et al. 2001). The situation of the body is understood to limit the range of 
possibilities, for instance doing computer work in one room permits having to order 
items on the desk and prevents having to touch the stairs (Miltenberg et al. 1998; 
O’Connor et al. 2003). Additionally, quiet activities in classrooms, such as reading 
tasks, have been found to increase tic frequency (Watson et al. 2005). Also the 
absence of activities in the presence of boredom and stillness of the body is associated 
with an exacerbation of tics, which may include compulsive interactions (Robertson et 
al. 2002; Eapen et al. 2004; Barnea et al. 2016; Godar and Bortolato 2017). Although 
not remarking on an inclusion of compulsions, Silva et al. (1995) conducted a study 
seeking to identify differences in tic frequency and severity related to ‘environmental 
factors’. It included very broadly defined, overlapping activities that severely differed in 
duration. Examples included sports, talking to a friend, living away from home, and 
being alone. Despite their results being largely inconclusive, differences in bodily 
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environments did articulate a difference in tic performance. However, the study does 
not analyse or suggest how these differences could be understood in terms of bodily 
environments and urge management, or what consequences this has for the origins of 
urge driven phenomena, including compulsive interactions. 
The few clinical studies that do register a difference in kind, report it as a side effect of 
a particular methodology, or conceive of it as a case study that serves as illustration 
(e.g. Mansueto and Keuler 2005). The former occurred in the study of Goetz et al. 
(2001) who tested a video method as enhancing tic treatments. In addition to 
performing a fourfold of tic frequency, their participants performed different kinds of tics 
in the ‘home’ environment compared to the ‘doctor’s office’ environment. These 
different kinds of tics were mainly performed when the participant was alone, which 
was attributed to the shame they caused. The video method rendered the body static, 
which therefore could not capture any interactions that would be performed when 
mobile.  
The latter occurred in Eapen et al.’s (1994) study, which describes a woman affected 
by coaches. Seeing, or even just imagining one resulted in her having to close her 
eyes, count to 10 in a number of ways, go home, shower, and change her clothes. It 
also reported a man who had to rub something when touching another person, as well 
as touch and fold objects. Leaving the spatial circumstances largely unchallenged, it 
argues for considering a continuum between ‘internal and external stimuli’. 
Remarkably, compulsive interactions are claimed to originate in ‘internal stimuli’ (i.e. 
tingling feelings in the body or urges), whilst tics were found to originate in ‘external 
stimuli’ (i.e. hearing a cough) which would be conceived of as echo and 
coprophenomena6. Thus, differences in kinds of compulsions (and tics) that seem to be 
related to the environments they take place in seem to be analysed on cognitive and 
sensory terms, and not on environmental terms. Furthermore, places with specific 
cultural norms are prone to invoke compulsions, such as having to touch a painting in a 
museum. Cohen et al. (2013) describe a physicist who, during WWII, had to quit his job 
because whenever he saw the sign “Danger High Voltage,” he had the strong urge to 
touch the machine. Such findings point at the direct surroundings being associated with 
an increase in frequency and severity of compulsions.  
                                               
6 Echo-phenomena assemble echolalia; repeating sounds voices or words vocally, and echopraxia; 
repeating another person’s movements. Coprolalia involves swearing and using inappropriate language to 
the situation, and copropraxia captures making obscene gestures, such as pulling the finger, and doing the 
Nazi salute.  
39 
 
Negotiating compulsive interactions both often results in stress, anxiety and frustration 
(e.g. Bornstein et al. 1990; O’Connor et al. 1994; Silva et al. 1995; Robertson et al. 
2002; O’Connor, et al. 2003; Woods et al. 2009; Eapen et al. 2004; Conelea and 
Woods 2008b; Singer 2013). This articulates in daily life, rather than major life events 
(Findley et al. 2003; Conelea et al. 2011; Springer 2013), and on an hourly (Silva et al. 
1995; Leckman et al. 2006), rather than weekly basis (Silva et al. 1995; Hoekstra et al. 
2004). The articulation of temporality in negotiating compulsive interactions in medical 
and clinical literature is further reinforced by effects the presence of particular other 
people can have. Depending on the understanding familiar people of a variety of social 
relations have of compulsive interactions (see Meucci et al. 2009), compulsions are 
being suppressed or not (Capriotti et al. 2013). In the presence of unfamiliar others, 
those afflicted are found to suppress more often, which in turn increases the urge 
sensations (Leckman and Cohen 1999; Goetz et al. 2001; O’Connor et al. 2001; 
Specht et al. 2013). Social tensions that cause one to suppress can be so pervasive 
that, for instance, Nick van Bloss (2006) only felt comfortable enough to perform his 
compulsive interactions in an unrestrained manner alone in his bedroom. Indeed, the 
immediacy of a situation also pronounces an increase in frequency and severity in 
heightened anticipation (Wood et al. 2003), thermal stress (Lombroso et al. 1991), and 
mornings (Silva et al. 1995). None of these studies make distinctions between different 
kinds of compulsive interactions. 
Negotiations of compulsive interactions in the medical and clinical literature is offered 
on a structural basis through pharmacotherapy and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT), and on a momentary basis with behavioural therapies, and bodily adjustments. 
The kind and circumstances under which such strategies are mobilised may also reveal 
what elements of the surroundings are most poignant and difficult to cope with. No 
specific traditional medicine has been developed for urge-driven conditions, therefore 
drugs7 with pervasive effects are prescribed (see Lombroso and Scahill 2008; 
Shprechter and Kurlan 2009). Success rates vary strongly, and it is not (yet) clear how 
medication works, but testimonies include the experiential reduction in amount and 
severity of all sensory phenomena and thus compulsive interactions, as well as weight 
gain, apathy, and lethargy (Verdellen 2007; Shprechter and Kurlan 2009). In some 
countries, cannabinoids containing Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) can also be 
prescribed. To date, they have found to be inconsistent but promising in their 
seemingly more targeted influence, and causing less general apathy compared to 
                                               
7 These include dopamine receptor blockers, neuroleptic and a-typical antipsychotics, and depend on the 
kind and multitude of diagnoses. 
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traditional medication (Müller-Vahl et al. 2003; Curtis et al. 2009; Müller-Vahl 2013). 
Pharmacotherapies would therefore suggest that the experience of one’s body and its 
surroundings is a crucial aspect in the performance of compulsive interactions. CBT 
attempts to breaks the psychophysiological chain between urges and compulsive 
interactions through functional analysis and management of this relation (Verdellen et 
al. 2004; 2007; O’Connor et al. 2009). This therapy does therefore not regard 
compulsions as ‘loss of control’ over the body, but as fulfilment of perfectionist needs 
that coincides with not-just-right feelings (O’Connor et al. 2002). As such, CBT would 
suggest that disorder as such is found to be easily problematic.  
Behavioural therapies Habit Reversal Training (HRT) and Exposure/Response 
Prevention (E/RP) take a more momentary, embodied and affective approach to 
negotiating compulsive interactions. In both therapies suppression is rewarded and 
disruption of compulsions is encouraged (Shprechter et al. 2009). HRT provides a set 
of bodily techniques to prevent compulsive movements, such as keeping the arms 
folded tightly together when the urge emerges to touch something (Azrin and Nunn 
1973). With this therapy, people are encouraged to immobilise the body in such a way 
that it restricts responding to the urge. E/RP also aims to interrupt the urge-compulsion 
sequence by tolerating the uncomfortable urge sensation (exposure) until it fades away 
(response prevention) (Verdellen 2007; Verdellen et al. 2008). Through practice the 
discomfort of urge sensation is found to decrease in both therapies (Specht et al. 
2009). As such, they are punitive measures for compulsions in the ways they provide 
bodily means to intervene in compulsive processes, and promote ‘self-control’ (see 
Miltenberger and Fuqua 1985; Mansueto and Keuler 2005). Recently, relaxation 
techniques, including mindfulness, that also promote urge toleration also report early 
successes (Reese et al. 2015; Gev et al. 2016). In effect, they desensitise the person 
to sensory phenomena, and thereby reduce compulsions (but see Houghton et al. 
2017). As such, these therapies focus on the urge, and the way compulsivity is 
performed is less important, as the movements themselves are not found to be the 
problem (see Beste and Münschau 2017). Nonetheless, these coping strategies can 
only capture compulsions that become visible with static bodies in clinical settings, 
easily captured in words, and resemble tics in their short duration and lack of 
complexity. Therefore, these professional strategies locate negotiations of compulsions 
entirely with the body and cognition. As such, potential environmental elements that 
could help coping have not been considered. 
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In the ways those affected have learned to negotiate their compulsive interactions, the 
environment is acknowledged and actively used. Basing his study on participant 
experiences, O’Connor (2002) conceptualised three strategies; ‘containment’, 
‘correction’ and ‘concealment’. During containment, compulsions are suppressed by, 
for instance, adopting a posture that prevents the performance. When correcting, 
compulsive movements are redirected into other-than-compulsive acts. With 
concealment, compulsions are performed whilst not appearing compulsive, are hidden 
underneath baggy clothes, and work through people avoiding a situation in which 
compulsions might have to be performed. Indeed, 38.4% of participants in Conelea et 
al. (2013) study even actively avoid public places, and Peter Hollenbeck (2003) avoids 
using a phone because he finds it very difficult to speak whilst calling, which requires 
him to visit colleagues in their offices. With correction and concealment those afflicted 
assert that “If I keep it in, it will build up and I’ll have to let it out later one way or 
another since I can’t contain it.“ (O’Connor 2002, pp. 1134). The individual practices 
people adopt thus register a far more active use of the situation and the bodily 
environment than professional medical aid; both in terms of negotiations of urges and 
compulsion performance, and in terms of anticipation of compulsive interactions. 
Potentially problematic in the consideration of bodily surroundings is that professional 
therapies reframe compulsive interactions in such a way that environmental attendance 
is no longer regarded a coping strategy.  
 
2.1.3 Section conclusions 
Conceptualisations of compulsive interactions in the medical and clinical sciences, to 
date, have consisted of broad categories that reflect them as action rather than 
interactions. Such conceptions holds people entirely responsible for their 
performances, which is at odds with the experience of the sensory phenomena. 
Especially the urge to compulsively act being experienced to locate in a range of body 
parts as well as in the extracorporeal, if experienced at all. Studies in the medical and 
clinical sciences demonstrate a limited understanding of, and analytical interest in, 
bodily environments affecting compulsive interactions, despite implicit invocations of 
potential impact. Indeed, some bodily environments, such as the home as social and 
familiar space, seem to invoke or allow compulsions to be performed. Nonetheless, in 
line with the scientific onto-epistemology, bodily surroundings are understood as inert 
and passive, and differences between places are treated as a given. Furthermore, the 
kinds of activities the body becomes involved in seem to have a directional effect on 
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the compulsions that are made possible, as well as the way in which the body is 
experienced. This immediate and situated appreciation of the body is also used in the 
ways those affected negotiate their compulsions, despite articulating far less in the 
professional medical support offered.  
The kind of scientific research that compulsive interactions have been part of focuses 
strongly on elements that can be – or otherwise have become – measurable and 
correlative – rather than causal – in relationship. In addition, its evidence-based 
premise that prioritises observation over experience, as well as its assumed 
universality of the body – and brain – produces a particularly thin, broad, and therefore 
vague consideration of the compulsive interactions, which is not particularly informative 
for this study. Indeed, the medical and clinical sciences have conceptualised 
compulsivity as an exclusively cognitive – rather than affective – phenomenon (Hacking 
2010). Whilst this has shaped a language that successfully captures the doctor’s and 
therapist’s working practices, it has failed to extend beyond these into the greater 
experiential dimension (Bankey 2004; Greenhough 2011) and apprehend compulsive 
interactions in their complexity (Clegg et al. 2013). The hesitation of the medical and 
clinical sciences to study difference in kind of compulsions and quality of urges, leaves 
a large gap that this study might contribute to filling up. An emphasis on kind through 
an experiential and spatial onto-epistemology may change this.  
In responding to the research questions, this literature suggests that compulsive 
interactions are mainly performed as touching, ordering, symmetry seeking acts, and 
mental play, and involve objects. They are sustained by three sensory processes, are 
suggested to respond to particular kinds of spaces, with an extra sensitivity to the 
home. Also, negotiations identified seem to take place through situations of the body 
on the basis of visibility, abolishing particular interactions, and reducing responsiveness 
to the urge, in which the bodily environment was not regarded to play a role. As such, 
this literature suggests that the compulsive aspect of the interactions is mediated 
through the body and that experience plays an important part in the unfolding of 
compulsive engagement and its negotiation. The next section develops these findings 
further by exploring in what ways a geographical approach can help conceive of the 
effects of bodily environments on compulsive interactions, as well as their negotiations, 
and how this informs conceptions of person-place relations. Particular attention is paid 
to the embodiment of the interactions and how the bodily environment comes to appear 
during compulsions. 
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2.2 EMBODYING COMPULSIVITY AND PERCEPTION 
The previous section has analysed compulsive interactions through engagement with 
the medical and clinical scientific literature. This research suggested the broad 
categories, the involvement of sensory processes, and the probability of effects of the 
situational circumstances. This literature placed the responsibility of compulsive 
interactions, and therefore also their negotiation, exclusively with the human. Such lack 
reduces those who engage with their surroundings compulsively to their brain, 
collections of behavioural measures, and diagnoses, and ignores intricate knowledge 
of their body and its constituencies. In effect, this is largely at odds with experiential 
accounts, and omits possibilities to engage with the effects of bodily environments in a 
geographical sense, which is the aim of this thesis. In order to understand how 
compulsive interactions are performed and negotiated, the study turned to experiential 
and spatial dimensions in human geographical literature. As argued in the Introduction, 
human geographical work is underpinned by the conviction that phenomena can be 
explained by their spatial embedding (Holloway and Hubbard 2000). In particular, with 
a well-established interest in the spatial processes that involve the body, could further 
inform the thesis.  
This thesis focuses on compulsive interactions that are analysed on the spatiality of 
their constitution and effects, as well as on the conditions upon which the negotiations 
of the interactions take place. Therefore this section does not analyse existing 
geographical scholarship on spatialities involving or about compulsions, which includes 
geographical literature that discusses spatialities of disability, abnormality and ill-health 
as such (see e.g. Pinder 1995; Kobayashi 1997; Gleeson 1999; Corker and 
Shakespeare 2002; Michalko 2002; Price and Shildrick 2002; Barnes and Mercer 2004; 
Curtis 2004; Watson 2004; Gregory et al. 2009). Rather, this thesis explores how 
compulsive interactions emerge from and produce spatialities, and how they are 
formed by, related to, and reflect the embodied situation (see e.g. Iwakuma 2002; Moss 
and Dyke 2003; Philo 2007; Bissell 2010; Chouinard et al. 2010; Davidson and 
Henderson 2010; MacPherson 2010; Schillmeier 2010; Duff 2011; Andrews et al 2012; 
Hall and Wilton 2016). 
The medicalised dimension of compulsive interactions has sparked very little interest in 
non-medical academic disciplines. This includes human geography, as compulsivity or 
urge-driven phenomena have not explicitly been part of geographical enquiry (but see 
Davis et al. 2004, and Segrott and Doel 2004). Therefore, the spatial and experiential 
dimensions of medicalised bodily performativity that bear similarities with compulsivity 
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help explore in what ways compulsive interactions are constituted and negotiated, and 
what this might teach us about person-place relations. Therefore, the following review 
of the geographical literature allows for the preservation of potential differences in kind 
of performance and experience thereof, as well as their momentary and situational 
aspects. Subsection 2.2.1 does so by focussing on empirical research into medicalised 
bodily performativity that shares aspects with compulsive interactions. These include 
urge-driven tics, fear-driven compulsions, sensory overloads in those with ASD, and 
overwhelming environments in delusions and phobia, and have been explored through 
a range of phenomenological epistemologies in which the body takes a central role. 
They seek to map the embodied life worlds they produce to unearth ‘alternative’ ways 
of ‘knowing the world’ (Wilton 1998; Chouinard 1999; Hansen and Philo 2007; 
Davidson and Orsini 2013). Subsection 2.2.2 develops these insights by rendering 
them through processes of perception. For instance, Temple Grandin (2005, pp. 67 in 
Despret 2013) argues to take autistic experiences of the world serious as “We’re 
seeing, hearing, and feeling all the things no one else can”, which can challenge “the 
often taken-for-granted ways in which we inhabit our bodies, construct boundaries and 
make creative use of the world around us.” (Segrott and Doel’s (2004, pp. 610). This 
supports the thesis by identifying how the bodily environment comes to appear and 
how it becomes affective. 
 
2.2.1 Medicalised performances and spatial experience 
In the absence of geographical engagement with compulsive interactions, this section 
explores medicalised conditions that share certain aspects of compulsivity. These 
conditions are mainly derived from their recognition as closely related from a diagnostic 
perspective, but also in terms of shared aspects of life worlds. The geographical 
analysis of these conditions is explored and related to experiential accounts of those 
performing compulsive interactions. The only geographical engagements with Tourette 
syndrome registers motor and vocal tics. As part of a social geography, they have been 
conceived of as disruptive “to the order and health of public spaces” (Davis et al. 2004, 
pp. 104). Buckser (2006; 2008) drawing on this implicates the situational in exploring 
the effects of the unintentional appearance of tics. These studies demonstrate how 
‘ticcing bodies’ are perceived by ‘non-ticcing’ bodies, and flag up what social 
dimensions negotiations of compulsions might be based on. The more disruptive the 
tics are, and the less intentional they look, the stronger disapproving responses might 
be. Even when such response is not as strong as expected, the anticipation already 
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intensifies the urge suppression anxieties in order to adhere to the “script of a healthy 
body” (Davis et al. 2004, pp. 111). By extension, this would suggest that compulsive 
interactions invoke different responses, which, in turn, can be anticipated and on the 
basis of which become suppressed. Unfortunately, there is no geographical or remotely 
spatial social scientific study on urge-driven phenomena. The following literature 
attends to similar medicalised performances, which includes fear-driven washing 
compulsions, heightened sensitivity as experienced by those with a ASD diagnosis, 
mania, as well as agoraphobia, delusional perceptions of, and toxic relations with the 
bodily environment. This informs the thesis by the spatial and experiential conditions 
upon which urge-driven compulsions and their negotiations take place 
Anticipation also seems to be a key part in fear driven compulsions performed by those 
with an OCD diagnosis. Segrott and Doel (2004) focussed on washing compulsions 
driven by fears of contamination by regarding the expression as embodied spatial 
practices in everyday places. They translated these practices into the use of spaces 
and objects in a creative sense, providing an intricate picture of daily struggles in the 
house, as well as public spaces. For instance, ‘OCD sufferer’ Jane (Ibid. pp. 602-603) 
had to take off her shoes and clothes, place them in a bin bag in the hallway and throw 
away the food she had bought. She had become convinced that she had stepped in 
dog excrement and that this had contaminated the food, so she had to retreat to bed 
because she only feels safe there. It demonstrates the extent to which fear compels 
people to perform these compulsions to feel as comfortable as possible.  
Washing compulsions thus seem to be profoundly spatial in their articulation of 
relations between the body and the house, as different body parts and house ‘zones’ 
become involved at different times and rhythms of the day. Additionally, spaces of ‘high 
circulation’ such as the library and public transport were therefore incredibly hostile 
environments for Jane. The accumulation of compulsions as well as the anticipation for 
them then actively creates ‘geographies of fear’, around which the body, other people, 
objects and other aspects of daily life become meticulously organised. As people who 
perform urge-driven interactions emphasize the repetitive and routine aspect of their 
compulsions (e.g. Eapen et al. 1994; Shane Fistell 2012), perhaps such ‘zoning’ of 
places and ‘compulsive associations’ with objects are not unthinkable.  
The study demonstrates that although washing compulsions seem excessive and 
irrational, they are produced within a set of relations stemming from fears that do not 
differ very much from other-than-compulsive fears. However, as Segrott and Doel 
(2004) argue, “the difference between efficacy and excess is over-determined by the 
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difference between choice and necessity” (p. 599). Nonetheless, conceptualising 
compulsions as spatial practices renders them purposeful and wanted beyond 
abolishing fear. Additionally, this does not reflect experiences of Bliss (1980) and the 
other person in Karp and Hallett’s (1996) study, who feel overpowered by objects that 
become part of their urge-driven compulsions. Such conceptualisations, therefore, 
regard compulsions to be instigated entirely by the human, and the objects with which 
they take place static and uninfluential to the constitution and negotiation of 
compulsions outside the direct interaction. 
People with an ASD diagnosis report sensory experiences similar to those performing 
compulsions. Especially autobiographical narrations on feeling overwhelmed by, and 
becoming ‘meaning-deaf’ to, the bodily surroundings. This produces difficulties in the 
comprehension and prediction of environments because of their apparently incessantly 
changing appearance. Davidson and Henderson (2010) argue that spaces fail to form a 
unity as objects between themselves do not seem to relate in any way. As a result, 
these people do not only have difficulties in positioning themselves in environments, 
but also relating these to other environments (Mills 2008). This “is like living in a social 
and environmental fog” (Darius 2002, pp. 18, in Davidson and Henderson 2010), in 
which any kind of meaningful performance feels out of place. These relationships are 
forged, but then in a way that does not involve meaning, as Gerland (2003, pp. 21, in 
Davidson and Henderson 2010) explains: “If my mother said something in a violet-
coloured way in the kitchen and two months later used that violet tone of voice in the 
bathroom, I suddenly realized that the kitchen and the bathroom had something to do 
with each other.” Spatial perceptions on the basis of sensory processes are better 
indicated with spaces rather than places, as the meaningful aspect that makes space a 
place is absent (see Massey 2000; Cresswell 2004). These rich and materially very 
detailed conceptions of spaces also reflect how Van Bloss (2006) and Kane (1994) 
perceive spaces; as made up of object collections and details of spaces that may or 
may not be just-right. When not overwhelmed by their surroundings, those performing 
urge-driven compulsions do not seem to have problems recognising spaces.  
Other medicalised experiences of environments that have effects on people 
conceptualise different dimensions of embodied person-place relations that may 
indicate how compulsive engagement could be thought of. Mania, which is a 
phenomenon experienced by those diagnosed with bipolar disorder, can see people 
perform interactions that seem irrational (Chouinard 2012). Hornbacher (2008, pp. 38) 
describes  
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My mind is racing ahead and I chase it, writing as fast as I can, failing 
heart stuttering, body disappearing. I can do anything. Nothing can 
stop me. I’m a flurry of motion, sitting on the floor of my bedroom arms 
flying, shuffling papers into piles, brain racing, reading snippets of 
writing… Making rapid little red-pen marks on the pages, cutting and 
pasting, short of breath, pulse pounding, I am back in my element, 
where I can do a thousand things at once, fuelled by the rabid energy 
triggered by the booze, no food, no sleep. 
It seems to be an account of a body that is entangled with its constituencies in ways 
that do not serve a purpose beyond the manic situation, and in which objects seem to 
channel the energy of her ‘racing’ mind. A compulsive interaction might evoke similar 
experiences, but last a lot shorter. 
In agoraphobia, surroundings are experienced to impose on people in their invocation 
of disturbing “sensation[s] of infinite vastness” (Blodgett 1887 in Callard 2006, pp. 876). 
Spaces seem to be experienced as undefinable and unbounded entities that torment 
people in the exposure it forces upon them (Davidson 2007). Especially larger, open 
spaces seem to paralyse the body and prohibit its performativity to do anything other 
than leaving it (Davidson 2000a; 2000b; 2003). Compulsive experiences might align 
here in the way the relation between the body and its environment evokes such a 
powerful response, and is mediated to reduce the anxiety. Hester Parr (1999) studied 
people who experienced harrowing delusions in which the spaces they resided in 
became so pervasive that they erased the experience of having a body in the space 
they resided altogether, which induced doubt over one’s very existence. Perhaps 
delusional experiences might resemble the feeling of the urge when it emerges in an 
object; what materiality belongs to the body and what to the objects and space one is in 
might refrain from becoming clear. 
Geographical literature on similar interactions and experiences have registered a 
plethora of negotiating practices that mobilise the bodily environment in a number of 
ways. These practices also include taking medication, which according to ASD author 
Lawson (2005, pp. 67 in Davidson and Henderson 2010) feels as if “[her] very lifeblood 
felt sucked dry and [she] had no desire to relate to anyone or anything”. She argues 
that it ‘turned down the volume’ of her experiences: not just the sensory dimension, but 
also the emotional one. This is very similar to how Tourette’s authors Amy Wilensky 
(1999) and Nick Van Bloss (2006) express their experiences of taking medication. 
Negotiation practices also include managing the presence of more or less familiar 
people in particular places. Those with fear-driven compulsions may ask others they 
share their house with to comply with particular systems and rules by not altering object 
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arrangements that can disrupt routines, or actively participating in these routines 
(Segrott and Doel 2004). A culture around objects and spaces might not be relevant in 
urge-driven compulsions apart from instances in which household members become 
part of them. Suppression helps negotiating public spaces with many unfamiliar others  
(Wilensky 1999; Davis et al. 2004) as every twitch or noise opens up possibilities of 
others to comment on the expressed behaviour (Handler 1998). 
Objects have also been identified as central to negotiating the performance of 
unwanted acts and/or mediating adverse experiences. In ASDs objects are used to 
retain a focus on the body in order to cope with the anxieties of not knowing 
environments. In addition to humming softly (Lawson 2005), this can involve keeping 
the body in motion by body rocking (Cowhey 2005), and holding familiar objects in sight 
(Davidson 2010). In the case of obsessive washing compulsions, objects become 
ordered by their levels of dirtiness or enact a regime, and in turn, render spaces more 
or less contaminated, which determines the kind of activity possible (Segrott and Doel 
2004). Well-ordered and systematic placements of objects diminishes fears because a 
disordered system resembles a dirty system that allows for contamination (Douglas 
1966, in Segrott and Doel 2004). Also, stemming from a shared visual hypersensitivity 
to patterns with OCD (O’Connor 2002), urge driven compulsions ‘restore’ the 
organisation of environmental elements in accordance to these patterns. Accordingly, 
objects that act in a system, being rationalised, become de-animated, de-spiritualised 
and denied of the capacity of a subject (Bauman 1992). Indeed, centralising the 
scattered effects of visually disordered objects by placing them in a group diminishes 
the influences of individual objects; a strategy also recommended for autistic people 
(Williams 2005). Granting the possibility for controlling and predicting spaces, other-
than-compulsive ordering seems to decrease tension (Davidson 2003; Segrott and 
Doel 2004).  
These adverse experiences and having to perform unwanted acts in these studies 
reflect negotiations of these disturbing acts in terms of person-place relations. This 
differs from the strongly bodily oriented negotiation practices the medical and clinical 
sciences have argued compulsions to invoke. These spatial relations articulate strongly 
in the case of Environmental Illness (EI), which registers individuals to “react adversely 
to everyday chemicals in the environment at levels politically conceived to be ‘safe’” 
(Coyle 2004, pp. 62). Those affected manage their sensitive body by managing their 
environment by modifying it to such an extent that it is considered a ‘safe space’. Only 
in such a space, which “should ideally be stable, predictable, controllable and 
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communicative (Coyle 2004, pp. 62), these people can thrive. Although this condition is 
not necessarily related to bodily interactions in the same way as compulsions are, it 
may suggest that altering environments may help to reduce compulsive engagements. 
Indeed, as O’Connor (2002) remarked, many of his participants follow strict routines, so 
as to exert as much control over the situation as possible. 
The geographical literature on medicalised conditions is mostly based on 
psychoanalysis, in which actions and experiences are interpreted. Nonetheless, 
compulsive interactions as well as the sensory phenomena seem not to be analysable 
in this way. Apart from the confusing not-just-rightness (O’Connor 2002) and the 
allusion to perfecting the execution of compulsions, they are not perceived as troubling 
the self beyond not wanting to perform them (Robertson 2000). Compulsions are then 
also not a matter of ‘bodily control’, for they are performed voluntarily and only in 
response to an urge that is not psychosomatic. Hence, psychoanalysis of compulsions 
does not help understanding their spatiality (Kuschner 1999). Only the effects of 
particular compulsive engagement might then be understood to relate to the self, for 
instance, compulsively touching or ordering other people (see Van Bloss 2006).  
This subsection expanded on a number of ways in which the different medicalised 
sensitivities, performances, and anxieties orchestrate daily life with a condition related 
to compulsivity. This geographical literature contributes to understanding the 
experiences of the body, objects and spaces during the moments in which compulsivity 
and related conditions articulate most strongly. As these studies are conducted in 
social and cultural theoretical traditions, they are focused on the anxieties, rather than 
the actualised bodily performances from which these anxieties stem. The rich 
experiences of performing medicalised acts in the spaces they emerge with suggests 
that the way the bodily environment comes to appear is crucial in the unfolding of 
medicalised performances. For Research Questions 1 and 2, this suggests that 
compulsive interactions could be conceived to be related to the particularities of objects 
and spaces, and these may be directional in the ways in which these relations are 
negotiated. With regards to Research Question 3, this section suggests that 
compulsive interactions might be resonating strong situational attractions and 
repellences. As this body of literature suggests that the experience of the particularities 
of objects and spaces excite these effects, the next section explores literature that 
engages with the bodily environment through processes of perception. This allows 
conceiving how object and space particularities relate to bodily capacity and come to 
articulate in compulsive interactions. 
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2.2.2 Bodies / Perception 
In placing experiences of sensitivities and performances related to urge-driven 
compulsive interactions, this subsection reviews literature on the bodily aspect during 
the performance. In particular, it reviews literature on the ways in which bodies8 are 
perceived to relate to their environments during action. As such, this subsection 
reviews the literature to understand how compulsive interaction might emerge from 
processes of perception, and, as such, ‘find entrance’ in other-than-compulsive life. 
The section does so by retrieving bodies from their medicalisation and the diagnostic 
structures through which the experiences in the previous subsection have been 
conceived of. In phenomenologically oriented literature, bodies become the means to 
knowing the ‘self’ through their sensory, affective perceptual markers that instate 
relation with other human beings, objects, spaces (e.g. Seamon 1980; Rose 2006). 
However, in compulsive interaction with these extracorporeal entities such markers 
precisely do not register the self, as this kind of engagement does bear no semblance 
to memory, or coherency, of a subjectivity. Even the potentially repetitive aspect of 
compulsions which would catalyse knowledge of the self (Degnen 2013), they seem to 
produce the opposite: a rupture in self-knowledge. Indeed, compulsive engagement is 
characterised by its experiential lack of recognisable associations with other humans, 
objects or spaces (see Bliss 1980). 
The rupture in self-knowledge through the body occurring with the urge emergence and 
compulsion being performed can be analysed through Leder’s (1990) 
conceptualisations of the corporeal field, corporeal foci and focal demands. Corporeal 
foci invokes the collection of locations on the body that require attention during an 
activity (e.g. fingers whilst touching). The corporeal field entails all possibilities for 
corporeal action, which can be divided when multiple actions take place at the same 
time when focal demands compete (e.g. driving and cooking) versus focal demands 
that do not (e.g. writing and eating). Leder draws on Ricoeur (1966) who argues that 
the body recedes from conscious experience and into the object the action is 
performed with, and Zaner (1981) who claims that body parts that are not involved in 
an activity enlist in a background attitude and leave awareness. Compulsivity would 
                                               
8 This study is in the full acknowledgement that a generalised understanding of ‘the’ body does not exist 
(see e.g. Butler, 1990; Haraway, 1991; Gatens, 1991), and that any invocation of such generalisation is 
truer to a more masculine, heterosexual, white, middleclass experience of bodies (see Longhurst, 2010, 
Stark, 2016), as a feminist and racial ‘re-culturing’ of bodies has not taken place in the medical and 
clinical sciences and in many philosophies of consciousness. This study does not seek to further universal 
invocation of the body, therefore, it refers to the body in the plural where such considerations are 
required. 
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then express in two ways. First, other-than-compulsive activities that require a specific 
set of corporeal foci, effectively ‘silencing’ others, sudden urge emergence redirects 
focus to the body part – or extracorporeal entity – in need of compulsive engagement 
on the other-than-compulsive activity. Secondly, some corporeal foci seem not to 
recede from experience; mainly pertaining to those involved in touching (Karp and 
Hallett 1996). Problematic is the rather territorial understanding of the body and its 
constituencies, as well as the lack of appreciation for difference in kind of both bodily 
activity besides competitiveness, and bodily context. 
Compulsive interactions thus seem to be enrolled in perceptive processes that happen 
entirely outside the self, but are crucial in the ways in which the body relates to its 
environs. For instance, Plügge (1967 in Leder 1990) argues that environments 
perceptually change with the bodily condition; during tiredness environments lose 
attractiveness and variety. These processes are experienced as being mobilised by 
their own sets of demands, power, and temporalities (Leder 1990), and constitute what 
Ricoeur (1966) calls, the ‘corporeal involuntary’. With a number of caveats, 
experiences of compulsivity could be regarded to share the experience of pain on its 
episodic structure, sensory intensification and its enduring and undeniable presence 
(Leder 1990). Additionally, it disturbs the openness of the self to the world by 
redirecting one’s focus from the extracorporeal to the inner body; “As [pain] pulls us 
back to the here, so severe pain summons us to the now” (Ibid. pp. 75, emphasis 
original). Compulsivity might therefore be regarded to constitute its own subjectivity, 
such that affected bodies may experience ‘split subjectivities’ (e.g. as experienced in 
pregnancy and voice-hearing). Compulsive subjectivities that unfold with the 
interactions could then be experienced as being bestowed on selves in addition to 
bodies. In addition, studies by Land et al. (1999) and Hayhoe et al. (2003) suggest that 
in a 'cluttered' environment the corporeal field narrows and reduces the possibilities for 
organising other-than-compulsive life alongside compulsions, which would put more 
pressure on the person to negotiate compulsive engagement. 
Through the diminished experience of a dominant self in compulsive engagement, the 
body could be conceived of to ‘revert’ from leib, as the embodied self, to körper 
(Fleissner 2007). Körper indicates the material form, and functional machinic entity that 
also includes the bodily unconscious (Leder 1990). Whilst the rendition of the body as 
körper could be the one medical and clinical sciences conceive it as; contrary to its 
ontological containment within the skin, the processes of perception turn bodies 
outward towards its environs. This suggests another plethora of ways in which bodies 
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performing compulsive interactions cannot be understood without an analysis of its 
embedding in the material environments. Reversions between the experience of leib to 
körper in compulsive interactions may then help conceive of the experience of being 
urged to perform compulsions. The disruption it creates with other-than-compulsive 
acts could be understood as expressing in an ongoing alignments of corporeal and 
extracorporeal sensations, and an ongoing ‘dance’ of intermingling wanted and 
unwanted movements. 
For this study, this suggests that processes of perception underpin compulsive 
interactions. Indeed, literature on perception allows attending to the sensory processes 
that seem to support and sustain compulsive interactions, as well as form the premise 
on which negotiations can be decided. Nonetheless, conceptions of embodiment in 
such literature do not suffice in capturing compulsive engagement with the 
extracorporeal without centralising the self. Whilst this does prioritise the perceiving 
body over decisive and rational minds, it does not allow for analysing the dispersal of 
sensibilities beyond the body (see Kane 1994; Karp and Hallett 1996). Also, it ‘pacifies’ 
the bodily environment in these moments, which is at odds with experiential accounts 
(Bliss 1980). A less anthropocentric stance would enable tracing these sensibilities 
beyond the skin, and locate the perceiving body amongst material and immaterial 
presences that articulate the compulsively performing body (after Mol 1999; Conradson 
2005).  
 
 
2.2.3 Section conclusions 
This section demonstrated in what ways the body and its environment may become 
caught up in compulsive interactions and in what way they impact the sensory 
processes that constitute them. Through explorations of performances that share 
aspects with urge-driven compulsions, compulsions have only been considered on the 
intentionality of their appearance. Nonetheless, the section offers insights that mainly 
help to answer Research Questions 1 and 2, and have implications for Research 
Question 3. The capacities of the body and particular parts is suggested to impact 
compulsions through the perception of their engagement with the extracorporeal world. 
Furthermore, experiences, arrangements and ‘irrational’ use of objects seem to play a 
crucial role in the constitution of particular compulsions. And finally, ‘zoning’ of spaces 
in the house, and avoiding public spaces with particular characteristics arguably require 
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consideration in understanding the constitution of compulsive person-place 
engagement. 
Whilst the experiences mentioned might share only a few aspects with urge-driven 
compulsions, they demonstrate the entanglement of the body with its constituencies 
and the profound impacts it has on how affected people experience embodying 
(particular) spaces and objects. The geographical literature suggests that negotiations 
do not only take place with the performance of compulsions, but also in the sensory 
processes that may lead to their constitution. The body and processes of perception 
become mediated with, through and in spite of objects and spaces in the way 
compulsions are negotiated. Arrangements of and specific elements in bodily 
surroundings may therefore have considerable impact on the way compulsive 
engagement takes place. Negotiations of compulsions may then be considered to aim 
at retaining predictability and a status quo, as well as distraction from certain objects 
and spaces. The literature on perceptive processes is strongly generalised, and 
pinpointing difference between kinds of compulsions remains rather unimaginative. 
Nonetheless, the literature demonstrates how compulsive experience might be 
constituted, and help to outline the conditions upon which compulsive engagement 
takes place through the relation with the body outside the self.  
The final section of the literature review engages with theory that captures experience 
and spatiality of the body-world relations in compulsive interactions to pinpoint what 
existing literature claims about such unwanted and unprecedented engagements with 
bodily surroundings. This section further analyses how compulsive interactions can 
contribute in understanding relations between people and place. It does so by 
evaluating literatures that assume a less anthropocentric stance, and, as such, further 
disrupt knowledge hierarchies between the human over the non-human (see Whatmore 
2009; Greenhough 2011). In the turning away from the psychosocial, and a thorough 
reliance on experiential, this study’s turn to poststructuralism, affects and the 
performative is not instating a return to the impersonal, mechanic, and scientific. 
Rather, it aims to identify and contextualise the personal, the space of emotions, and 
the conditions for anxiety in compulsive interaction. 
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2.3 DECONSTRUCTING AND RE-SPATIALIZING COMPULSIVE INTERACTIONS 
 
OUR EXPRESSIVITY IS NOT ENTIRELY UNDER OUR CONTROL,  
BUT RATHER THAT IT [ALSO] BELONGS TO THE SITUATION. 
- SCHEIFFELIN 1998, PP. 197 IN DEWSBURY 2000 
The previous sections related bodies, objects and spaces in the compulsive interaction, 
but did that from a brain and cognitive behavioural point of view, and from an 
experiential and perceptive point of view. In distinguishing between the compulsive 
engagements this is, however, not sufficient. The bodily situation with the objects and 
spaces that help constitute it requires qualitative differentiation to pinpoint exactly how 
they become involved. Indeed, the empirical studies in the previous section 
demonstrate that only particular bodily environments are associated with the potentially 
strong response that accompany them. Washing compulsions, interactions during 
mania, the intricacies of delusions all gained their thrust through their particularity. 
Discussing compulsive interactions as experienced but decontextualized is therefore 
not helpful. Rather, it might be useful to explore to what extent they can be understood 
as taking place in the moment and in situ (also articulated in Beljaars and Anderson 
forthcoming). By retrieving their situated unfolding, it becomes possible to trace the 
taste of the appeal, the rhythm of touch and order, and the sweet relief of perfected 
symmetry and balance. In these intimacies, the compulsive interaction stands revealed, 
and in turn, through these intimacies the compulsivity of person-place relations stands 
revealed.  
In overcoming the lack of answers to the constitution and negotiation of compulsive 
interactions on the part of the continuous processes and structures identified as being 
involved, this section attends to the momentary and situational emergence of 
compulsions. Doing so allows attending especially to Research Question 3, and has 
strong implications for Research Question 1 and 2. First is explored what attending to 
the momentary and in situ means by exploring the evental, performative, and affective 
in a flat ontology (Subsection 2.3.1). Thereafter, the geographical literature is explored 
on spatial theoretical engagements with human and more-than-human bodily 
materiality with which compulsive performativity unfolds (Subsection 2.3.2). The next 
subsection continues to analyse how embodied performances are constituted from a 
stance of unintentionality, purposelessness, and in a less deliberate manner. It reviews 
literature on the ways in which objects and spaces may be considered to become 
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actively involved in compulsions (Subsection 2.3.3). The subsection thereafter reviews 
literature on how the situation composed by geographies of bodies, objects, and 
spaces contributes to the analysis of compulsive interactions as they unfold 
(Subsection 2.3.4). 
 
2.3.1 Events / Affect 
In order to move from understanding compulsivity as an alteration in the brain, a 
diagnosis, or a condition to a phenomenon that emerges in the moment and in situ, an 
ontological shift needs to be made. Such a shift allows for focussing on the 
compulsion’s unrelatedness to further life, as well as the shock of the urge emergence 
that suddenly requires the affected person to stop what they are doing, and continue 
only after the compulsion is completed. Such an ontological shift that captures the 
spatial is possible through a poststructural geography of immanence, in which 
knowledge is derived from events (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). An event can be 
understood as a happening that sketches the present moment; as a spatial act of 
immediacy, spontaneity and determination (Dewsbury 2000; Dewsbury et al. 2000; 
Thrift and Dewsbury 2000; Woodward 2010; Shaw 2012), amounting to an ontology of 
change (Badiou 2009). It gains its vital thrust with the intensity of something that has 
never happened before, simultaneously connecting pasts and a multitude of futures 
(Dewsbury 2000). Events configure situations of which humans are part but never 
centralised, which allows centring compulsive interactions themselves. Interruption has 
been conceptualised as the experiential shock of the body undergoing an event, raising 
both the default – habitual – and the ‘new’ to awareness, while also questioning them 
(Dawney 2013). Interruptions can thus help exposing how the body figures in 
compulsive engagements, and what people do to reduce the shock that it brings forth.  
Allowing for the compulsive intimacies to articulate and to capture the situation in which 
compulsions unfold, the extracorporeal world that becomes involved in the compulsive 
interactions requires a ‘stronger voice’ and ontological presence. The analysis thus 
requires expansion to also include the specificity of objects and spaces that create this 
world. This is only possible by decentralising the human involved in the analysis of 
compulsions (see Mol 2002). In line with poststructural (e.g. Thrift 1997; 2004; Doel 
1999; Murdoch 2006) and post-humanist (e.g. Whatmore 2002; Coyle 2006) 
approaches in human geography, the ontological focus then shifts to the relations 
between the body and the environmental elements. “Humans are envisioned in 
constant relations of modification and reciprocity with their environs” according to 
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Anderson and Harrison (2010, pp. 7). Such a relational approach “emphasizes the co‐
constitution and mutual entanglement of otherwise different (and often far distant) 
phenomena” (Castree et al. 2013, np). It merits the human and the more-than-human 
in person-place interactions to be of equal power (Doel 1999; Whatmore 2002). In 
effect, compulsive interactions then require to be analysed from a stance in which the 
more-than-human environment has as much impact on their unfolding as the human 
has. Therefore, every action ought to be understood as an interaction that is both 
constituted by the human and the more-than-human (Ingold 2000; Thrift 2008). 
Therefore, in analysing why bodies do what they do, should invite analysis of what 
bodies do. Such claims resonate with the impossibility to interpret compulsive 
interactions (see Kushner 1999). 
A decentralisation of the human allows expanding the ways in which people figure in 
compulsive interactions. Such expansion entails a movement away from human 
dominance stemming from a rationality, deliberation and logic that humans have been 
attributed with (Bridge 2000; Stark 2016). Medical and clinical approaches to 
compulsivity have conceptualised it as opposed to such humanity in addition to the 
ability of being almost fully aware of and accountable for one’s actions. This is despite 
the purposelessness of compulsions intricate and situated knowledges, considerations, 
and sensations experiential accounts testify to (e.g. Bliss 1980; Kane 1994; Hollenbeck 
2003; Turtle and Robertson 2008; Wilensky 1999).  
Such expansion also holds that in addition to cognitive deliberation, poststructural and 
posthuman approaches to geographies of the body challenge structures of meaning as 
– only – determinant of action (Anderson and Harrison 2010). This literature 
emphasizes the more-than-representational aspect of body-environment relations (e.g. 
Thrift 2004; 2008; Lorimer 2005; Harrison 2009; Anderson and Harrison 2010; 
Anderson 2012). Such considerations go beyond social constructions, the symbolic 
and representation and focus on the practical embodied composition of subjectivities – 
(e.g. Wylie 2009; 2010; Anderson and Harrison 2010; Anderson and Wylie 2010). They 
make space for “the unconscious, haptic knowledge, and practical dimensions of 
human existence” in human geographies (Castree et al. 2013: np). As such, the 
intelligible comes from the sensible (Dewsbury 2003). Indeed, in the absence of 
meaning, rationality, and purpose, the performance and negotiation of compulsive 
interactions may then be better understood along these lines. This allows exploring and 
attuning to more nuanced ways in which human bodies and their environments relate 
and create compulsive performative thrusts (after Brigstocke and Noorani 2016).  
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Attuning to the performance of these compulsions can take place through the affective 
dimensions that envelop, guide, and make felt the composition of the entities involved 
(after Deleuze and Guattari 2004). Affect can be understood as pre-reflexive or 
prepersonal intensity (Deleuze and Guattari 2004; Massumi 2002) that incites 
modifications to bodies (Spinoza 1996 in Dawney 2013). As such, affections render 
both human and more-than-human bodies “dynamic and emergent multiplicities; their 
powers constituted through their differential capacities to affect and be affected” 
(Bissell 2008, pp. 2649). Affect requires an openness from bodies to their 
constituencies that allows it to be affected (Thrift 2004; Harrison 2008). It comes in 
existence in and qualifies both the encounter of human and non-human entities, as well 
as these entities (Deleuze 1988). Affects are not bound by human experience, and can 
easily escape awareness (Thrift 1997), but can also become personal in emotions 
resulting their bestowment upon human bodies (Thien 2005; Anderson 2009; Anderson 
and Harrison 2010; Ash 2015).  
Mobilising an ontology of affect to understand compulsive interactions helps 
understanding the thrust of the coming together or assemblage of elements that 
constitute the compulsion (after Deleuze and Guattari 2004). This thrust can also be 
understood as the performativity of the compulsive event, and can be regarded as “the 
gap, the rupture, the spacing that unfolds the next moment allowing change to happen” 
(Dewsbury 2000, pp. 475). It presents a potentially forceful possibility that is 
indeterminate, not intentional and non-directional that provides an incentive to action, 
other than intention offered by the self (Nash 2000; DeLanda 2006; Anderson and 
Wylie 2009). Scheiffelin (1998) therefore argues that human beings caught up in the 
performativity of events can never be fully accountable for their performances. The 
compulsive aspect of the urge-driven interactions then locates in the performance itself, 
not in the human or the human body. Attending to the performative of the situation in 
compulsive moments thus allows for pinpointing the differences between individual 
compulsive interactions and what they accomplish (i.e. tracing how the new situation 
differed from the old one and what new potentialities it then has).  
A flat ontology of in-betweenness intimately connects and blurs separations between 
mind and body (Protevi 2009; Dawney 2013). As all entities involved have the same 
affective potentialities to contribute, there is no inside or outside within the constitution 
of compulsions. Consequently, the activity and power assigned to the human and the 
human body in more hierarchical ontologies is mirrored by the nonhuman and objects 
and spaces (Thrift and Dewsbury 2000). The extracorporeal is then retrieved from its 
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conceptualisation as “inert backdrop of brute things projected upon by our hopes, 
desires and fears” (Anderson and Harrison 2010, pp. 7-8). Negotiating compulsions is 
then as much an affair of human bodies as it is of the realm of the extracorporeal.  
Whilst an ontology of affect suggests that upholding a separation between the body 
and its environment creates a false difference, empirical literature on compulsions, tics, 
and other medicalised performances insists on the importance of this difference in 
experiential terms. Therefore, the literature analysis continues to draw this line of 
difference; not to re-instate a “radical discontinuity” between the human and non-
human (Murphy 1995, pp. 689), but to acknowledge the crucial importance of the 
experiential knowledge about the constitution of urge-driven compulsions. Urges are 
then rendered the experienced effect of embodied situations that invoke compulsive 
interactions; not as exclusive cause. This goes without denying the affectivity of the 
urge experience itself. In the following subsections this stance is explored further.  
 
2.3.2 Fleshy Resonance 
FLESH DOES NOT MEDIATE BETWEEN PRE-EXISTENT AND INDEPENDENTLY 
CONSTITUTED ENTITIES; RATHER, IT IS IN AND THROUGH MEDIATION THAT 
ENTITIES ARE INTERRELATED AND BECOME THE ENTITIES THEY ARE. 
- HOEL AND CARUSI 2015, PP. 78 
In rendering compulsive interactions as relationality of human and nonhuman affects, 
the human body becomes a “body amongst bodies” (Anderson and Wylie 2009, pp. 
327). Human and nonhuman sensibilities and movements are then as much capable of 
affecting and being affected, and as much capable of shaping and interrogating (ibid.). 
The point where affects ‘meet’, and compulsive shaping and interrogating takes place 
is the focus of this section; the lively bodily materiality, its blood and bones, its 
fleshiness. Here, the flesh is not addressed on the sensuality of the bodily or capacity 
for identity formation. Rather, it is an “operative, organizing force” (Hoel and Carusi 
2015, pp. 78) that articulates in its capabilities and sensibilities that are creative of a set 
of conditions upon which compulsions can unfold and are experienced. Indeed, it is in 
the instantiation of the bodily flesh that compulsive interactions gain their sensory 
quality, and upon which negotiations may take place. This might be the case in 
particular for compulsive touching, but as the literature does not differentiate between 
the sensory qualities of other interactions, such as ordering and balancing, the flesh 
may be the locus of amalgamation of affects in all interactive compulsions. In turn, the 
59 
 
bodily flesh needs to be attributed an affective quality in and of itself, that sets the 
possibilities of the involvement of the flesh. 
Bringing the performative in line with the fleshy allows tapping into an intense and 
proximal mode of knowledge that might be crucial in understanding the particularity of 
compulsive interaction. Nonetheless, capturing this quality is very difficult. The 
sensations and experiential feelings of amalgamating affects in human and non-human 
bodies in the moment of particular kinds of touching (Paterson 2009; Fulkerson, 2014), 
and fleshy encounters more broadly (Hetherington 2003) seem encapsulated in a 
severe untranslatability (Lund 2005; Harrison 2007; Anderson 2012). Indeed, touch is 
not limited to the contact point on the body, but resonates in the whole haptic system 
(Gibson 1966) as well as in somatic sensations (Paterson 2009; Paterson and Dodge 
2012). Despite their unfathomability in terms of capture, body-world interactions that 
erupt from the flesh give rise to the particular subjectivities that underpin compulsivity 
(after Thrift and Dewsbury 2000; Rose 2006). Therefore, compulsive engagements 
might help expand and deepen non-representational proximal and sensory knowledges 
(Dixon and Straughan 2010), and develop ‘tactile topologies’ (Dixon and Jones 2014). 
Additionally, attending to compulsive touch could offer insights into the ways in which 
object and space affects resonate with human bodies. 
Resonance between human and nonhuman bodies in compulsive interaction has been 
emphasized in its actional sense (e.g. Lingis 2000; Anderson and Wylie 2009) and the 
ways in which nonhuman materiality is involved (e.g. Hetherington 2003; Bondi et al. 
2005; Wylie 2005; 2006). Since in compulsions objects are not addressed in terms of 
their meaning, interactions become mutual interrogations, in which “flesh materialises 
and senses as a productive process of questioning and provocation”, entangling 
“matter and thought into relations of substitution and distanciation” (Anderson and 
Wylie 2009, pp. 325). As such, objects and spaces might become part of compulsive 
interactions because of their specific provocation to specific aspects, dimensions, or 
capacities of the human flesh. In these literatures it is suggested that a person 
imagines the sensations that go along with activities associated with objects that one 
lays his/her eyes on (Gallagher 2005). For example, seeing a door presents 
imaginations of the feelings that arise when opening it such as the cold touch of the 
handle and the fierce grip to turn it, stepping back to accommodate for the turning circle 
the door requires, and subsequent air stream softly brushing against one’s skin. It is 
therefore not unthinkable that these imaginations as part of affective, precognitive 
processes may incite urges to engage compulsively. Lingis (1999, pp. 14) argues “we 
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see not shapes but possibilities” (see also Bergson 1911), which demands an 
understanding of space and time that is pre-modal with which objects and spaces 
acquire a particular organisation (Matthen 2014). As such, considerations of the flesh 
help enlivening the extracorporeal, “rather than a detached gaze in which materiality 
stiffens into objectivity” (Anderson and Wylie 2009, pp. 324).  
Resonance of object and space materiality with the fleshy human body seems to 
produce sensibilities with which compulsions take place. Anderson and Wylie (2009) 
have used Lingis’ (1998) conceptualisations of materiality in terms of ‘levels’ to 
articulate the ways in which more-than-human materiality figures in the spatial 
experience upon which compulsivity might flow forth. In searching imperatives for 
action, levels denote matter in terms of light, colour, sound, texture, as bright, dull, 
vivid, and refractive, smooth and scratchy. Such levels of materiality intertwine with 
sensibilities that they allow humans to see with and according to the levels of matter 
(Lingis 1998, pp. 28-29): 
Even as it surfaces as a property inherent in a thing, this red also 
plays across the room; the red of the roses intensifies the green of 
the leaves, bleaches the whiteness of the sheets of the bed, rouges 
the cheeks of our friend in the bed ... this red would not be the red it 
is if it did not mould surfaces with a certain grain and elasticity and 
quilt depth with a particular spongy density ... a colour ... sends forth 
a wave which brings other colours into relief and solicits their 
approach, lays open a field of possibility and materialises a wave of 
duration. 
Anderson and Wylie (2009, pp. 327) then argue that the intertwining of materialities 
and sensibilities do not occur in a space and time, but are constitutive of their own 
space-times, “their nature is this incessant composition of qualitative, differential 
spatial, and temporal `tunings’” (see also Morton 2013). This in itself goes beyond 
being a property of matter. Rather, in its experiential affects, matter can create a world 
through the conditions of the sensibilities it taps into (see Wylie 2006). Further 
developed in animal studies, such worlds are created with the presencing of large 
predators and their affects in a natural area’s in which smaller predators are considered 
a pest; all stemming from a pile of excrement (Clayton 2016). In this the figuration of 
the excrement affects animals and then humans in particular ways; in other 
circumstances, it would affect them differently. In effect, objects and situations are 
constituted through their affective resonance. According to Bergson (1911, pp. 6-7): 
They [objects] send back, then, to my body, as would a mirror, its 
eventual influence; they take rank in an order corresponding to the 
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growing or decreasing powers of my body. The objects which 
surround my body reflect its possible action upon them. 
In the process, the object’s ‘thingness’ understood as a stability is lost (see Bennett 
2010). Indeed, as compulsions have been understood to not address objects on their 
functionality or aesthetical value, the objectness, or ‘thingness’ does not play a role. 
Therefore, to understand the ways in which objects help constitute compulsive 
interactions without pinning them down on their thingness, they require addressing on 
their materiality (after Bennett 2004; Anderson and Wylie 2009). 
In Dangerous Emotions, Lingis (1999, pp. 29) goes on to emphasize that objects and 
spaces, as well as animals evoke human movement and engagement in accordance 
with them: 
Our movements are not spontaneous initiatives launched against 
masses of inertia; we move in an environment of air currents, rustling 
trees, and animate bodies. Our movements are stirred by the 
coursing of our blood, the pulse of the wind, the reedy rhythms of the 
cicadas in the autumn trees, the whir of passing cars, the bounding of 
squirrels, and the tense, poised pause of deer. The speeds, 
slowness, and turns of our movements come from movements we 
meet about us. 
Lingis’ quotation then suggests that compulsions may be understood as ways, 
articulations, or even exaltations of objects, spaces and other presences reverberating 
through the flesh. Indeed, compulsive interactions would then go beyond transcendent 
empathic tendencies (Banissy and Ward 2007), or practising with the help of an object 
(Maravita and Iriki 2004). If we accept this, compulsivity could be understood to reveal 
new ways in which materiality affects bodies in their relations to the world. Also, 
perhaps it is in the affection that stems from the very alignment of compulsive bodily 
movements with extracorporeal matter that anxieties arise, and, in turn, what sets the 
conditions upon which compulsions are negotiated. Arguably, in absence of meaning 
and a relation to the self, compulsivity might then be constituted through resonance of 
matter through the body. Such an understanding contextualises and narrows the 
exclusively human and cognitive ways in which human spatial engagement more 
broadly is conceived of by inserting material affects (after Dewsbury 2003; Rose 2006; 
Wylie 2006; Lea 2009; Ash 2015; Ash and Simpson 2016). 
To conclude, this section has sought to articulate a less anthropocentric stance in 
analysing the literature on compulsive body-world relations. This informs the thesis by 
allowing to attend to the particularities of the bodily environment. It has done so by 
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locating compulsive interactions and the basis for their negotiation in the bodily flesh. 
This has opened up the ontological space for the extracorporeal affects of objects and 
spaces, as the flesh and the movements it permits allow these materialities to 
reverberate through the body. Such reverberations result in compulsive engagement 
with these materialities on the terms of these materialities. This, thus, suggests that the 
human cannot be conceived to be entirely responsible for the performance of 
compulsive interactions, which refutes medical and clinical invocations as such. To 
further analyse how such considerations might help understand the purposelessness 
and unintentionality with which compulsions are experienced, the next subsection 
teases out how compulsive body-world engagements are aligned with other 
engagements. 
 
2.3.3 Distributed Intentionality 
Up to this point, the literature review has established that compulsivity is experienced 
as meaningless and holds very little to no relations with the self in the ways similar 
medicalised performances do. Additionally, the interactions are unprecedented and 
seem to be disruptive because they seem unrelated to other-than-compulsive acts, and 
because bodily surroundings seem to affect their unfolding. The previous sections have 
sought to move away from its medicalised dimension, and understand it on its own 
terms. They have rendered the fleshiness and movements of the human body and its 
affective resonance with lively materiality. In attending to such resonances, this section 
traces the different ways in which materialities and sensibilities construct the direction 
or tendency towards the accomplishment that sustains compulsive interactions. This 
helps formulate answers to Research Question 1 and 2, as the section establishes in 
what ways the bodily environment can be considered to affect the performance of 
compulsions.  
Here, it is useful to tease out what is meant with the direction or the tendency towards 
accomplishment of compulsive interactions. This is possible through a brief 
consideration of body-world relations as experienced in human geographical literature 
that develops a postphenomenological set of theories on the spatialities of the body in 
experience. Traditional phenomenological understandings of human bodies have been 
assumed a certain intentionality and have been ascribed a capacity to help reaching a 
certain goal (e.g. Seamon 1980; Buttimer and Seamon 1980; Merleau-Ponty 1962). In 
unsettling this, Harrison (2008) emphasises the vulnerability of the corporeal in all of its 
openness and passive submissiveness to the world. He argues that this renders bodies 
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consistently subordinated to action; as always waiting to be moved by the 
extracorporeal. Indeed, such bodily subordination might be experienced by those 
affected, as the emergence of the urge seems entirely unpredictable.  
Corporeal subordination then destabilises the subject/object divide, as this no longer 
situates the human subject intentional towards, and therefore prior to the nonhuman 
object (Zahavi 2003; Simonsen 2013; Ash and Simpson 2016). As such, the “body-
subject is now ‘of’ the world: body and world, subject and object, are conjoined as 
flesh” (Wylie 2006, pp. 525). Experience should therefore be understood as a co-
emergence (Nancy 2000; Wylie 2006; 2009; 2010; Dewsbury 2007; Romanillos 2008; 
Ihde 2009; Lea 2009; Simpson 2009; Yusoff 2013; Ash and Simpson 2016; 
McCormack 2016). Indeed, it is not unthinkable for such an unfolding of compulsive 
interactions to be experienced in this manner, as experiential accounts do not 
demonstrate knowledge of what urges exactly require of the body, and not all 
compulsions are preceded by urges. Intentionality stretches over processes of 
subjectification (Dewsbury 2007) in an ongoing unfolding of experience (Wylie 2006).  
Human perception of non-human objects and space then becomes perception with 
(Rose 2006; Wylie 2006). This is not to say that objects do not exist before emerging in 
experience; rather it is in their appearance that experience is constituted and 
intentionality emerges in the direction the compulsion unfolds with (Deleuze 1988; Ash 
and Simpson 2016; McCormack 2016). The intentionality or direction of, or tendency 
towards accomplishment of compulsivity ought then to be regarded as spatially 
dispersed; involving but not being instigated by the human. As such, differences 
between directions of intentional thrust sustaining compulsive engagements then allow 
pinpointing and analysing differences in kind. In turn, compulsivity constitutes a 
phenomenon that can be engaged with empirically, and that may demonstrate how 
intentionality does not situate with the human through the lacking relation to the self9. 
Intentionality and its constitution has been mobilised in geographical research to 
understand the coming-about of embodied engagement with the extracorporeal that 
share an apparent diminished human involvement. The concept of ‘practice’ has been 
mobilised in literature on bodies-in-action (e.g. Nash 2000; McCormack 2002; 2005; 
Valentine 2002; Saldanha 2005; Wylie 2005; Roe 2006; Spinney 2006; Anderson 2012; 
                                               
9 I elaborate on this lacking relation with the self in conference paper “Writing Compulsive Corporeality: 
Postphenomenological methodology and Tourette syndrome”, Session Post-phenomenological 
Geographies: methods and styles of researching and writing the human (1): Subjects, RGS with IBG 
Annual International Conference 2016, London 
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Colebrooke and Miele 2017) or for corporeal inaction (Bissell 2009; Harrison 2009). 
Practices render all human activities performed in unison with material arrangements 
and social phenomena, without being predetermined by these events (Simonsen 2005; 
Schatzki 2010). Nonetheless, they are understood to be vested in a flow of past events 
that provide input for a history that directs present practices (Lefebvre 1991). Whilst the 
human is not rendered dominating force and materialities are given primacy in the 
performance of practices (Mol 2002), their inherent timing of and benefit to the human 
retrieves the intention of the act from the nonhuman (see Harrison 2009; Schatzki 
2010; Greenhough 2011). This differs fundamentally from compulsions, as 
compulsions are never a matter of choice (Bliss 1980; Van Bloss 2006; Turtle and 
Robertson 2008). Responding to an urge, compulsions do not seem to inherit 
directions of past performances. This indicates that in compulsive interactions human 
affects are less dominant than practices are. 
A minimal involvement of the human and a potentially more dominant extracorporeal 
involvement in the constitution of compulsive engagement, compulsivity can be argued 
to demand a passivity of the human body (after Bissell 2008). In situating the human as 
more-than-rational (Anderson 2006), the human body becomes susceptible to outside 
affects and induces an inevitable bodily tolerance to seduction of such forces (Harrison 
2008). This vulnerability can demonstrate how unreflective thought may play a more 
important role in mobilising the situated body (see also Dewsbury 2003; Bissell 2008; 
Stark 2016). Performing compulsive behaviour is essentially an act of stilling the mind, 
and, as such, compulsivity strongly resembles the concept of ‘habit’. According to 
Dewsbury and Bissell (2014, pp. 23): 
Habit, then, would present less a compromise between a 
transcendentally fixed separation of the individual and the 
environment and more a mutually emergent system of processes of 
immanent becoming at once organic and inorganic, interior and 
exterior. 
In vitalist understandings, habit is a bodily engagement that does not involve the self, 
and happens outside the active involvement of the subject (Malabou 2009; Bissell 
2011) As such, “habit becomes the unruly nonhuman force that constricts the capacity 
for self-knowledge and realisation in its ‘devitalisation of sense’” (Malabou 2009, pp. 
vii). Habits thus seem to be understood to have a similar disposition on the lack of 
relation to the self as compulsivity. Furthermore, for habits, but also in poststructural 
thought more general, every repetition occurs in an absolutely unique context, posing a 
distinctive assemblage of sensibilities and materialities (Ravaisson 2009; Grosz 2013; 
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Dewsbury and Bissell 2014). As such, habits would have the conceptual capacity to 
reflect the sensibilities and material intricacies of the situation, upon which intentionality 
of compulsive interactions grabs hold. 
Whilst habits seem to resemble compulsive interactions on a number of aspects, it 
differs in others. This might be contrary to compulsive interactions as these can be 
repetitive, and seem to require a very distinct engagement to rid the urge sensation. As 
such, whilst habits take place in the flow of present engagement without recollection 
from the past (Carlisle 2006), subjectification processes underpinning compulsions do 
seem to require active human involvement. Also, habit might not capture specific 
material constellations with which urges emerge to compulsively order or balance 
materiality. Additionally, habits can be experienced as “giv[ing] birth to wondrous and 
unsettling – enchanting – new forms'' (Bennett 2001, pp. 40 in Anderson and Wylie 
2009) which, in contrast to compulsions, allows for a distinctly positive experience.  
As compared to conceptualisations of practices and habits, compulsive engagement 
seems to differ on its separation from the self, but rely on active human attention in 
subjectification processes. Moreover, lacking alignment with the human, the 
intentionality that emerges with the unfolding of compulsive engagement seems to be 
affirmative of extracorporeal agency. The literature reviewed in this subsection thus 
suggests to provide more agency to the extracorporeal in understanding the 
constitution and negotiation of, and differences between compulsive interactions. 
Importantly, extracorporeal materiality seems to be addressed on appearance as such. 
In other words elements of objects and spaces could be thought to replace or acquire a 
new compulsive purposiveness that differs from their other-than-compulsive purpose. 
Relating this to Research Questions 1 and 2, suggests that the bodily environment can 
be addressed on its materiality or form, and not its functionality. In turn, answering to 
Research Question 3, this suggests that compulsive interactions pinpoint person-place 
relations that articulate a simultaneous emergence of body and world. Effective 
negotiation of compulsive interactions thus requires addressing this constellation. 
Compulsivity would then locate in an embodied engagement that does not happen by 
or upon the body, but with it. This is up to a point in which compulsions would be 
actively resisted, which is currently not acknowledged in the geographical 
conceptualisations of embodiment. As such, this demonstrates that in human 
geographical theory, compulsive interaction requires a new space carved out for the 
person-place relation it embodies. The final subsection traces the spatialities of 
compulsive interactions in the situation of their unfolding. 
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2.3.4 Spatial Articulations 
This section asks if there are ways of preserving the differences between compulsive 
interactions, whilst thinking them as constitutive of a collective of sorts. It explores 
literature that assembles these events as affirmative of a shared or interrelated 
spatiality. This helps understand in what ways the bodily environment gains a ‘new 
conception’ that is not based on functionality, but on particular compulsive intensities. 
Insights in such collections might unearth how negotiations take place, not just with 
regards to emerging urges, but in relation to the object and space constellations more 
broadly, as compulsive interactions could be considered to have follow-on effects with 
the appearance of the situation evolving. 
As argued in the previous section, for compulsive interactions to take place, the human 
body, and extracorporeal materiality need to assemble in such a way that the urge to 
interact emerges. To place the volatility of the compulsive situation, Deleuze’s 
conceptualisation of experience may be helpful. Deleuze (1988 in Colebrook 2002) 
argues that to experience an object means to fuse with it, and sharing in its space and 
time. However, fusing with one object excludes fusing with others, and by extension, 
prohibits sharing in the space and time of others. The tension that lies between objects 
– and thus also spaces – can amalgamate in a perceptual cacophony of different 
rhythms (Rajchman 1998). The friction this may result in might be considered to 
emerge in the heightened sensitivity the experiential accounts of those affected speak 
of (e.g. Bliss 1980; Kane 1994; Van Bloss 2006). These sensory phenomena might 
then be thought to locate the human in place that has fallen into a collective rhythm that 
is somehow disturbing to the human (see Anderson 2015). This suggests that 
compulsive interactions could also be performed in a reactionary sense. Indeed, this is 
in lines with Bliss (1980) and Kane (1994) who regard tics as providing temporal relief 
from the urges. 
Further unpacking a spatial situation from which compulsivity could be thought to arise, 
is by attending to how the differing rhythms produce experiential turbulence. Coined by 
Serres (1995), turbulence can be understood as an intermediary state between order 
and disorder, presenting materiality “tensed between a gathering (and thus forming a 
unity) and a distribution (and thus forming multiplicity)” (Anderson and Wylie 2009, pp. 
321). Bodies, objects and spaces are thus always involved in gatherings with others 
they might share experiential rhythms with, and distributions with other materiality with 
which friction arises (after Deleuze 1991; Bennet 2001). These magnetisms and 
repellences give bodies, objects, and spaces ‘complex presence’ (Mol 2002). It is not 
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unthinkable that for those having to perform compulsive interactions, such complex 
presence could be experienced as not-just-right feelings, and by extension, the 
disruptive world of people like Amy Wilensky (1999). 
Up to this point, compulsive interactions have been understood as disruptive because 
they are unwanted and unprecedented in and of themselves. Nonetheless, 
conceptualisations of turbulence and rhythm that attend to the disruptive element of 
urge driven compulsions suggest further spatial connotations. Mitch Rose (2006) 
argues that transcendental understanding of our lives and the worlds that sustain them 
is deeply seated in equally transcendental cultures around specificities of places. 
Through their transcendental conceptualisation, places are already assumed a 
coherence in their presence stemming from the way they are invoked. Rose 
problematizes this a priori coherence of spaces, as this is contrary to the way their 
material presence is experienced (see also Ingold 2000; Wylie 2002). Rather, he 
argues, with bodily movements and imaginations, elements of spaces co-emerge as 
subjectification processes, giving rise to particular presence of spaces (see also Wylie 
2006; 2009; McCormack 2016). Having dinner, doing board games, and entertaining 
guests might then perform ‘living room-ness’ in a space. The disruptiveness of 
compulsive performances may thus stem from their qualitative difference from the 
specific performative cultures that pervades places. Indeed, the conditions upon which 
negotiations are deemed possible and are performed might then also take place within 
the cultural conditions in these places.  
In the same way, it could be argued that with the particular materialities and spatiality 
that spaces perform presence, a particular ‘compulsive culture’ could be thought. Not in 
the interpretative sense, but as attentive to the persistence of material distinctiveness 
over time (see also Romanillos 2008; Simpson 2009; Wylie 2009). In other words, 
spaces could be thought to actualise with the affected human moving through as a 
particular affective regime with which compulsions emerge that transcends the 
compulsive moment. For such persistence of an affective regime to be able to actualise 
with human performativity, and actualise again with the person residing in the place the 
next day, it is useful to think with ‘the percept’.  
Developed by Deleuze (1991) on the basis of Bergson’s object images (1911), the 
percept alludes to perceptions within space by a person, which is a unique 
constellation of all that is present: a gathering of the subject, object and perception 
itself. As such, the percept is “anterior to the prescription of perceiving subject and 
perceived world” (Anderson and Wylie 2009, pp. 332), and therefore does not belong to 
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the subject (Wylie 2006). Percepts constitute “a pure flow of life and perception, without 
any distinct perceivers” (Colebrook 2002, pp. 74), and acquire quality by the 
capabilities and sensibilities of both object and subject (Dewsbury et al. 2002). Whilst 
Wylie (2006) mobilises the percept in a visual sense10, compulsive interactions might 
help develop the concept on its tactility. Situated ‘compulsive cultures’ then consist of 
the collections of all possible percepts that can be ‘taken’ when the human ‘steps into 
them’, without necessarily predetermining compulsive engagement. Negotiating 
compulsive interactions could then be mediated through these percepts, their 
collectives, and their spatial distribution. By extension, thinking collective percepts 
invites thinking difference between percepts in terms of their compulsive capacity. Jane 
Bennett (2004; 2010) invites taking further distributive thinking of compulsive 
interactions and their experiential conditions in lively compositional ecologies. 
Thinking compulsions as actualised through percepts preserves the qualitative 
difference whilst still enabling an attendance to their assemblage. The sensitivities in 
these conceptualisations allows tracing the particular affects that underpin Laura’s 
compulsions as mentioned in the introduction to the thesis. Now, we can see the 
spatial and experiential constellations that culminate in her compulsively touching of 
the bottom left corner of a cupboard door, and compulsively aligning the condiment 
flasks with the edge of the kitchen counter. They are not only pronunciations of her 
bodily capabilities and sensitivities, object materiality and appearance, and the 
turbulence the situation is caught up in, but also of the kitchen as a space of touch, 
alignment, and balance that is outside meaning, human intention, and purpose. In 
addition to the socialities that pervade these spaces, negotiating compulsive 
interactions may then be considered to take place with reference to the specificities of 
these collectives. Our familial kitchen would thus invoke its particular conditions upon 
which urges arose, were met, and were negotiated in different ways as her bedroom 
and other realms of Laura’s life did. 
 
2.3.5 Section conclusions 
This section sought to move closer to the compulsive performance of the interaction 
between the human body and the nonhuman environment. In attending to the 
intricacies of the unfolding of the embodied engagements it adopted an ontology of 
                                               
10 Wylie does so to think through the co-emergence of self and world through depth. It is based on 
Merleau-Ponty’s work, which prioritises the visual over other senses (Hoel & Carusi, 2015). 
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immanence. By centring the compulsive interaction, rather than the person performing 
the act, the human and the nonhuman could be conceived as equally powerful in its 
constitution. As also reflective of the experiential accounts of those affected, the 
intentionality, which directs urges and compulsions, can no longer only belong to the 
human. In its dispersion over the situation, the body moves with the particularity of the 
extracorporeal, resonating its affects in the flesh. Subjectification processes that 
underpin this resonance then emerge as percepts upon which compulsive interactions 
are performed. This presents an account of compulsive bodily engagement that 
emerges with the particularity of different spaces, object appearance, as well as 
capabilities of the body. 
Compulsivity then becomes a means to “emphasize the closeness, the intimacy, of 
humans and nonhumans” (Bennett 2004, pp. 365); constitutive of a geography in which 
the human takes part, but is not dominant. It is a person-place relation that could be 
imagined as a geography of escalating or excessive affective materiality so eagerly 
theorised in posthuman affinity through interpretation, but so problematically captured. 
Compulsive interactions present the instances of human life during which it is 
inharmonious and conflicted, and in which human dominance can no longer blatantly 
be asserted. It requires thinking the spatiality of the human body not only beyond its 
biological functionality, but outside meaning and culture. In studying compulsive 
engagement with the extracorporeal, we need to leave the grand symptomatic 
gestures, and the recognisable but tokenistic practices of what geographers have 
affirmed human spatiality as. Instead, compulsivity demands truly looking at all 
intricacies of the concerted movements with which the human and nonhuman acquire 
presence. 
 
2.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This study is aimed at unearthing the ways in which compulsive interactions emerge as 
spatial processes between bodies, objects, and spaces, as well as how they are 
negotiated. It also asks these questions to learn more about spatial relations between 
humans and spaces. The literature review gathers the performance of compulsive 
interactions in a number of ways, which allows to provide a speculative answer to the 
research questions. The following can be argued. Medical and clinical approaches 
have unfortunately been few, but they have categorised the interactions in broad terms 
as touching, ordering, aligning and balancing. They seem to take place wherever 
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affected people go, but seem to increase in ‘frequency’ and ‘severity’ with a greater 
familiarity of spaces as well as other people present. Additionally, the kind of 
compulsions have been related to the bodily activities the body is otherwise engaged 
in. Compulsions and their negotiations also have been found to be intricately related to 
three sensory phenomena that urge the performance of the compulsion, denote its 
completion, and envision the broader perceptual world.  
Despite a clear lack of literature on urge-driven compulsions, and very little surrounding 
it, literature on the spatiality of comparable medicalised conditions and processes of 
perception demonstrate the entangled experiences of the body, objects, and spaces. 
These experiences underpinned by perceptive processes seem to emerge with 
intricate spatial zoning and separation exercises. These sets of literature then articulate 
conditions upon which bodies, objects, and spaces become forced into organisational 
regimes, insofar as they are recognised to meet these conditions. As such, these 
studies unsettle the rigidity with which bodies, objects, and spaces have uncritically 
been assigned a certain mundanity and passivity in people’s lives. Nonetheless, they 
do so largely prioritising the diagnosis rather than the performance, which juxtaposes 
the potentially different spatial processes with which these elements exist. Also, whilst 
these studies articulate their potential forcefulness as a destructive to the self, the 
current study required reading them on the less or non-representational aspects, as 
well as the perceptive processes that underpin compulsive subjectivity. Indeed, in their 
escape from psychosocial analysis and other approaches, seeking to understand how 
compulsive interactions are performed and negotiated cannot take place on essentialist 
terms. 
This study then sees compulsive engagements beyond an expression of 
symptomatology and pathology, or disability, normativity, and health. Therefore, it 
urges for a hesitation to immediately study and conceptualise compulsivity in medical 
terms or patterns of suffering. Instead, the literature reviewed invokes to vitalise the 
performativity of urge driven compulsions through the lively thrust of the presences that 
make up the situation of the body and its constituencies. As such, the compulsive 
element of the interaction is taken away from the human, and uncoupled from the body, 
and redistributed over the corporeal situation with which the human is caught up. 
Negotiating urge-driven compulsions is then no longer solely an affair of the brain, the 
body, or its movements, but incorporates the bodily situation in its material and social 
totality. Compulsivity then presents a modality of performativity that the geographical 
literature does not entirely come to grips with, and therefore problematizes existing 
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conceptualisations of person-place relations. Indeed, compulsive interactions seem to 
defy taken-for-granted notions about human embodiment in geography; not only in 
terms of the complexity of the body-self/subjectivity relations, but also in its ill-
conception of compulsions’ meaninglessness, purposelessness and disruption. 
In addition to empirical studies, this research signals the distinct lack of conceptual or 
theoretical acknowledgement of compulsivity in the more theoretical literature. In 
carving out a conceptual space in geography, the poststructural and 
postphenomenological literature cited nonetheless invite working through the spatiality 
of compulsivity. Indeed, it suggests ways in which the compulsive aspect of person-
place relations can be mobilised as a conceptual vitality in itself. Therefore, the 
literature review set it up as a phenomenon that can be attributed a ‘thrust’ in its 
desirous assembling of human and nonhuman elements of the bodily environment 
(after Deleuze and Guattari 2004, see also Beljaars forthcoming). Especially through 
the distinctive lack of relation to the self, its disruptive subjectivity, and in its difference 
from practices and habits, compulsivity may help analyse “the inherent and continuous 
susceptibility of corporeal life to the unchosen and the unforeseen – its inherent 
openness to what exceeds its abilities to contain and absorb” (Harrison 2008, pp. 427).  
Then, conceptualising the momentary and in situ performance of compulsions as 
assemblages allows attending to every shift in circumstances, and how this shapes the 
conditions for the next urge to emerge (after Deleuze and Parnet 2007 in Anderson and 
McFarlane 2011; McCormack 2016). In effect, compulsive performances then 
assemble heterogeneous elements without the restraint of categories, such as objects, 
spaces, bodily capacities, and sociality (after Deleuze and Guattari 2004; DeLanda 
2006; Dovey 2010). The study then overcomes the inherent difficulties of requiring to 
choose between particular categorisations that have prevented medical and clinical 
sciences from investing in environments. Indeed, compulsions as assemblages invite 
qualitative difference between individual interactions, rather than the quantitative, 
categorical difference upon which the scientific understandings are based (Deleuze 
1994; 2004). As such, conceptualising compulsions as assemblages allows attending 
to different dimensions of bodies, objects, and spaces (Deleuze and Guattari 2004; 
DeLanda 2006; Dewsbury 2011). In effect, this conceptualises them as emergent and 
vanishing microspatialities. In addition, it allows recognising how negotiations avoid or 
destabilize these compulsive assemblages. 
Whilst rendering compulsive interactions assemblages helps expressing the non-
hierarchical co-emergence of heterogeneous elements, I argue that the particularity of 
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compulsions cannot be analysed as assemblage. Indeed, assemblage ontologies do 
not differentiate between the particular kind of involvement of these elements. In 
assemblage theories11, heterogeneous elements that constitute assemblages 
territorialise towards their collectiveness, which in turn becomes powerful through their 
presence within and becoming of the assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). 
Emphases on presence and becoming disallows distinguishing the kind of contribution, 
and requires elements to lose their properties (DeLanda 2006). For example, in Laura’s 
case, drawers can contribute to compulsive interactions by virtue of any of their 
corners, wood-feel, location at hip height, as well as their capacity to close. This 
indicates a particular situation of the flesh of Laura’s finger, as well as the appearance, 
and particular wood-feel of, the drawer tip in composition with the kitchen and the 
availability of the body to engage compulsively.  
Whilst assemblages help to identify the elements that constitute compulsive 
interactions, these theories cannot quite grasp how these constitutive elements relate 
to each other in compulsive situations but from a human perspective. In other words, to 
answer the research questions, the thesis needs to be able to conceive of the spatial 
conditions upon which the elements become involved as emergent from bodily 
perception processes. This suggests the need to employ a methodology with a flat 
ontology that does not prioritise the human over the nonhuman or the corporeal over 
the extracorporeal, but which does involve a human corporeal percept. Capturing the 
spatial conditions of compulsion emergence would thus involve a methodology with a 
particular sensitivity to the articulation of the form and materiality of objects and 
spaces, and, as such, allow for a ‘mapping’ of these compulsive configurations. 
Additionally, it requires involvement of perceptions of performing compulsions, as they 
inform the formation of subjectification enlacing bodies, objects, and spaces. However, 
these perceptions would not need to be based on introspection and the relational only.   
  
                                               
11 e.g. Deleuze and Guattari 2004; Latour 1993; 2005; Colebrook, 2002; Delanda, 2006; 2016; and for 
human geography in particular Anderson and McFarlane 2011, Dewsbury 2011 Anderson 2012; Thrift 
1997; 2008) 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
The literature review demonstrated that compulsive interaction is a severely 
underresearched phenomenon. Indeed, where compulsions are researched, they are 
understood as solely a malfunction of the brain, as actions rather than interactions, and 
in terms of severity and frequency, rather than kind. As a consequence, the consulted 
literature does not explain how particular contexts, and the conditions they arise from, 
sustain, and evoke particular kinds of compulsive interactions, and in what ways 
negotiations map onto them. This study aims to uncover how compulsive interactions 
emerge through encounters between bodies, objects, and spaces, the ways in which 
these relations are negotiated, and what can teach us about relations between people 
and place. In this chapter I demonstrate in what ways the social scientific methodology 
that guided this study can help to overcome the gaps in the literature and help inform 
these aims. 
The chapter opens with the Onto-epistemological Questions (section 3.1), which sets 
out the philosophical premises of the empirical study. It does so by attending to the 
more-than-representational aspects of compulsive interactions, elaborating on the 
spatial and experiential organisation of perception through the sensory, and carving out 
in what ways personal histories have informed the methods. The following Subsection 
3.2 on the Research Design elaborates on the recruitment of research participants, the 
ethics and researcher positionality, as well as the study locations, the set-up before 
and during initial meetings, the use of diagnostic tests and extra information provided 
by three participants. Subsection 3.3 Methods elaborates on the ways in which I 
employed the methods, namely, semi-structural, in-depth interviews, ethnographic 
observations, and mobile eye-tracking, followed by the analysis of the different kinds of 
data produced through these methods, and the participation effects on the participants. 
Subsection 3.4 provides a summary, and elaborates on the organisation of the analysis 
chapters 
 
3.1 ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS 
For understanding the complexities and kind of compulsive interactions that are 
constituted through spatial configurations of bodies, objects, and spaces, this section 
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attends to the onto-epistemological parameters of the study. As highlighted in Chapter 
2, compulsive interactions have not been studied as such in the literature to date. 
Understanding them in broader terms as urge-driven movements sees them appearing 
in empirical studies on their frequency and severity and in compliance with pre-existing 
categories. Additionally, they have been studied in terms of their capacity to 
incapacitate people in their daily lives. As such, these studies are underpinned by onto-
epistemologies that position compulsive interactions in terms of structures of cognition 
and meaning, which silences their spatial and affective dimensions. The methodology 
of this study thus needed to be sensitive to the spatial, perceptive, and reflexive ways 
in which compulsive interactions and their negotiations are performed. Therefore, the 
study organised knowledge formation through performative, more-than-
representational dimensions (Section 3.1.1), the in situ spatial and experiential 
organisation through the sensory (Section 3.1.2), and long term experiences of 
performing an negotiating compulsive histories (Section 3.1.3). First, I turn to the 
ontological situation of the human with the more-than human and the capacities upon 
which both figured in the study.  
In the literature review I have suggested that it is necessary to conceive of compulsive 
interactions and their negotiations through a flattened ontology. Such ontology 
equalises the human and nonhuman capacities in their contribution to compulsions 
(see Law, 2004). As these human and the nonhuman capacities differ, the thesis aimed 
to uncover the conditions upon which they became involved, and attended to them in 
commensurate ways. Nonhuman objects and spaces have been rendered affective on 
nonnormative terms. In this, their constitutive aspects were not rendered in accordance 
to human conception but human perception (after Harman 2002; Ash 2015). In other 
words, their meaning, aesthetics, and functionality were not prioritised over their 
physical form and embeddedness in the material situations (see Bennett 2001; 
Whatmore 2006; Anderson and Wylie 2009). Moreover, human involvement has been 
based on human capacities for consciousness, sensation, as well as intro- and 
retrospection. Additionally, their capacity for timing, postponement, and predicting 
consequences has been attended to. 
 
3.1.1 Performativity: Beyond words 
As academic and autobiographical literature on compulsivity and urge-driven 
performances argue, rationality as linear logic and self-world relations seem unable to 
explain the urge for, nor the kind of, compulsive engagement with the extracorporeal. 
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This presents specific conditions for the study’s engagement with the human and their 
experiences. Methods such as interviews that do so, often do so to uncover meanings 
and sense-making processes (after Bryman 2012). Indeed, in uncovering compulsive 
performance the basis for knowledge expands from only comprehending signification to 
also include “the world of substance, flesh, and viscerality” (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 
pp. 54). Such expansion is based on poststructural and postphenomenological 
rejection of essentialism for knowledge formation. Instead, the non-representational 
theories that characterise these criticisms challenge the requirement for sense-making 
processes for understanding phenomena (Thrift 1997; 2008; Dewsbury 2003; Harrison 
2007; Anderson and Harrison 2010).  
A focus on knowledge formation outside sense-making processes and structures of 
meaning envisions new modes of communication; for instance through movement such 
as dance (McCormack 2003) and by posthuman attunements (Brigstocke and Noorani 
2016). It also highlights problems with capturing experience in and of itself, as in the 
communication of experiences, elements always get lost (Agamben 1999). In other 
words: “the sense of this movement disappeared when one tried to capture it through 
meaningful reflection” (McCormack 2003, pp. 493). This is only through the 
nonrelational aspects of experience that, nonetheless, tell us something about human-
world relations (Harrison 2007; Anderson and Harrison 2010; MacPherson 2010), but 
also in particular experiences that are pathologised and not shared across humanity 
(Davidson and Henderson 2010). In case of compulsivity, urges in particular seem to 
be nonrelational phenomena as Verdellen et al. (2008) argue that they are difficult to 
capture in words (see also Woods et al. 2005). Additionally, some might not be 
memorable enough to last a memory, and sink in the body-memory in a similar fashion 
as some habits do (see Bissell 2011).  
In capturing experiences in the most fitting way possible, the methodology for this study 
needed to cater for any expression of performing compulsions. This required a 
sensitivity to everyday language, medical and clinical jargon, metaphors, utterances, 
and gestures, and offer the potential for the exemplification of compulsions and 
negotiations, and share sensations. Such an approach would not impose a method of 
knowledge construction (see Feld 1982 in Pink 2009). Rather, it needed to provide 
accounts of sense-making processes of life with compulsions and their negotiations, as 
well as be sensitive to the boundaries of experience (after Lea 2009). Such a tracing 
would effectively ‘map’ experience onto compulsive configurations. In turn, this 
conceptual ‘mapping’ would also allow for situating the uncommunicable, 
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untranslatable, and non-representational aspects of compulsive interactions, as well as 
their negotiations. Especially the latter invited thinking through explicit bodily 
dispositions – feeling and movements or “intelligence-as-act” (Melrose 1994 in 
Dewsbury 2009, pp. 327), which approached compulsive performances as close as 
possible through my own body (after Crang 2003; 2005; Longhurst et al. 2008; 
MacPherson 2010). 
 
3.1.2 Experience in situ: The sensory 
In order to determine the ways in which spatial situations of bodies, objects, and 
spaces become involved in constituting and negotiating compulsive interactions, the 
study needed to attend to processes of perception and embodiments of compulsivity. 
As such, it attends to the spatial and experiential organisation of the sensory. As the 
onto-epistemological position suggested, the study should be sensitive to the flesh as 
an “operative, organizing force” (Hoel and Carusi 2015, pp. 78), as touch invokes a 
spatiality centring the body as frame of reference (Chirimuuta and Paterson 2014). The 
study thus attends to the visceral to attune to and “bring background or previously 
undetected non-human objects and forces to the forefront and so enable them to be 
studied and analysed” (Ash 2017, pp. 206). Furthermore, spatial experience is 
constituted by the totality of the modes of perception to produce a system of bodily 
orientation (Ingold 2000), and the summing up of the senses (Spence and Driver 
2004). As bodily orientation with reference to objects and/or spaces had been named 
to incite compulsive engagement (e.g. Wilensky 1999; Shane Fistell in Crichton-Miller 
et al. 2004; Van Bloss 2006), this study is sensitive to the ways in which bodies 
position in accordance to the extracorporeal.  
Whilst spatial experience cannot be reduced to one sense (Pink 2009), the 
visuocentrism in Western philosophy underpinning social scientific research does 
prioritise vision over other senses (Atkinson et al. 2007; Stokes and Biggs 2014; 
Chirimuuta and Paterson 2014). Indeed, compulsively engaging with the order and 
organisation of objects, as well as the heightened sensitivity had been claimed as 
largely vision-related phenomena. With vision invoking a different kind of spatiality 
centring the extracorporeal as frame of reference (Révèsz 1950 in Chirimuuta and 
Paterson 2014), the visual needed to be specifically accommodated in the methods to 
capture compulsive ordering and balancing. Additionally, the methodology also needed 
to cater for the particularities of the tactile, to capture instances such as Shane Fistell’s 
compulsive urge to ‘touch’ Oliver Sacks’ breath with his own (Rawlence 1996). In 
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conjunction with a lack of reference to the self, the study refrained from mobilising 
sensory data as means for the interpretation of meaning. Rather, it needed to 
epistemologically position sensory data as indication of the kind and location of spatial 
processes that enlace the corporeal with the extracorporeal. This would help to 
determine the conditions for compulsive subjectification processes through first-person 
perspectives.  
 
3.1.3 Compulsive histories 
In order to understand how compulsive interactions co-emerge with particular body-
object-space constellations, I needed to turn to historical experiential accounts. Such a 
move would not re-instate a structural approach to compulsive interactions, rather, as 
Segrott and Doel’s (2004) study suggests, historical experiential accounts provide the 
conditions upon which the human would become involved in the compulsion. Indeed, 
prior knowledge of situations and activities prone to compulsive urges, especially those 
that are habitual and/or repetitive, may inform certain expectations of compulsive 
engagement. These expectations would include particular challenging, or potentially 
harmful compulsive associations with specific objects and spaces (see Eapen et al. 
1994; O’Connor 2002; Segrott and Doel 2004), as well as different people who might 
hold particular views of compulsions (see Buckser 2006; 2008; Kuschner 1999; 
Wilensky 1999; Davis et al. 2004; van Bloss 2006).  
Such narrative first person perspectives could offer the potential to map compulsive 
subjectivities upon which negotiations of the urge unfolded. Methodological attendance 
to historical experiences could capture how compulsions were carried out in particular 
ways or rendered invisible and to what effect. These experiences may inform future 
decisions to negotiate compulsive urges or interactions with momentary perceptive and 
bodily measures (see e.g. Wilensky 1999; Van Bloss 2006; Buckser 2008), or not 
(Crichton-Miller et al. 2004: np). Experiences may also identify negotiations with 
structural measures, such as through taking medication or having therapy (Davis et al. 
2004). Furthermore, histories of being medicalised, often including misdiagnosis, and 
clinical constructions of compulsions, impact the experience and negotiations of 
compulsive engagement profoundly (Kushner 1999). These histories of compulsive 
engagement and the reflexive intricacies of human involvement and the effects on 
situational wellbeing also offer the potential to help develop a broader understanding 
about the ways in which compulsivity may form person-place relations.  
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In short, this section set out the study’s particular onto-epistemological premises that 
combine the spatialities of human and nonhuman performativity, mediation in the flesh 
and through perceptions in in situ experiences, and personal histories of compulsivity. 
This combination allowed attending to human-nonhuman interactions, and developing 
subjectification processes beyond representation and without requiring interpretation. 
Therefore, I decided on a methodology that spans the human and the nonhuman 
elements involved in compulsive interactions, includes perceptions and experiences of 
the unfolding urgency and negotiation, and articulates the distinctive spatial qualities of 
compulsions. The next section develops these premises into the design of the study, 
before elaborating on the research methods employed. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study aims to uncover how compulsive interactions emerge with processes 
between bodies, objects, and spaces, and how these relations are negotiated in order 
to develop our knowledge about spatial relations between people and place. This 
section elaborates on the ways in which I needed to organise accessing compulsive 
interactions, their negotiations as spatial configuration, and subjectification processes. 
In doing so, this section builds on the onto-epistemological conditions set out in the 
previous section. As has been noted in the previous section, the where, when, and how 
of urge-driven compulsive engagement does not appear in previous empirical research. 
Therefore, I relied heavily on the experience of people performing compulsions. As Del 
Casino (2010) notes, in what ways medicalised performances articulate depends on 
the spatial and social circumstances. Consequently, I needed to create environments 
that were supportive of, and stimulating for, people to discuss their experiences, and 
for compulsions to arise. I did so in a number of ways in close collaboration with the 
people I worked with. This section elaborates on these environments after explaining 
participant recruitment (Subsection 3.2.1), through research ethics (Subsection 3.2.2), 
and feeds these ethical concerns into the ways in which the research meetings were 
organised (Subsection 3.2.2) 
 
3.2.1 Participant recruitment 
This study attends to compulsive interactions, not people performing them, nor the 
Tourette syndrome diagnosis. However, compulsive interactions have not been studied 
in social sciences before, therefore, there was no guideline of how many participants 
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would be ideal for this study. As Segrott and Doel’s (2004) study suggests, there can 
be an incredible richness and vastness of the data working with only one participant. 
Indeed, through focussing on compulsive interactions further than a clinical diagnosis, 
there is the potential for this study to have a vast, open-ended appearance. Instead of 
finding more resemblance with the addition of every participant, there was a risk that 
the kind of compulsions identified varied further, increasing the complexity of the 
phenomenon and the multiplicity of the implications (after Rajchman 2000, cited in 
Dewsbury 2009). This study therefore had to balance the need for a suitable and 
respectable recruitment group without this becoming unmanageable.  
 
Involvement in this study required participants to perform compulsive interactions, such 
as touching, ordering, balancing and instating symmetry, that were driven by urges 
and/or not-just-right feelings. To cater for negotiations to have taken shape, all 
participants had to be aware of, and have the capacity to discuss performing them. 
Additionally, as advised by Dr Cara Verdellen, participants would have had experience 
with performing compulsions for at least one year prior to and during the study as part 
of their Tourette syndrome diagnosis. Furthermore, those involved had to be at least 18 
years of age, as the urge would most likely have developed by this age 
(Banaschewitski et al. 2003; Verdellen et al. 2008). As such, this study could also help 
provide insight into adults with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis, as the vast majority of 
medical and clinical literature is based on research with diagnosed children. Also, all 
participants had to have Dutch as their native language to avoid missing out on 
linguistic nuances, as well as a sharing understandings of medical and cultural contexts 
of everyday life. Despite focusing on compulsive interactions rather than people, 
participant diversity in terms of age, gender, race, education, occupation, living 
situation, and medical history had been safeguarded in recruitment efforts. On the 
basis of discussions with Dr Cara Verdellen12 and my sister, as well as on the basis of 
the developing database over the 8 months I worked with them, 15 people complied 
with the recruitment requirements, and became involved in the study. This number also 
sustained the need for a rich and diverse collection of compulsions that remained 
manageable. Their involvement ranged a period between several days and 7 months 
(see Table 1 for a short description of the participants). 
 
  
                                               
12 Dr Cara Verdellen could advise me on the variety of compulsions performed and the differences 
between people, and my sister could advise on the differences between places, times, presence of other 
people, and activities. 
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Table 1: Participant occupation and living situation 
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Alan M 67 Retired, former graphic 
designer 
Lived with his partner and many pets in large 
house in a suburban neighbourhood 
Siôn M 41 Freelance camera man Lived with his partner and children in semi-
detached house in a suburban neighbourhood 
Sara F 21 Part-time voluntary carer 
at a home for disabled 
people  
Lived alone with pets in a small studio in a 
small village 
Elisa F 35 Part-time psychiatric 
nurse 
Lived with partner and pets in small house in a 
small village 
Cai M 18 Unemployed, former 
student in logistics 
Lived with house mate in assisted living 
complex in a suburb of large city 
Sage F 25 Working with disabled 
children on voluntary 
basis 
Lived with boyfriend and pets in farm house on 
the countryside during the interview and 
observation, and in a 3rd floor flat in a suburban 
neighbourhood during the eye-tracking 
sessions  
Tomos M 27 Musician Lived on his own in a small house in a 
suburban neighbourhood 
Lowri F 24 Student pedagogy  Lived with her partner in a small flat in a city 
centre 
Ginny F 35 Unemployed after a 
wide range of jobs 
Lived with partner and children and dog in a 
suburban neighbourhood of a middle sized city 
Mina F 39 Unemployed, legally 
deemed partially unfit for 
work, former insurance 
doctor 
Lived alone in a flat on ground level in the 
centre of a middle-sized city 
Bill M 38 Unemployed Lived with his partner, son and dog in a house 
in a suburban neighbourhood of a town 
Joe M 53 Unemployed, legally 
partially deemed unfit for 
work, former lorry driver 
Lived with wife, two children and pets in a 
small terraced house in a village 
Rhys M 21 Law student Lived in a shared student house 
Dylan M 21 Unemployed, former 
fitness coach 
Lived with parents and pets in a small terraced 
house in a middle-sized town. 
Nora F 52 Legally deemed entirely 
unfit for work 
Lived with husband and pet in a small terraced 
house in a large town 
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The networks of my sister and the professional networks13 of advisor Dr. Cara 
Verdellen helped recruiting two participants. Furthermore, as Casler et al. (2013) 
argue, calls for participants on social media platforms have increasingly become 
commonplace, and they proved very useful in this study as well. Nine participants were 
recruited via social media. I have been a member of a number of Dutch Facebook 
pages on which people with TS discuss experiences. These, as well as related 
websites of various Dutch patient interest groups14, allowed the placement of open 
calls for participants on online platforms. Especially the Facebook pages allowed for 
inviting individuals who seemed relevant to the study on the basis of their comments on 
these platforms. Private direct messaging with email follow-up resulted in the 
recruitment of nine people. Additionally, three participants were recruited during an 
annual meeting day of the Dutch patient organisation15, and one through snowballing. 
Despite efforts, no people of colour could be recruited. This is a reflection of the 
particular societal group I had access to. No participant withdrew from the research. 
 
For becoming involved in this study, the participants had several reasons. These 
included feelings of altruism and pride in aiding other people and younger generations 
by sharing their experiences of compulsive interactions and negotiations of this aspect 
of their life. Some emphasized the lack of understanding and information of, as well as 
treatment for compulsivity. Reflecting on their own life, some participants saw 
involvement as an opportunity to discuss this aspect of their life with an informed and 
empathetic stranger. Participation also stemmed from curiosity about the qualitative 
character of the research and the methods, as participating in medical and clinical 
studies tends to differ strongly. 
 
3.2.2 Ethics and positionality 
As this study is a social scientific one, the applied research ethics for the involvement 
with and care for all participants are grounded in the Cardiff University ethical 
guidelines and requirements for social scientific work as set in 2015. The study was 
                                               
13 At the time of the empirical study, Dr. Cara Verdellen was head of and clinical psychologist at the HSK 
Expertise Tics Centre, Den Bosch, The Netherlands. She and her colleagues asked the people with 
Tourette syndrome they treated with behavioural therapies if they would be interested in partaking in this 
study. 
14 Websites and social media platforms included those of Stichting Gilles de la Tourette, Tourettenet, and 
Stichting Dwangstoornis.  
15 This annual meeting was organised by the Dutch Patient Organisation in Baarn, The Netherlands on 18 
May 2014 
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approved by the Cardiff School of Geography and Planning ethics committee in 2015. 
The empirical study was supported by Dr. Cara Verdellen, who is specialised in 
behavioural therapy treatment for people with TS as a registered clinical psychologist. 
Additionally, the informed consent form utilised was the standard version the Cardiff 
School of Social Sciences and translated into Dutch. All participants signed two 
informed consent forms; one of which was for them and the other for my archive. With 
the confirmation of the availability of a mobile eye-tracking system five months into the 
fieldwork, additional information was provided in a leaflet and was discussed 
extensively. All participants were anonymised and appear under a Welsh or English 
pseudonym that ‘fitted with their personality’ as I had come to know them by. 
Furthermore, all participants were guaranteed that all identifiable tropes would be 
omitted from the data and that the data would be treated as confidential. 
In creating an environment in which the participants were comfortable with sharing their 
experiences with me and allowing me to witness their compulsive interactions and 
negotiations, a relationship of trust, empathy, respect, and support was crucial (after 
DeLaine 2000). Therefore, I organised the empirical study in particular ways. The most 
important guidance for the study was seeking to “do no harm” (Hay 2010, pp. 38, see 
also Murphy and Dingwall 2005). People with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis above 
the age of 17 are not categorised as vulnerable adults according to the Protection of 
Vulnerable Adults Regulations 200216. Some of them did discuss their participation with 
a health professional and/or with a significant other. All found themselves capable of 
participation after they had read and discussed the recruitment leaflet with me. The 
potentially invasive character of this study was negotiated by leaving the participants in 
charge of their participation as much as possible. This is method specific and is 
elaborated on in detail in the Subsections 3.3.1, 3.2.2 and 3.3.3. Allowing the 
participants to adjust the ways in which the methods were employed resulted in a 
methodological diversification. Personalisation of the methods helped catering for 
different compulsive sensitivities, and may therefore have enriched the data (after Pink 
2009). As such, circumstantial ethical concerns differed per participant, and 
determining what was right in each situation, and how to respond varied (Crang and 
Cook 2007).  
                                               
16 People with Tourette syndrome are not denoted as ‘vulnerable adults’ according to the Protection of 
Vulnerable Adults Regulations 2002, because they are not “substantially dependent on performing basic 
functions”, do not have “a disability to communicate or are severely impaired”. As such, they are 
“capable of protecting themselves from assault or physical abuse or his/her will or moral wellbeing being 
subverted or overpowered” 
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Focussing on potentially debilitating performances by a person has certain ethical 
implications, as they are a source of anxiety (O’Connor 2002). Additionally, 
negotiations of compulsive urges and engagements are precisely adopted, agonised 
over, and perfected to render them invisible to other people (Ibid.). Being asked to 
share them and ‘give their tricks away’ can be experienced as entirely counter intuitive. 
This rendered the participants vulnerable to negative effects of the study’s focus. 
These effects are further elaborated on in section 3.317. Therefore, at the beginning of 
all research meetings, I explained what to expect, emphasized that they could stop at 
any time, not answer questions, stop activities without needing to provide a reason. 
This did occur, and I am aware that there are social mechanisms that may prohibit 
research participants from doing so (Bryman 2012). However, during any research 
meeting regular breaks were taken; on request of the participant, on my suspicion they 
needed one, and by dragging out any ‘natural’ pauses, such as another person or pet 
requiring attention, or transitions, such as between two eye-tracking sessions.  
To help constitute a safe and positive research environment, I was aware of and 
negotiated my own presence in and impact on it. As a young, able-bodied, 
undiagnosed, and highly educated woman with affiliations to Dr. Cara Verdellen I had 
several privileges in comparison to the participants, which will have had effects on the 
ways in which I was perceived by them. In sustaining the participative character of the 
study, I negotiated these privileges by presenting myself in a number of ways in order 
to create a relationship of trust (after Spradley 2001). In addition to positioning myself 
as a researcher, I did this through positioning myself as friend whenever possible (after 
Everhart 2001), and without risking coming across as unprofessional (Bryman 2012). 
The fact that I do not have a medical or clinical degree but am sufficiently informed, 
was articulated in varying degrees between participants, with some using scientific 
jargon to check that I could follow. Mediating this was also helped by mentioning that I 
was advised by Dr. Cara Verdellen, who is known to several of the participants. As 
such, in comparison to medical and clinical researchers and professionals they would 
have encountered, I presented myself in a personal and informal fashion. Also, after 
‘leaving the field’, I ‘gave back’ (Watts 2011) by being available for any kind of 
conversation about the project and the participants’ lives, inviting the participants to a 
                                               
17 In my capacity of a researcher I was also vulnerable to be negatively affected by research meeting, 
through being confronted with aspects of personal histories that I would find difficult personally. After 
such aspects, such as self-harm, suicidal tendencies, abuse, as well as painful compulsions came up in the 
research meetings, I reflected on them in my field note diary to deal with the effects. Whilst I have been 
subject to compulsive interactions, on a number of occasions, they were never problematic. 
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repeat lecture on the results requested by the Dutch Patient Organisation in May 2017, 
as well as promising to send them the finished dissertation and any other publication. 
In articulating my personal narrative to this study, which has become an accepted and 
encouraged practice in social scientific research for the unique perspective it brings 
(Coffey 1999), I also presented myself as the sister of a person with Tourette’s. With 
this presentation, I claimed (some) knowledge of compulsivity by having witnessed how 
daily life can revolve around it and the Tourette condition more broadly, as well as 
diagnosis, treatment, and social situations. This also meant that I would not act 
surprised or even shocked when they would tic, and they would not have to fear being 
confronted with common misconceptions (see Buckser 2008). Hence, I positioned 
myself as personally involved in the research and having the knowledge only people 
closely involved with person with TS can have. As I enquired, most participants felt 
they did not need to suppress all their tics and compulsions in my presence, which 
could be regarded a sign of trust as people suppress less around familiar people (see 
Meucci et al. 2009; Capriotti et al. 2013). Some explained that they used moments 
alone (e.g. in the bathroom, kitchen) to release the tension and “let some [tics] out”, as 
Nora argued. Knowing that such moments would only need to last a couple of seconds 
I would also intentionally create them by turning away, and attending to anything away 
from them, which, for example, became visible in Sage’s second eye-tracking session 
(see Subsection 3.3.3). Nonetheless, (a lack of) suppression cannot always be 
understood as indicating trust, as Elisa could not stop suppressing during the 
observation (see Subsection 3.3.3), which could be an effect of the method itself. I kept 
a field diary about any ethical concerns during meetings to remain reflexive in treating 
people fairly and with the right kind of care (after Manalansan 2006), and to construct a 
personal account of the meetings (Sanjek 2001). This helped to keep an eye on the 
evolving relationship with participants and the articulation of the power differential, and 
the impact of other people’s presence.  
I also mobilised my sister as a third subjectivity, or a ‘compulsivity proxy’, for her 
specific compulsions, negotiations, and experiences of particular places. Bringing 
Laura into the conversation occasionally opened up possibilities for bridging 
compulsive interactions and negotiations across participants, prompting particular 
sensitivities, and gauging their response to a restatement of a particular experience. In 
some cases it seemed to have helped participants in their considerations and 
formulations of their compulsions and negotiations (see Pink 2009). Additionally, in 
some cases I mobilised myself creating ‘conscious partiality’ (Mies 1993), in the sense 
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that I could have – undiagnosed – OCD or TS, based on genetics, the OCD in my 
family, and shared sensitivities with my sister, in order to think, or sense through 
particular compulsive affects. For instance, Nora commented on me rearranging a 
stack of papers: “See, you’re doing it too: you have Tourette’s yourself”. Embodying 
this position might have given them the feeling I understood better than others without 
a TS diagnosis. Seeing participants perform compulsions I would put in words how my 
body resonated with the sensations, and without leading their answers, my fieldnotes 
reflect on this. I noticed: 
“So what I say is important; the muscle tension, the exact posture of 
the body, the space as lived and felt, as well as the urge as lived and 
felt. Is not knowable from the outside. I am indeed approaching what 
it is, but can’t reach it.”  
As such, I was empathetic without claiming to know or feel like the other (Pitt and 
Britzman 2003; Rashed 2015). I made sure that my sensitivities would not lead to an 
overtly imagined intersubjectivity between me and the participant (Coffey 1999; 
Desjarlais 2003). Despite a reduced ‘risk’ of claiming expertise and the appropriation of 
the voices of people with compulsive experiences, I worked with them in a participative 
fashion (Chouinard 1997; Gleeson 2000) to “‘overcom[e] alienation’, rather than ‘attain 
freedom from power’” Blencowe et al. (2015, pp. 397). Additionally, in line with Rashed 
(2015) on Schizophrenia, the various theoretical approaches this study takes, cannot 
overcome the radical otherness posed by compulsivity, as is congruent with 
phenomenological thought of psychopathology (see Jaspers 1997). This articulates the 
applied ethics of interpersonal human relations.  
The broader study that seeks to deconstruct the medical and clinical renditions of 
compulsivity in order to reconstruct it as a spatial theory, requires a consideration of 
more-than-human ethics. With the increasing popularity of continental philosophy and 
its deconstructive tendencies in geography, geographers have sought to extend ethics 
beyond the category of the human, as tendencies commensurate with a decentring of 
the human required re-envisioning the conditions upon which ethics are based (e.g. 
Popke 2003; 2005; 2007; 2009; Braidotti 2006; Barnett 2010; 2012; Yusoff 2013). In 
positioning the human as equally powerful as the nonhuman, I accept that humans and 
nonhumans become equally responsible for compulsive interactions, and further 
compulsive relations between people and places (after Harman 2002; Ihde 2009). As 
human and nonhuman categories differ in the ways in which they contribute in the 
constitution of the compulsive situation, ethics emerge from the conditions upon which 
they contribute (see Lea 2009; Bingham and Hinchliffe 2008; Ash 2015). The ethics of 
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reconstructed compulsive interactions then inflect the relationships of the elements that 
constitute the spatial configuration. In other words, in Sage compulsively pressing her 
finger into the corner of the table, I argue for placing ethical concerns first and foremost 
between Sage’s finger and the table corner, rather than only at Sage.  
 
3.2.3 Organising the study 
Environments conducive to capturing the experience and spatiality of compulsive 
interactions and their negotiations could only be determined by the research 
participants themselves. Unlike research spaces in medical and clinical studies, which 
include and are largely limited by the doctor’s, therapist’s and researcher’s office (see 
Conelea and Woods 2008), I wanted the research spaces of this study to consist of a 
mixture of everyday spaces. Indeed, conducting the study about the particularity of 
places in these places helped to capture more aspects and details (Anderson 2004; 
Anderson et al. 2010). As discussed with the participants, these spaces came to 
consist of homes and gardens, supermarkets and small shops, trains and train stations, 
cars, natural areas and parks, cafe’s, pharmacies, as well as town centres and streets. 
This presented a mixture of varying materialities, activities, publicness (Eapen et al. 
1994; Goetz et al. 2001), cultural convention (Wilensky 1999), social ‘safety’ 
(Hollenbeck 2001; Van Bloss 2006), and presence of ingrained routines (Van Bloss 
2006; Pink 2006; 2012). In these spaces, the dynamisms between bodies, objects, and 
space elements varied with the capacity for bodily mobility, object adjustment and 
touch(see Hetherington 1999; Clintberg 2014), sensory stimulation (Gerland 2003), as 
well as particular kind of bodily negotiations (Goetz et al. 2001; Davis et al. 2004). 
Whilst the intricacies of such wide variety of places cannot be generalised, I argue that 
such particularity can offer insights into the ways in which not-just-rightness is mapped 
onto body-object-space configurations. 
By far the most research meetings were organised in the home. As argued by many of 
those experiencing compulsivity (e.g. Shane Fistell in Crichton-Miller et al. 2004; Van 
Bloss 2006), as well as indicated by Goetz et al. (2001), the home is a place where 
compulsions are most prevalent. Apart from the general absence of unfamiliar people, 
the home differs from other spaces for being a place that can be altered and adjusted 
at will to accommodate compulsivity in terms of appearance and object formation. This 
flexibility can also accommodate negotiations (see Buckser 2008), which render the 
home a place that could invoke a stronger diversity. Organising the research 
encounters in the home could potentially have been intrusive because of painful 
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memories and associations (Miller 2001), nonetheless, participants felt most 
comfortable there.  
The first time participants and I met were informal meetings that were not recorded or 
subjected to informed consent, and took place in a friendly and conversational manner 
in most cases at their home. In these meetings I prepared them for the subsequent 
participative character of the study and the interview. In addition to a general getting to 
know each other, during these meetings we discussed the project and its organisation, 
as well as some of their compulsive interactions. Also, adjustments to particular 
aspects of the methods were made to meet the preference and concern of the 
participants, and thereafter we discussed and signed the informed consent forms. With 
six participants these meetings took place about a week before the interview was 
scheduled. After these visits, I noted relevant information, which in addition to the 
clinical tests were used in the preparations of the interview guide. With the nine others I 
briefly added follow-up questions to the general interview guide on the basis of the 
conversations.  
During the initial informal meeting I asked participants to fill out two clinical diagnostic 
tests to gauge if there would be any relation between test scores that capture 
frequency and severity, and kind of compulsions and urge sensations. These tests are 
self-referential tests, which expect people to translate their experiences in difference in 
degree (see Cath et al. 2001). The Premonitory Urge for Tics Scale (PUTS) (Woods et 
al. 2005) is set up to measure the kind of urge sensation, prevalence, and effect in 
relation to tics. It turned out to be less suitable for compulsions of the interactive kind, 
and differentiating between bodily regions or the tics that followed the urge. Originally 
developed for obsession driven compulsions but also used for urge-driven 
compulsions, the Dimensional Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (DY-BOCS) 
(Rosario-Campos et al. 2006) measures the kind and severity of compulsions within six 
dimensions. I only used the third dimension on “Symmetry, Ordering, Counting, and 
Arranging Obsessions and Related Compulsions” for its accommodation for 
compulsive interactions. 
Filling out both tests proved highly problematic for almost all participants; many left 
blank spaces, required help, added notes explaining answers, and/or wanted to 
discuss complexities to their answers during the interviews. Therefore I quickly learned 
to leave it up to the participant when they would be most comfortable to fill them out. In 
case this happened after the interview, I would ask any questions about their answers 
during the research meeting after, and would note their argument in my fieldwork diary. 
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The richness of their experience and dynamism of compulsions did not translate into 
the reductively narrow test aim, as well as the fact that the test answers were 
categorised, the confusing examples that were provided, and the physical lay-out of the 
form largely include reasons participants expressed their frustration with. Ginny 
reflects:  
“I am so compulsive with questionnaires – I had to fill out one the 
other day, and I want those things to be positioned differently, these 
answers, because it’s just not right or eh.. (…) yeah, I get completely 
befuddled sometimes, because often it’s just wrong.” 
The ambiguity of their answers already demonstrated the effects of the lack of 
experiential knowledge of compulsive interactions in the clinical sciences. Nonetheless, 
their answers to the tests not only helped to direct the focus of the study towards 
compulsive interactions, it also to helped to start the interview as I would ask them to 
elaborate on their answers. 
Alan, Elisa, and Sara provided extra information about their compulsions. They felt that 
it would help them communicate their compulsive interactions more clearly in case I 
would not ask, they would forget to mention them, or they would not become visible 
through the methods I had proposed. Alan had compiled a list of past and current 
symptoms for intakes for therapy and research participation. Elisa and Sara18 had 
written a document to archive their conditions combined with major life events and 
personality traits. They had written the documents mainly for themselves, but also for 
new people in their lives to shape expectations and omit having to explain certain 
things. In addition to aiding activity choices for observations and eye-tracking, all three 
documents informed the interview questions, and were very helpful in steering the 
interviews towards compulsive interactions and their negotiations.  
Elisa and Sara also provided video recordings of themselves in particular everyday 
situations that would evoke ‘excessive’ compulsive expression. Elisa video-recorded 
herself for 40 minutes while she was cycling to work. Although not showing compulsive 
interactions, the video does demonstrate how her urges to perform particular kinds of 
tics and negotiations are strongly related to her socio-spatial situation, and in my 
absence in particular (see also Goetz et al 2001). As Sara’s observation did not 
                                               
18 Elisa and Sara are friends and share their Tourette’s diagnosis in addition to difficult experiences in their 
past. They have read each other’s document and update it with the unfolding of their lives. They also 
decided together to participate in this study and discussed their participation experiences with each other. 
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demonstrate as many compulsions as she had expected beforehand, she recorded 
herself alone doing her morning rituals in a series of 4 short videos. These entailed 
activities that had not been part of the observations or eye-tracking sessions. In the 
recordings of both women the bodily environment remained invisible, as the cameras 
were pointed towards their face and upper body whilst they narrated what they sensed 
and felt, thereby addressing me directly. These recordings demonstrated how video 
methods other than mobile eye-tracking (see Section 3.3.3) would be problematic in 
capturing compulsive interaction between bodies, objects, and spaces. Handheld 
cameras could prevent performing them, as the camera needed to be pointed at the 
body part, object(s), and space element(s) involved. Moreover, a static camera in a 
room has a high chance for recordings to be blocked by the body or objects. Also, a 
go-pro camera mounted on a participant’s head or chest would create too much 
discomfort, and the participant would have to angle their head or chest towards every 
compulsive performance. I did not extend a request for ‘symptom lists’ or videos to 
other participants, as the amount and invasiveness of the regular methods had already 
placed a large burden on them in terms of time, energy and emotionality. 
Evaluations of their participation and its effects were documented through evaluation 
forms that I had left with them at the end of the last research meeting. Any kind of 
evaluation was welcomed, and to accommodate for differences in conveying such 
information, I added a notebook and blank papers for unstructured thoughts, and a 
survey style form with open ended questions about the research style, communication, 
the methods, their relation with me, participation effects, and concerns. They came with 
two envelopes one addressed to me and one to my supervisor. I received five back. 
The effects of the different methods have been added to the sections below. 
The research design as set out in this section supports and develops the study of 
medicalised performances through a social scientific methodology. I also explained 
how conducting research on a phenomenon included in the Tourette syndrome 
diagnosis can take place by rendering the body mobile and outside laboratory 
conditions. As such, I set out how familiar spaces to participants provide a relevant 
articulation of compulsions. Furthermore, I explained how the participative character of 
the study, and a commensurate caring and trusting relationship between the 
researcher and participant can optimise information about the kind of compulsions, and 
what ethical implications this has. The latter included the suggestion to shift the ethics 
emerging with compulsions from the human towards including the human and within 
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the body-object-space configuration. The analysis sections in the next chapter provide 
further proof of the success of such an approach through the means of this study.  
In this section I elaborated on the mediation of access to compulsive interactions via 
people with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis. Furthermore, I explained the applied 
research ethics upon which the study created an atmosphere conducive to access as 
many kinds of compulsive interactions as possible through the engagement with 
research participants. In line with the distributed intentionality and the 
human/nonhuman configuration I conceptualised compulsive interaction as, I also 
argued for a posthuman ethics of compulsivity. Lastly, I explained the design of the 
study in terms of research sites, initial meetings, the mobilisation of clinical diagnostic 
tests, as well as unsolicited information provided by three participants. Building on this 
organisation, in the next section I expand on the methods employed. 
 
3.3 METHODS 
To understand how compulsive interactions may emerge with particular body-object-
space configurations, how their negotiations may intervene, and how this might explain 
certain aspects about person-place relations, I adopted three methods: semi-structured 
in-depth interviews (Subsection 3.3.1), participant observations (Subsection 3.3.2), and 
mobile eye-tracking (Subsection 3.3.3). These methods were designed to be enable 
formulating answers to all research questions. This section elaborates on the ways in 
which I mobilised them, and, as such, the study is based on 15 interviews 14 
observations, and 30 eye-tracking sessions, followed by 21 interviews on the basis of 
the recording, in addition to fieldnotes. Thereafter, it explains the analytical procedures 
for all methods (Subsection 3.3.4). This demonstrates how the onto-epistemological 
underpinning and research design informs the ways in which the data is gathered and 
analysed from which this study makes it claims. With this I offer a research strategy 
that captures compulsive interactions as commensurate with the theoretical disposition 
developed in the literature review. Additionally, it comprehensively captures compulsive 
interactions and their negotiations by overlapping and connecting the three dimensions 
covered by the methods. Whilst pursuing an ethics of qualitative difference demands 
accepting that compulsive interactions and negotiations are always partial in their 
appearance, I argue that their collective understanding creates a tapestry that 
articulates compulsive body-object-space configurations with which new kinds of 
person-place relations can be recognised and interrogated. Ethical considerations of 
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each method are discussed in the relevant subsections that follow. 
 
3.3.1 Interviews / Experiencing compulsive interaction 
The 15 interviews with a total duration of 27.3 hours serve a number of goals in 
uncovering the ways in which compulsive interactions are performed and negotiated, 
and how performing them reflects back on person-place relations. In particular, it helps 
to understand the human positionality in compulsions and the ways in which subject 
formation takes place in relation to perceptive and spatial processes. Interviews have 
been used extensively in geographical work on medicalised conditions that are 
associated with compulsivity (see Subsection 2.2.1), they have mainly been mobilised 
for psychoanalytical purposes, in which the data was interpreted to uncover meanings 
(e.g. Parr 1999; Davidson 2000; 2010; Davidson and Henderson 2010; De Leeuw et al. 
2017). However, in this study this was not necessarily the case (see Subsection 3.3.4). 
Indeed, I mobilised the interview method to provide information on the ways in which 
different kinds of compulsive engagements are determined and how and when objects 
and spaces become involved. The interviews were also the best method that could 
capture urges preceding acts or negotiations, the not-just-right feelings prior, during 
and after the interactions, and heightened sensitivity. Furthermore, the interviews 
aimed to point out what kind of negotiations were performed in what situation, and how 
a history of negotiating the urges was valuable to the research.  
I would keep an informal dialogue going until the start of the interview as a way of 
easing the participants into the more formal part of the meeting, to help them cope with 
the pressure of being voice recorded and asked to talk about very personal issues. A 
number of short breaks were taken depending on the participants’ requirements. 
During some interviews, partners or children would join in, which in some cases would 
prompt new topics, and gave a glimpse of the reception of the performances in the 
household. Often unsolicited but relevant information was offered before or after the 
recorded part of the meeting was noted in my fieldwork diary (after Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995). All interviews were recorded on a digital device, except one when the 
recording device malfunctioned. In this case I recorded myself recalling as much as I 
could from the meeting.  
The interviews were based on the filled out clinical tests, the information that had 
become available in email correspondence and during the initial meetings and in three 
cases also the extra pieces of information. I used this information to formulate person-
92 
 
specific interview questions and reformulate more general questions that were divided 
into three themes; ‘compulsive interactions’, ‘personal compulsive histories’, and 
‘negotiations and coping’ (see Table 2). Most of the time I would start with asking after 
their history with compulsivity and Tourette’s more broadly, which had the character of 
a life history method (Miller 2001), and gave them the opportunity to adjust to being 
interviewed. These histories served to contextualise the way they might regard the 
compulsive tendencies of their body, what professional aid they pursued and its 
success, and that shaped the ways they negotiate performing compulsions. 
The interview guide has mainly been used as a reminder of topics to cover with this 
particular participant as I followed the participant’s trail of thought, and asked questions 
from the guide that were close to it. The clinical tests proved very helpful in prompting 
both them to remember symptoms and me to ask for more detail or build a bridge to a 
related topic on the list. Although most participants were keen and confident in talking 
about their experiences of tics, they were less familiar discussing compulsive 
interactions, and needed to be guided (see Kvale 1996). It was possible to excite 
participants to talk about these experiences by providing examples of compulsions and 
Compulsive interactions 
Experience of compulsive interactions and urges, not-just-right feelings and heightened sensitivity; 
experience of different places; effects of activities and routines; bodily positions and movement; 
effects of specific objects, textures, forms, temperatures; presence and behaviours of others; other 
circumstances that have an effect on their compulsions (e.g. time of day, day of week, holiday 
situation, weather) 
Personal compulsive histories 
General history of the Tourette’s condition with the person in relation to particular places and 
institutions; influence of familiar and unfamiliar people and animals, wellbeing over time, anxiety 
and mood associated with compulsions; ‘acceptation’ of the disorder and its role in daily life 
Negotiations 
Experience with therapy and medication; accounts of (positive and negative) feedback from 
familiar and unfamiliar others; adjustment to particular situations; urge suppressions; coping 
strategies in specific places; object placements; bodily positions and movement; altered perception 
(e.g. being tired, wearing glasses/contacts/sun glasses, wearing gloves)  
Table 2: Overview of the topics in the interview guide 
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negotiations of my sister or other (anonymised) participant’s answers (after Barter and 
Renold 1999). Furthermore, as the three clinical categories of ‘touch tics’, ‘symmetry 
seeking and balancing acts’ and ‘ordering acts’ proved inadequate to capture the 
compulsive interactions discussed (because of overlap and not covering the whole 
breadth of compulsions mentioned), I mobilised them as aspects, rather than kinds. For 
instance, for Joe, touching an object in a particular way may be performed as a way of 
‘checking’ if the eyes have seen something ‘right’. The interviews thus accommodated 
for meanings and emotional aspects of compulsivity if the participant wanted to discuss 
it on such terms. I closed all interviews off with the question whether compulsive 
interactions had any meaning to be able to be able to explicitly attend to whether, and 
in what ways compulsivity relates to the self, as experiential accounts dispute this 
relation (see Chapter 2). 
The Tourette’s condition beyond compulsions shaped the interviews in a number of 
ways. Whilst I talked with them as strategy to encourage them to memorise and 
mention what they could consider irrelevant details, the reverse also occurred in about 
half of interview situations. It could have been an articulation of the anxieties that lace 
formal interviews, and/or as articulations of their tendency for verbal repetition 
(echolalia in clinical terms, see Section 2.1.2). Repetition of my words would restrict to 
the first part of the sentence, which I negotiated with keeping my sentences as open-
ended as possible to avoid leading them (Bryman 2012). This might also have been the 
case because, as expected, most participants struggled to recall particular 
compulsions. Furthermore, during the interview rhyming, sounds, enforced speech, and 
some vulgarities had to be uttered. Dylan explains that the latter (coprolalia) carries no 
meaning, and as such did not have any impact on the interview: “Sometimes I just 
vomit words which, later on, I think of, like, heh? Huh?” For Dylan that included "sieg 
heil" "heil hitler" at the time of the interview. Expressing his frustration with this, he 
argues “I’m not a national-socialist, so… it has nothing to do with my political 
preferences! (…) it’s hurtful, therefore it happens”. He is relieved it only happens “at 
home during the rebound” and the tic “so far hasn’t bothered him outside actually”. 
Whilst such utterances did not change the content of the interview, suppressing them 
did cost energy that tired participants, and the excess energy would intensify any other-
than-compulsive emotional expression.  
Interviewing people about aspects of their lives they might not be entirely comfortable 
had ethical implications. Recalling difficult periods from their past, especially with 
regards to the period before they were diagnosed had often been laced with suffering, 
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as well as going through teenage years, and having to accept that fulltime education or 
work would probably not be possible. Apart from remaining nonjudgmental (Kvale 
1996), my experience with my sister helped me help them to put in words what they 
wanted to say – and what not. There were differences in how personal participants’ 
stories would become and how quickly they were comfortable with conveying private 
aspects. Depending on how comfortable they appeared to me, how well we bonded, 
and if I could sense or know of a trauma (e.g. eating disorders, abuse, self-harm, 
suicidal tendencies) when discussing certain topics if I would ask them to further 
expand on these topics. When such traumas were brought up, I would not enquire 
further, let them decide what they wanted to convey, and offered reactionary support. 
This approach worked for a number of participants, such as Alan, who argued “just like 
with that psychologist, I am at ease with you – you calm down”. I also made sure to 
‘cool down’ the interview as the situation required (after Luker 2008). Furthermore, 
whenever possible I would put the voice recorder out of the participant’s sight to reduce 
associative stress and distraction. Those who have reflected on their experience of the 
interviews via the different ways of feedback were very positive. 
As many of the compulsions I asked participants to elaborate on in depth were difficult 
to put in words, many participants offered to ‘demonstrate’ them (i.e. to interact without 
waiting to feel urged to). Demonstrations also included compulsive organisations of 
objects, or entire rooms that had been brought in line with compulsive requirements. As 
such, the largely static interviews shifted to mobile interviews, presenting spaces of the 
house as an ‘archaeology of compulsive knowledge’ (after Anderson 2004). As such, in 
addition to intentional demonstrations, the interviews provided ample opportunities to 
observe compulsive engagements, as I noticed them, or when evocative situations 
arose. The latter happened when Elisa received a parcel during the interview. Straight 
after she closes the door and steps back into the living room where I am sat, she says: 
“This one is for my partner, but I always have to unpack parcels, I 
can’t… *rips plastic* so… I just can’t eh eh… parcels, that’s eh, that 
needs unpacking *opens box* so this is pure compulsivity you’re 
witnessing! *grins*” 
These instances prepared me in focussing my attention during the observations. 
Therefore, whilst the research methods were clearly demarcated in time, practice, and 
purpose, in practice the methods had flown into each other. Indeed, the interviews also 
set a style of communication during the observations in which participants would 
explain and think through compulsive engagement and negotiations and new insights 
they had after the interview without being prompted. On some occasions, the only 
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difference between the interview and the conversations during the observations was 
that the latter was not audio recorded. I did, however, write everything I could 
remember in my fieldnotes diary after the session if I did not have a possibility earlier. 
Five participants told me about the effects the interview had on them after I left. 
Negative effects included fatigue for up to a few hours after the meetings, or hangover 
feelings as Mina argued. Some also stated that they ended up reliving the meeting in 
their mind for a few hours. After I had learned about the effects in particular the 
interview could have, I told participants with whom I had scheduled an interview about 
these potential effects. Discussing their symptoms and condition in general may have 
caused participants to rethink them and regard them differently; potentially in a 
negative manner. In turn, such consideration also had therapeutic aspects that were 
pursued by a number of participants. Siôn approached me as if I was a mental health 
professional, expanding on his life beyond compulsivity and Tourette´s related aspects, 
engaging me in broader discussions about meaning in life, religion and altruism. Ginny 
had a similar disposition and frequently asked me questions on experiences of my 
sister and other research participants, in particular for knowing how common or 
uncommon her experiences were.  
This subsection on the interview method thus explained how the study is sustained by 
the experience of compulsive interactions. It informs the study on which particular 
compulsions happened where, and with or without which people in the vicinity. The 
interviews also contribute to knowledge of the ways in which sensory processed where 
experienced and in what ways they shaped the conditions upon which compulsive 
engagements between people, objects and spaces take place. Furthermore, the 
method captured the various historical aspects that had shaped the relationship with 
their compulsive bodily performances, including their medicalisation. As such, 
employing this method allowed mapping the subjectification processes that underpin 
compulsive interactions and their negotiations. With elaborating on the interview 
method I constituted the ways in which, through retrospection, the human becomes 
involved in the spatial configurations between bodies, objects, and spaces in 
compulsive moments. So far, this leaves unexplored how aspects of compulsive body-
object-space configurations and negotiative interventions take place outside 
retrospection. The interviews thus offer a human historical point of view, but lack an 
appreciation of the immanence of configurations between bodies, objects, and spaces 
(after Kusenbach 2003). In the next subsection I explain how my employment of the 
participant observations attends to these dimensions. 
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3.3.2 Participant Observations / Seeing-Doing Compulsive interactions 
In the previous section, I explained how the interview method provides retrospective 
accounts of the experience of compulsive engagements and the premises this sets for 
their negotiation. In also enabling attendance to the sensory processes that guide 
compulsive interactions between bodies, objects, and spaces, the largely static 
interviews thus helped to grasp mainly aspects of the human contribution to compulsive 
person-place relations. Building on the contribution of this method to the study, this 
section expands on how I attended to the nonhuman aspect by observing the mobile 
human body amongst objects and with reference to the spaces in which compulsive 
interactions took place as they took place. As such, what follows is an elaboration on 
how I mobilised participant observation to capture compulsions that did not produce a 
memory or happened in full awareness, and that what cannot be conveyed in 
language. The ethnographic ‘onlooker’ perspective on compulsions gave me the 
opportunity to see how 248 registered compulsions and 2.5 hours of ongoing 
compulsive activity unfolded between other-than-compulsive life, how this difference 
articulated, and what this implied for negotiations. Employing this method then allowed 
me to attend to the nonhuman extracorporeal dimension of compulsive interactions 
without mediation via the human. The section first turns to the method, then I elaborate 
on the practical conduct, the subsection thereafter expands on the ethics of the method 
and how I navigated any concerns, and concludes with the contribution to the 
methodological literature. 
As the medical and clinical sciences are underpinned by observations, as is the 
hallmark characteristic of positivist empirical research, urge-driven phenomena are 
often studied through observational analysis. However, in the observational methods 
employed in these fields, only purely bodily tics can arise. Lance Turtle with a 
Tourette’s diagnosis (in Turtle and Robertson 2008, pp. 451) regards this as potentially 
problematic; 
Only I am with me all the time, however, so only I can see the truly 
chaotic nature of the day-today and hour-to-hour variation in my tics. 
These observational methods render the body static and seek to separate it from its 
context, which impedes the appearance of urge-driven compulsive interactions (see 
Beljaars (under review). Hence, for observing compulsive interactions, the social 
scientific methodology guiding participant observation is more appropriate as it 
understands the material and social context of phenomena to be constitutive of the 
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phenomenon focused on (Pink 2012). Indeed, participant observation is a method 
where understanding about the relations between the body and its context can be 
developed for the study of medical conditions (e.g. Davidson 2003; MacPherson 2010; 
Raymaker and Nicolaidis 2013). Nonetheless, for this study, I did not mobilise 
participant observations in the way classic ethnography prescribes. Indeed, I have not 
immersed in the study situations as I could not participate in the compulsive 
interactions as experienced by those involved (Pink 2003). Additionally, the 
observations in this study captured bodily interactions as performed outside human 
intention, purposefulness, and meaning: not culture, shared practice, and not primarily 
sociality.  
Participant observation as employed here attends to the performative and pre-reflexive 
knowledge, capturing communication beyond language (see Buller 2014) and 
introspection (Glaser and Strauss 1967), and helping to retrieve the trivial details of 
everyday experiences only made possible through being mobile (Kleinman 2001; 
Kusenbach 2003; Czarniawska 2007). As such, it provides participants with the 
possibility for experiential reflection on compulsions and negotiations observed, and 
allows for attending to aspects that may seem insignificant to, or go unnoticed by the 
participant at the time (after Kusenbach 2003). The observations were sensitive to 
differences between what was said during the interview and what happened during 
observed performances of compulsions (after Eyles 1988 in Herbert 2000). As Herbert 
(2000) suggests, such differences can be a direct result of different bodily situations, 
which is supported by earlier experimental clinical research by Goetz et al. (2001). 
Also, the observations showed how compulsive and other-than-compulsive interactions 
intertwined. 
In recognising compulsive from other-than-compulsive interactions my sensibilities 
developed through having lived with my diagnosed sister, as well as through extensive 
discussions with her and Dr Cara Verdellen. ‘Learning’ to recognise compulsive 
engagement per participant was helped by all prior meetings (including with recruitment 
attempts), which gave me an idea what to look for during the observations. Before and 
during the observations, I looked for changes in the smoothness and disruption of 
movements, as well as the way in which movements fitted with their intentional 
engagements. In case I felt that these did not fit with these acts I would write them 
down as compulsions. Nonetheless, in the moment and in situ, my sensitivities became 
most important. Depending on the situation and the participant, compulsive 
engagement unfolded whilst commented on at the time, after the performance, and/or 
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after the session. Also, in some instances, such as with Mina, participants ‘taught’ me 
how to do a particular touch tic by telling me synesthetic intricacies of their 
engagement. As such, on occasions, I joined their embodiment without claiming to feel 
what they felt, but to grasp the felt knowledges that pervade compulsive interactions 
(after Haraway 1991, in Despret 2013). In doing so, I rendered my own body 
‘responsible’ to our shared environment, and could be understood as a way of being 
sensitive on terms of another (Mol 2002; Despret 2013). Nonetheless, if I was unsure, I 
asked the participant if they considered what I observed had been compulsive. 
As commensurate with the participative character of this study, the participants decided 
on, and had the lead, during the activities for the observation, as well as the time, 
place, duration, and the presence or absence of the diary. Doing so gave them control 
over the observation situation and left them in charge of the amount of tension they 
were willing to cope with. The activities were chosen in terms of the increased 
likelihood for evoking compulsive interactions. Helping them think through possible 
activities I provided some examples based on the pilots I had conducted with my sister, 
and experiences from prior sessions with other participants.   
The observations lasted between 20 minutes and 3 hours, which was highly dependent 
on the activity and the energy and concentration level of the participant at that time. On 
the one hand, the observation of Sara took only 20 minutes because she had just had 
therapy and was tired, and I could only observe her for 20 minutes of the journey to her 
place. Although she offered, I did not feel comfortable to continue observing. On the 
other hand, I had joined Ginny during a day in which she had a number of short 
activities planned, and was happy for me to observe as long as I wanted to. This 
allowed me to observe her in multiple environments doing multiple activities over a 3 
hour period. She was very energetic throughout the observation and did not seem 
bothered with being observed, and even said she forgot several times. As expected, 
the amount of compulsions I could identify differed greatly amongst participants, 
ranging between 3 and 63 per session, and varying greatly in complexity and kind. For 
all participants except Sage one observation has been performed. In addition to her 
first observation at her school, Sage agreed to do a second observation at her home 
where she performs most compulsions.  
Taking notes during the observations made most participants rather self-conscious. 
Therefore, I had offered all participants to do the observation without diary as the sight 
of me writing in it could produce insecurities. During some sessions, taking notes felt so 
inappropriate that I refrained from noting them there and then. Instead, I wrote them 
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down as soon after the sessiond ended. In addition to the compulsive engagements 
themselves, any other relevant occurrences during the observations were recorded in 
the diary (e.g. places, space effects, other people noticing, the occurrence a 
compulsions was related to). I had devised a list of abbreviations to be able to note 
compulsions without having to look, and although I had planned to write up these 
headnotes in full fieldnotes (Emerson 1995; Sanjek 2001) before they get ‘cold’ (Mead 
1977), I ended up not doing so. This was because they were not only difficult to capture 
in words, and exhaustive accounts of all compulsions would have to be written, and still 
these would not be ‘complete’ (Jackson 2001). In fact, all compulsions I attempted 
describing in words failed to be captured because of the performative and synesthetic 
dimensions. Indeed, I was only to put them in words satisfactorily within the context of 
the analysis in which I mobilised them. 
The participant observation presented a number of ethical challenges. The pressure of 
being observed can be considerable for any person, and for those performing with a 
Tourette’s diagnosis this is likely to be higher for the unwanted movements they have 
to make when these are not suppressed. These anxieties seemed to have shaped the 
emergence of compulsivity with the participants’ bodies in two obvious ways. During 
and after the sessions, most participants argued to have performed less than they had 
anticipated before the observation started. This was also the case for Elisa who wanted 
‘to throw everything out’, but found she could not, and needed to do considerably less 
compulsive acts than on other occasions when cleaning her living room. With Nora, not 
many compulsive acts appeared, but those that did, she had not anticipated on 
showing and had been ones that she would perform only when alone or with close 
relatives. To provide as much reassurance as possible, the method was extensively 
discussed on the practicalities to create an image of what being observed would be 
like, explaining what my sister did while I piloted the method and how she experienced 
it. Also, the presence of familiar other during the observations was encouraged, and on 
some occasions we were joined by partners or children, such as during lunch, which 
could take some of the pressures away (after Kusenbach 2003). 
During the sessions, I ensured to be very discreet in looking at the participants’ 
performances by looking in their eyes when they spoke. More importantly, I also looked 
away many times to allow them to do bodily tics to make sure they did not have to do 
this with me watching. In avoiding standing or sitting directly opposite them, often I 
observed them from the corner of my eye. Also, I avoided questioning their movements 
as much as I could. Furthermore, retaining a friendly and informal communication style, 
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I kept our preferably not TS-related conversations going during the observation (Miller 
et al. 1998). This worked to distract participants from being observed, and seemed to 
help reducing tension, and in turn, would increase the possibility for more compulsive 
interactions to be performed. The mundane activities embarked on during the 
observations also helped distracting from the observational aspect. As these would 
often either be chores, such as cleaning or doing groceries, or enjoyable but 
necessary, such as having lunch, the activities were personally useful and were argued 
to feel less like a chunk out of their day. This helped take away most of the anxieties. 
On several occasions, the observations took place in a public place in the presence of 
unfamiliar people or a mixture of familiar and unfamiliar people. Having in-depth 
knowledge about the kinds of public spaces visited and the social norms that pervade 
them helped me to understand how they negotiated these spaces, and how that related 
to what they might have argued in the interview. Therefore, I stayed with the 
participants, without it catching attention from others, and appeared friendly or collegial 
with the participant. In supermarkets and shops, this was most tedious as I did not 
participate in gathering items on the grocery list, getting through check-out, and loading 
bags in the car. I kept my diary out of everyone’s sight as much as possible. On a few 
occasions, unfamiliar or familiar others started talking to either the participant or me, 
and in these instances, I would let the participant take the word and/or pretend I had 
not heard them. One instance stands out. A cyclist could narrowly avoid cycling into 
Cai, who did not like the cyclist on the curb where we were walking and deliberately 
walked in front of him. For a moment, words were angrily exchanged. The 5-second 
situation caught me by surprise, but in the moment I decided to prioritise the trusting 
relationship we had built up therefore, I remained passive. 
I did not disclose studying the participants in these public places, apart from once. 
Sage had asked and received permission for the observation to take place during a 
seminar in which she gave a presentation, hence I identified myself to the lecturer 
before class started. I concealed my identity as researcher for the students to keep 
unwanted attention at bay, which was possible as it was not uncommon for students to 
not know everyone taking the module. I was sat at an angle 10ft. away from Sage, and 
pretended to listen to the various presenters, whilst keeping an eye on Sage, and 
making notes that could not be read by the students next to me. After her presentation 
– discussing stigma and the Tourette syndrome diagnosis – we left the room. Sage 
was not particularly anxious about the observation, and was content with how the 
observation had unfolded.  
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The way I have employed the participant observation method created a perception of 
compulsive interactions in particular ways. Although I have been able to capture the 
compulsive interactions on which the study is based, the observations did not cater for 
capturing for compulsions out of my view, such as performed under the table, on the 
other side of the body, or as concealed through clothes (see O’Connor 2002). Also 
those interactions that looked or where made to look intentional, or those that took 
longer and did seemingly and not necessarily disrupt the bodily flow as the shorter 
ones. Furthermore, the compulsions that involve the placement of the body in relation 
to the spaces (see Bliss 1980; Wilensky 1999; Van Bloss 2006), and are based on 
proprioception. Crucially, negotiations were also very difficult to observe for obvious 
reasons, as these would also have been adopted with regards to my presence. As the 
observation required most of my visual attention to all parts their body and its spatial 
relations, I needed to remain inconspicuous in my activity to the participant and others, 
and keep the conversation going, noticing the lesser obvious observations proved to be 
too much. Taking up Turtle’s (Turtle and Robertson 2008) argument in the beginning of 
this section would suggest merit in spending extensive amounts of time with 
participants to see which compulsions would be performed. However, in practice this 
was impossible due to ethical reasons, and based on the outcomes of the study, I 
argue that an extended, more systematic observation it would not produce 
generalizable outcomes such a method would suggest. 
Despite the practical problems, the participant observation method as I employed it 
contributes to the development of research methodologies in Tourette’s as it 
documents a systematic way to engage with compulsions kinds. In addition, in 
response to Lance Turtle’s claim, participant observation as I mobilised it can help 
provide a broader understanding of urge-driven compulsivity and the Tourette’s 
condition more broadly outside doctor’s offices, therapy rooms and hospital chambers. 
As such, I argue that this study augments the positivist observation methodology with a 
social scientific one that might be hopeful to help constitute a bridge between the 
research traditions (see Beljaars, in review). Furthermore, this method contributes to 
ethnographic research on multisensorial and embodied natures of person-place 
relationships (See Paterson and Dodge 2012; Paterson and Glass 2018). As a method 
that has traditionally been employed for psychoanalytical approaches, this study 
contributes to developing it for spatial theoretical, and performative methodology more 
broadly. 
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In summary, this section expanded on the ways in which I attended to the mobile 
human body amongst objects and with reference to the spaces in which compulsive 
interactions took place as they took place. In mobilising the participant observation 
method, compulsions were captured that did not last a memory or happened in full 
awareness of the participant, and what they could not convey in language. The 
participant observations provided detailed insight in the ways in which compulsions 
unfolded between other-than-compulsive activities, how they differ in kind and how that 
is related to the spatial situation. Employing this method then allowed me to attend to 
the nonhuman extracorporeal dimension of compulsive interactions without mediation 
via the human. However, it did disappoint on the limited ways in which I was able to 
trace the spatialities of negotiations of the compulsive tendencies. Nonetheless, the 
third method of mobile eye-tracking builds on the interviews and observations by 
allowing more attendance to negotiations. Additionally, the next section elaborates on 
how mobile eye-tracking captures the appearance of the extracorporeal by taking the 
visual and auditory perspective of the participants.  
 
3.3.3 Mobile Eye Tracking / Performing Compulsive interactions 
In exploring how compulsive interactions emerge with and are negotiated within 
particular body-object-space configurations, and what this might teach us about 
person-place relations, I mobilised a mobile eye-tracking method. This approach builds 
on the retrospective and experiential accounts of the interviews and the unfolding 
observations from an onlooker perspective of the participant observations by adding an 
in the moment and in situ visual and auditory first-person perspective on bodily 
compulsive engagement. As such, the method captured the extracorporeal, and 
accesses the nonhuman aspect of compulsivity. Approaching the experience and 
spatialities of compulsions from this third epistemological angle was possible through 
the commercially available Tobii Glasses 2 system. Wearable eye-tracking devices are 
glasses mounted with a small HD camera and memory that records the gaze of the 
wearer when looking straight ahead (see Figure 3). This technology sends a laser to 
the back of the eye onto which it reflects, ‘hitting’ the special glasses that registers the 
passing of the laser with the movements of the eyes. The result is a video with a red 
dot that represents the location of what is looked at, or gaze fixation (see Land and 
Tatler 2009). In total, this method contributed 9.5 hours of eye-tracking recordings with 
an equal 9.5 hours of ongoing discussions with 14 participants in 30 sessions, and 21 
interviews with a total duration of 9.75 hours to the empirical study. 
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Figure 3: Diagram of the working of the Tobii Glasses Eye-tracker 2. Image taken from 
Tobii.com (https://www.tobiipro.com/learn-and-support/learn/eye-tracking-
essentials/how-do-tobii-eye-trackers-work/) 
 
Before starting a session, the device needed to be positioned in accordance and 
calibrated to the eyes of the wearer, using adjustments, such as darkened glasses and 
different nose pieces that come with Tobii Glasses 2. This resulted in recordings with a 
general match between the red dot and actual gaze fixation. As a result, the ‘locating 
fixations’ (see Land and Tatler 2009) that establish the location of objects before 
engaging them in an interactions could be traced with more or less precision, as 
appeared from the discussions in the interviews based on the recordings, and as was 
later used in the analysis of the eye-tracking recordings. Also, the laser system could 
not register all gaze angles (especially looking downward was problematic). Whilst this 
prohibited analysis of the gaze prior, during and after compulsions and negotiations, 
the red dot was mobilised on its indicatory capacity where possible. In the absence of a 
gaze analysis, the recordings still provided a first person perspective on the 
compulsions and their negotiations (see Appendix 1 for a selection of stills capturing 
compulsive situations).  
Mobile eye-tracking devices have originally been developed for quantitative research in 
the neurosciences, psychology, engineering and marketing (Duschowski 2003; Horsley 
et al. 2014). The supporting technology has evolved from static eye-tracking methods 
that register the gaze fixation on a sensitive monitor. With the wider availability and 
increased user-friendliness, the technology has become more commonplace in 
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neurological and psychological research – although, to date, not in Tourette’s research 
– as well as sports sciences. Despite video methods becoming a more accepted 
research method, mobile eye-tracking is relatively new in the social sciences, including 
human geography (see Beljaars and Anderson, forthcoming). Mobile eye-tracking 
produces a spatial composition of the human with the nonhuman articulating relations 
between perception and action. It provides insight in the spatial relation of the body 
with objects and spaces in terms of bodily reach and position, and the appearance of 
involved materiality, freezing it as percept in the compulsive moment (after Wylie 
2006). In conjunction with other video methods, mobile eye-tracking technology can be 
regarded to ‘adopt’ percepts, but unlike these methods, mobile eye-tracking adopts 
those percepts that grasp the bodily environment as it appears in compulsive 
situations. Nonetheless, as Gillian Rose (2016) reminds us, situations are always 
excessive to the visual methods that capture them in multiple ways; not only through 
inclusion and exclusion to the frame, but also to the spatial organisation of the visual 
composition produced by this framing (Ibid.) (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Still of the composition of Elisa’s back garden as captured by the mobile eye-
tracker 
 
As with any visual method, eye-tracking technology can be regarded to be active in 
producing the visual and auditory perception of bodily interactions (after Kittler 1999). 
At least, such a stance reflects postphenomenological rejections of a separation 
between technological gazes – and therein scientific gazes – and the ‘real’ (Hoel and 
Carusi 2015) on held up by phenomenology (e.g. Merleau-Ponty 1993, Seamon 1980). 
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Rather, different technologies, including mobile eye-tracking are understood to create a 
particular visual account of unfolding events (Ash and Simpson 2016). Instead of 
understanding mobile eye-tracking as an epistemological approach to access 
compulsive interactions, such postphenomenological concerns stimulates considering 
eye-tracking technology as way of perceiving in and of itself (see Ihde 2009). In the 
absence of interpretation, using such technology demands paying attention to the 
perceptive processes with which compulsive interactions and their negotiations 
articulate. Effectively, mobile eye-tracking adopts the first person perspective whilst 
postponing an immediate invocation of subjectivity. In the absence of subject-object 
dimensions, this method then demonstrates the conditions on which compulsive 
interactions are experienced (after Ihde 2003; Lea 2009). As such, mobile eye-tracking 
decentres the human and renders it ontologically equal to the more-than-human. 
Indeed, as it only records the body parts involved in the interaction, the human as more 
than body parts becomes an absence (see Romanillos 2008). As such, it quite literally 
flattens the human amongst the more-than-human; wood bordering stone bordering 
lines bordering blue bordering movement bordering skin. 
In this study, mobile eye-tracking helped augment the narrative interview method and 
observations to understand compulsive interactions and their negotiations. In addition 
to a partial first-person perspective, mobile eye-tracking captured aspects of 
compulsions that could not be communicated in words, and as such “extend[ed] 
sensory vocabularies” (Spinney 2011, pp. 163). These aspects do not only consist of 
the pre-reflective dimension, but also of the difficulties in translating the experience for 
those who do not have the compulsive experiences centred in this study. It also 
captured the details and collective thrust of objects and spaces that failed in being 
recalled, my notice, and/or my field note jottings. This demonstrated the details of 
object involvement and negotiations such as in social situations. Perhaps contrary to 
expectations of the leading role of the visual in compulsive interactions, a number of 
compulsions captured demonstrate an absence of visual engagement during the 
compulsion. Moreover, as with other video methods, mobile eye-tracking can provoke 
viewers to empathize with and imagine multisensory embodied experiences and not 
simply the aural and visual worlds of others, but can be felt in one’s own body (Pink 
and Mackley 2012). However, this very aspect makes the method fundamentally 
invasive (after Laurier and Philo 2006). 
Being video recorded is associated with an increase in tics (Cohen et al. 2013) or 
increased suppression (O’Connor 2002) in conditions that rendered bodies static and 
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when alone in familiar everyday places (Goetz et al. 2001). On the basis of these 
results, I suggested for participants to choose one, two, or more activities that would 
induce compulsions in a place, and for a duration that they were comfortable with 
recording with the mobile eye-tracker. Organising it in this way created situations that 
would evoke a wide diversity in compulsive interactions, without overwhelming the 
participant. Conducting the mobile eye-tracking method in itself had a number of effects 
that contextualise compulsive interactions and their negotiation, as well as body-world 
relations more general during the sessions. This expressed not only in the unfamiliarity 
of the technology but especially the way the technology framed the participants’ 
experience of their compulsions and body more broadly. Sage remarked:  
“What you look at is kind of really rather private, so I’m finding it a 
kind of strange idea that somebody looks with you doing stuff… you 
feel kind of spied on [I offer to sit outside on the balcony] I don’t really 
mind it, it more like you’re far more aware of your compulsions, and 
you already are because you’re wearing that thing (…) I’m wondering 
if it influences my acting, but I couldn’t really say” 
As compulsions in and of themselves are not a reflection of either the person 
performing them or a social situation, the presence of the eye-tracker did not actively 
play a role in ways in which compulsions needed to be performed. It did, however, 
influence the appearance of the extracorporeal for the wearer. The glasses tended to 
render the environment a little greyer, cut off a horizontal strip where the glasses have 
a ridge above the eyes, and prohibited bodily movement slightly because of the wire 
thread and battery. In what ways this altered body-world relations to the extent that 
compulsive urges would not emerge is unknown. In terms of capture, the body parts 
that people generally look at (e.g. hands and arms) when interacting dominated the 
recordings, whilst others mostly stayed out of sight.  
The technology, the device and the utilisation of the mobile eye-tracker in the research 
was extensively discussed with all participants to ensure informed consent for this part 
of the study19. As with the other methods, I emphasised that they had total control all 
aspects of the process. Depending on the activity, most participants agreed to the 
suggested two sessions, but the durations per session differed. During the sessions, I 
kept a close eye on discomfort or stress, and frequently asked how they felt. Following 
up on all preferences of the participants seemed to have minimised their discomfort. 
                                               
19 The eyetracking method had been included in all consent forms with a sub clause ensuring the availability of extra 
specific information on this method when it would become available. 
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Participants argued that the device did not evoke or inhibit any tics, including violent 
head and neck tics, jumping, and twirling. Varying with the preferences of the 
participant and depending on the activity, I stayed in their vicinity for assistance and a 
chat. During some sessions, participants were happy for me to watch the live 
recording, in others they were adamant I did not, and for most I chose not to watch it to 
reduce anxieties commensurate with the usage of the technology. Most sessions thus 
ended with the end of an activity, because they were tired, or because wearing the 
device became uncomfortable. Indeed, despite its relatively low weight, some 
experienced a ‘fish bowl’ feeling caused by the rounded glasses.  
The sessions were discussed and chosen with the participants who suggested things, 
or had come up as potential in earlier meetings. The activities within and the relations 
between the sessions therefore differed per person. For some the sessions attempted 
capturing activities that induced as much compulsive acts possible (e.g. Sage and 
Dylan), whilst for others they showed rituals and hobbies (e.g. Mina, Sara, and Bill), yet 
others showed everyday situations that happen all the time and involved familiar others 
(e.g. Siôn and Nora), some were more based on different environments (e.g. Ginny, 
Cai, and Alan), others on the difference between strongly and almost absently 
compulsive activities (e.g. Elisa and Joe). Whilst most participants chose an activity in 
their own home, others chose to wear the device in public. Creates an unconventional 
appearance, wearable eye-trackers may give rise to self-conscious feelings (see 
Paterson and Glass 2018), although those who suggested to visit a public place 
seemed fine. During such sessions, I made sure what the participant could expect, 
based on personal experience of having piloted the method, and stayed by their side at 
all times.  
If participants were comfortable with viewing and discussing the eye-tracking 
recordings, an unstructured interview was conducted in which the recordings were 
viewed together. Mina was one of the participants who declined as she expected 
watching the recordings would invoke anxieties. She regarded the recordings as too 
confrontational; watching herself perform compulsively without feeling an urge that 
justifies it was perceived as out-of-place (after Cresswell 1996). Indeed, eye-tracking 
provided a new kind of reflection on the participants’ compulsive performances and 
condition more broadly with substantive implications. Watching the recordings created 
a new concept through which they could engage with their body, for instance, Nora 
‘catches herself’ do things. The technology recreated their perspective from the 
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outside, as it can be paused and replayed, and as such, the eye-tracker performed a 
new ‘face’ of their own compulsivity (After Deleuze and Guattari 2004).  
Encouraged to elaborate on visible compulsions, urges, and negotiations recalled, 
participants narrated their experiences of compulsions or negotiations, using the 
recordings as memory aid (see Figure 5). These narrations also captured ideas of what 
triggered them, their accomplishment, how it felt performing them, and in what ways 
object materiality and space formation contributed. Compulsive engagements could be 
grasped through their ‘surfaces of affective attention’ (after McCormack 2003). 
Descriptions of such affections were paid close attention to for capturing the ways in 
which performativity was invoked in language. For example, “rubbing”, “sliding”, or 
“pressing” are vastly different kinds of interactions, attending to vastly different material 
and sensory capacities of the human and nonhumans (Fulkerson 2014). Some mobile 
eye-tracking sessions registered more compulsions than others. In the cases when the 
eye-tacker recorded very few compulsions, the absence was discussed; for instance, 
watching Alan’s second session ended up in him explaining what he understood as 
‘just-right’ and what as ‘wrong’. 
 
Figure 5: Discussing a compulsion with Sage. She points at the white button she rubs 
compulsively, and I pause the recording to allow her to elaborate. 
 
Watching the recordings presented them with a partial outsider’s perspective that 
invoked reflection on the compulsions; Sara notices “I really check everything all the 
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time, jeez!” At times, this partial outsider’s perspective did make participants self-
conscious, finding themselves acting “embarrassingly”, such as Cai. Despite “feeling 
more at ease” during his eye-tracking session than during the observation, which he 
attributed to my absence, he did remark on a conversation between him and his house 
mate about me as a female. Two other male and one female participants also felt self-
conscious in how they looked at me or my clothes on the eye-tracking recording. 
Additionally, some recordings in the private spaces of, and objects in, the home raised 
concerns, such as embarrassment over laundry and the potential visibility of passwords 
and pin codes. Watching the recordings was experienced by most participants with a 
mixture of curiosity, excitement, and anxiety that tended to decrease quickly after the 
start and increase with certain recorded situations. This anxiety about watching 
compulsions was commensurate with talking about them, hence generally very low. 
Moreover, longer and dynamic recordings tended to invoke light motion sickness in 
participants and me. Ginny remarks after seeing me narrowing my eyes; “yeah, you 
have that too, don’t you. Yeah, it’s all so fast!... I’m looking away for a bit”. All 
participants were offered their recordings, and some had requested it. 
In augmenting the interviews and participant observations, the mobile eye-tracking 
method did not capture compulsions taking place out of sight. Indeed, Sage noted that 
compulsions for which she brings fabric to her face do not show because she could see 
them: “[laughs], so every time something goes towards my face, I’m pushing it against 
here [points at upper lip].” These were thus reliant on participant’s memory and 
willingness to share them. Furthermore, the alignment with spaces and the spatial 
relations between the body and objects is only partially visible. Nonetheless, the 
negotiations of compulsive tendencies that proved difficult to be captured in the 
participant observations did emerge better, although the relationship with the urge 
remained absent. This section thus demonstrated how I employed the mobile eye-
tracking method with its capacity to capture subjectification processes through 
recording the extracorporeal conditions upon which these processes take shape. As 
such, the mobile eye-tracking method granted access to the nonhuman element of the 
different kinds of compulsive body-object-space configurations and ways in which they 
are negotiated. By extension, the combination of the three methods provides an 
empirical account that allows in-depth explorations of relations between people and 
places on compulsive terms. 
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 3.3.4 Analysis 
This subsection elaborates on how the data gathered with the three methods, 
fieldnotes, clinical diagnostics tests, and extra information have been analysed. 
Nonetheless, the clinical diagnostic tests were not used as data as such, because the 
connections between the answers on the test forms and the qualitative data of this 
study were too ambivalent to be able to pinpoint how the tests contributed. Also as they 
were interested in frequency and severity and not in kind, they were too reductionist for 
this study. In the analysis I prioritised retaining the complexity of the compulsive 
interactions and negotiations discussed. As such, I did not adhere to the clinical 
categories. Rather, I analysed their accomplishments, for instance on specific tactile, 
auditory, visual sensations, new orders of objects in accordance to each other and/or 
spaces, and feeling just-right again etc. As such, I was not necessarily interested in 
understanding how compulsive interactions differ from each other, but rather, what they 
have in common, and as such, what they produce and how are affective performances 
in themselves. As such, the analysis is based on an approach to coding that allowed 
for such exercise. 
 
# Code name 
1 Fleshy compulsive interactions (touching, ordering checking symmetry evening 
up inflicting pain self-destruction) 
2 Non-Fleshy compulsive interactions 
3 Habit, routines, rituals and meaning 
4 Reflectiveness, intentionality, voluntariness, rationality 
5 Urges and itches, body and body parts 
6 Processes of perception, heightened sensitivities, attention, and awareness, and 
sensory overload 
7 Imagination and just-right feelings 
8 Emotions, stress, anxiety, pressure 
9 Daily life activities, particular environments, and life events 
10 Presence and involvement of other people in Tourette aspects of their lives 
11 Medicalisation, visuality, ab-normality and comorbidities 
12 Dis-ability, capabilities of the -uncooperative- body 
13 Negotiations, coping, medication and behavioural therapies, suppression, and 
rebound, control and distraction 
14 Reflections of the research 
Table 3: Analysis codes 
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All 15 main interviews, 30 eye-tracking conversations, and 21 eye-tracking interviews 
were taped, and transcribed20 in Dutch. In addition to the fieldnotes and observations, 
the transcripts were uploaded in NVivo version 11 and manually coded in accordance 
to 14 themes (see Table 3). These broad themes gathered from the theoretical aspects 
had I identified in the literature review (after Ryan and Bernard 2003). I kept the list of 
14 codes deliberately short to avoid reductionism of pushing data in categories (after 
Emerson 1995). Also, in order to make the connection across the different kinds of 
data, analysing them in the same way helped forging broad connections. In the 
analysis, the interviews were not to be interpreted as representing or signifying 
underlying psychosocial processes, apart from the medicalisation history, as this sets 
the premise for the negotiations of the compulsions captured in the study. Experiences 
of negotiations themselves were also not interpreted, as this study is focussed on the 
how, as it treats the why as a given. As such, the experiences reproduced in the 
interviews were treated as de facto constitution of subjectification processes. 
The observation data had been analysed in a similar de facto way. The observed 
compulsive interactions had been written up from the abbreviations to a short 
sentence, connected to a place. In this manner, the short sentence became an aide-
memoire rather than an exhaustive description (after Jackson 2001). For instance, one 
of Bill’s observed compulsions was noted and translated in English as:  
Comfy chair in the living room having his lunch  
glass side squeezing + index finger poke underside.  
As such, I relied on my memory to retrieve the fullness of the compulsion. The 
observations were thus not interpreted in a psychosocial manner, but captured the 
material and spatial configuration between the body, object(s), and spaces. The way in 
which I would mobilise such observed compulsion would depend on and acquire 
context from the emerging argument in the analysis.  
Whilst film or video recordings as data has mostly served as a means for signification 
and representation (see Pink 2009), the past decade has seen an increase in using 
video methods for conveying affective, performative, and haptic dimensions of bodily 
movements (Alasuutari 1995) and encounters between humans and nonhumans (e.g. 
Lorimer 2010). For this study the analysis of the eye-tracking recordings then 
                                               
20 The eye-tracking conversations and eye-tracking interviews were partially transcribed on the basis of 
relevance, as these conversations and interviews would often include informal chat during the sessions or 
seeing objects would incite new informal conversations in addition to the compulsions noticed and 
discussed. 
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contributed in two main ways; first and foremost, the video material was analysed on 
the appearance of the materialities and spatialities in choreography with bodily 
movements with which the compulsive interaction unfolds. The analysis focused on the 
appearance of the material circumstances in terms of colour, form, function, position 
according to the body, and in case of ordering compulsions the analysis focused on the 
position to other socio-material elements, in what broader flow of movement 
compulsive interaction with an object or space has become ingrained, and if it has 
been of interest before or after. Rather than analysing these elements comparing them 
across compulsions, they were analysed on their composition. Through identifying the 
compulsions, the second contribution was made by the creation of the performative 
affect of the recordings of the compulsive interactions. Following Herzog (2000), the 
analysis of the compulsive engagement cannot be separated from the technological 
conditions of the eye-tracking recording itself (also after Deleuze 1989; Ihde 2009; Ash 
2013a; 2013b; 2017) 
Eye tracking analysis was done with a sensitivity to the particular compulsive 
sensitivities of the participant. For example, Ginny had perceptive issues in the 
supermarket, so I needed to pay less attention to her touching objects compulsively, 
and more to how she encountered and negotiated being in this space. This was 
information obtained from the interview and observation. Also not wanting to reduce the 
video recording to text, the captured compulsions were described, and as such became 
aide-memoires rather than analysis text. An example of such compulsion is 
‘SaraET2B14’:  
Sara / Eye-tracking session 2 / 47:09 B14  
She vacuums around a collection of stuff without moving it, then goes 
back to it and puts one thing on top of another, and moves both with 
four fingers in a sharper aligned position to the book case next to 
which it lies, and next to/as part of the collection. 
I have watched most of the recordings back at 50% of the speed to not miss anything, 
as some compulsions only took a second, which was the case with Sage. This was 
done in Adobe Premiere Pro CC 2015, which also allowed ‘gathering’ them into a 
collection of compulsions captured per session. 
The analysis of all data took place in Dutch. Also, quotations that were used in the 
analysis sections were translated to English by me, preserving the thrust and emotional 
affections of the statement and the personality of the participant. Where the English 
translations would allow it, I kept the active aspect of the statement intact, to preserve 
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the performative centre of participants’ phrasing of experiences21. In catering for this, 
some quotations in the analysis chapter may appear slightly awkward in translation. 
 
3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In exploring the complexities and kind of compulsive interactions, that are constituted 
through spatial configurations of bodies, objects and spaces, this chapter elaborated on 
the ways in which I embarked on the empirical part of this study. In line with the 
literature review, this study was based on an onto-epistemology that captured the 
performative and affective qualities of compulsive interactions, and preserved the 
difference in kind. Such differences were rooted in the spatial and experiential 
articulations of the configurations of bodies, objects, and spaces as productive of the 
compulsive situation. I recruited 15 participants that provided access to a wide array of 
compulsions. The participative character of the study ensured the participants to 
determine what kind of participation was most conducive to recording compulsive 
engagements, as well as to ensure what they were comfortable with. The three 
methods employed in the study were in-depth semi-structured interviews, participant 
observations, and mobile eye-tracking that combined produced a geographical account 
of compulsive interaction, including the spatial subjectification processes with which 
compulsions unfold. This combination of methods allows identifying the emerging 
patterns and situational resemblances in the data, upon which the analysis chapters 
are based.  
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the analysis of the findings produced with the employment 
of the methods and analysis as set out in this chapter. The data of the different 
methods employed is combined to explore different aspects and dimensions of 
compulsive interactions and negotiations to formulate the arguments that help to 
answer the research questions. As these arguments unfold, they aligned with the 
different empirical, conceptual, and theoretical aspects of the literature upon which the 
study is based (see Chapter 2). Interview data is presented through quotations that, in 
addition to the translated preservation of active and passive elements, also attempt to 
communicate the personality of the participant. The observation data is mainly 
                                               
21 Dutch differs from English in what sentence elements it activates and pacifies. English tends to activate 
the person in a sentence, whilst in Dutch it is more likely that the person is equalised with other elements. 
As such, objects and spaces were more likely to linguistically ‘work on’ the person. This emphasis is 
important for study as it demonstrates how objects in particular were perceived to affect and demand 
something from the participants. 
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presented as descriptions of situations from my own perspective, and the eye-tracking 
recordings are presented as descriptions of the relevant elements of the unfolding 
situation. The latter is organised in this way because of the limitations of the format of a 
doctoral thesis sets to the possibilities for adding video data. Some stills are added to 
the appendices to demonstrate the kind and intricacies of compulsions ´captured´, as 
well as the richness of this data. 
Chapter 4 establishes the phenomenon of compulsive interactions by exploring its 
emergence in between and alongside other-than-compulsive aspects of life, as well as 
the experiential processes involved in becoming compulsive. Chapter 5 takes this 
forward by exploring the ways in which bodies and objects become configured in 
compulsive interactions and their negotiations. Chapter 6 then explores the ways in 
which these configurations are spatially organised, and how their different durations 
produce an embodied ‘ecology’ which reflects the effects of compulsive interactions. 
Chapters 4 and 5 mainly formulates the premise upon which Research Question 122 
and 223 can be answered, and have implications for such formulations for Research 
Question 324, Chapter 6 provides the grounds for answers to Research Question 3 in 
particular, whilst also preparing for answering Research Questions 1 and 2. The 
answers to all research questions are developed in Chapter 7: Conclusions. 
  
                                               
22 Research question 1: How are compulsive interactions, performed by people with a Tourette syndrome 
diagnosis, affected by the bodily environment? 
23 Research question 2: How do people with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis negotiate performing 
compulsive interactions? 
24 Research question 3: What can be learned about the relations between people and place from 
compulsive interactions performed by people with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis with and the 
negotiation of affective environments? 
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CHAPTER 4 ARTICULATIONS OF 
COMPULSIVITY 
This doctoral study aims to uncover how compulsive interactions are affected by the 
bodily environment of people with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis, and how they figure 
in negating these interactions. In turn, the study explores in what ways compulsive 
interactions might provide new insights in person-place relations. In formulating an 
answer to the research questions the literature provided a number of suggestions. The 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2 demonstrate that, first and foremost, the understanding 
of compulsive interactions is limited. Nonetheless, the medical and clinical literature do 
suggest that they take place everywhere, but seem to increase in more familiar spaces, 
seem to be related with the presence of other people, and activities undertaken. 
Compulsions also seem to be sustained by three sensory processes; urges, not-just-
right feelings, and heightened sensitivity. The literature on similar medicalised 
performances as compulsions builds on this by suggesting that particular aspects of 
objects and spaces invoke them and can be used to negotiate them. Also, this 
scholarship emphasized the importance of experience and felt knowledges in 
understanding the compulsive relations between the body and its constituencies. 
Moreover, the kind of, and possibilities for, compulsive engagement seem to be related 
to perceptive processes and the flesh, as these produce a particular disposition of 
bodily, objects, and space capacities to accommodate them. 
Literature reviewed in Chapter 2 also suggests that compulsive interactions emerge 
from the encounter of the body with the extracorporeal, and from the subjectification 
processes that are co-constituted by the human and the nonhuman. Tracing the 
influence of bodily environments, suggested that compulsions needed to be studied on 
their performativity and affectivity, thereby granting the environment co-constitutive 
agency. Such suggestion challenges the location of compulsivity entirely with the 
human, as contended in the medical and clinical sciences. Rather, environments 
should not be understood to becoming involved in terms of the processes and 
presences in them, but by their actively productive capacities. Compulsive performance 
seems to share conceptual elements with practices and habits, which gathers them as 
constituted with distributed intentionality. These insights informed the methodology 
upon which the study is based. In capturing the performative and affective experiential 
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dimensions of compulsive interactions and their negotiations, this study adopted an 
onto-epistemology that was sensitive to the nonrelational, perception, and compulsive 
histories. It did so by employing in-depth semi-structured interviews, participant 
observations, and mobile eye-tracking. The participative character of the study allowed 
me to work closely with 15 participants and provided access to a wide array of 
compulsions, whilst safeguarding the wellbeing of those involved. 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data to understand how the phenomenon of 
compulsive interaction articulates in relation to the performance of other-than-
compulsive life. It does so to establish the conditions upon which the spatiality of such 
engagement takes place. As such, the chapter identifies how situations become 
compulsive, and what effects this has on the bodily disposition in relations to objects 
and spaces. The chapter then produces spatial subjectification processes to unearth 
how participants relate to the sensations that underpin compulsive urges and 
interactions, and how negotiations of these sensations map onto them. Whilst the 
medicalisation of the performances do not articulate in the spatial configurations of 
individual compulsions, Section 4.1 explores how this does so in subjectification 
processes and what the implications could entail. This analysis provides a context that 
situates the language the participants have used and what effects this has had on their 
conceptualisation of their involvement in compulsive interactions. Section 4.2 traces 
compulsivity in the way it expresses in or outside human awareness, with an 
experiential distinctiveness, and how it disrupts particular experiential, bodily, and 
spatial aspects of other-than-compulsive life. 
 
4.1 MEDICALISATION AND DIAGNOSTIC REIFICATION 
This section engages critically with the medicalisation of compulsive interactions and 
explores the articulation of their spatiality. It does so by tracing compulsive interactions 
in the ways in which participants express their experiences in technical clinical 
language and the ways in which they become reified through the Tourette’s diagnosis. 
As argued in the Methodology chapter, medical histories resonate in the subjectification 
processes through which I have studied compulsive interactions. Therefore, the 
vocabulary underpinning the retrospective accounts on which the analysis is partly 
based, reflects this medical rendition of participants’ bodily engagements. The section 
thus explores in what ways the Tourette’s diagnosis became a mediator of compulsive 
urges and interactions. This was not the case for all participants, such as Ginny who 
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was more lyrical than most other participants (see also Bliss 1980). Nonetheless, as I 
go on to discuss here, the experiential understanding of compulsive urges and 
interactions often proved difficult to access outside the whole medicalised Tourette 
syndrome condition. Indeed, the vast majority of the participants had difficulties 
separating the experience of their compulsive interactions from those of other aspects 
of the medicalised Tourette’s condition. Whilst the technical clinical and experiential 
vocabularies differ in constitution and purpose, as well as remit and scope in capturing 
compulsivity, the participants often merged them in the expression of their experiences.  
It was this ‘merged’ language that became demonstrative of the friction between the 
participants’ subjectification processes and the rigid medical subjectivity that had been 
imposed on them with having become diagnosable, and established through treatment 
on the basis of the diagnosis. For Lowri this was difficult as she struggled to express all 
her experiences through the clinical language, as she felt ashamed for not “knowing” 
that a particular movement she used to do “was a tic”. She experienced the clinical 
vocabulary to be so restrictive that it even made her question if seeking help through 
being diagnosed had been a right decision; she explains “So yeah… I don’t know if was 
relieved at that point”. For some participants, the clinical vocabulary had become the 
only vocabulary through which they expressed, exemplified by Joe; “I had it [Tourette’s] 
my entire life of course, but officially I know it for only four years”.  
The accounts from Lowri and Joe cannot be discarded as pure linguistic matters. 
Rather, as Davidson and Henderson (2010, pp. 465 citing McLaughlin 2005) argue; 
“the ‘production of diagnostic criteria’ has the power to transform ‘expressions’ of 
individual personality into ‘symptoms’ of pathology”. In other words, being diagnosed 
can alter one’s understanding of one’s own bodily performativity. This transformative 
power of the clinical vocabulary can then render acts problematic whilst they had not 
caused any suffering before the diagnosis. For instance, Rhys understanding of his 
body changed from always having a light cold because he sniffed to having a brain 
problem as it became rendered as a vocal tic25. In more general terms, as this clinical 
rendition26 of the body is required to gain access to treatment, for those with the 
diagnosis, compulsive engagement can be as much part of their daily lived reality as 
tics are. However, compulsivity is not a diagnostic criterion, but the interactions that 
come forth from it are understood to be part of TS. Therefore, being diagnosed with TS 
                                               
25 The Tourette’s diagnosis is the following: “have two or more motor tics (…) and at least one vocal tic” 
(DSM-V, emphasis original) 
26 In the Methodology I argued that such renditions are produced in laboratory conditions with static 
bodies. 
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in and of itself prioritises the experience of particular bodily movements over others. As 
such, the diagnosis and the clinical vocabulary it purports become affective presences 
in themselves through which bodily movements became known and expressed.  
The research participants also inflected the diagnosis on their body by measuring their 
compulsive engagements, urges, and other inexplicable sensations against it. In telling 
me about his stomach upsetting Joe argues this is due to tensions “because of my 
Tourette’s”. As such, in the lack of a rational, purposive, or meaningful explanation, the 
diagnosis itself became a self-explanatory entity, or was invoked as a reason for 
compulsivity. Additionally, what was understood to ‘belong’ to Tourette’s, had been 
effectively separated from other bodily performances, as if performed through a 
different subjectivity. Discussing Alan’s sensitivity to clothes, he sighs and says “…if I 
would be able to choose what to lose of the Tourette’s, I would choose that.” The 
diagnosis also became mobilised by participants to give character to bodily movements 
and engagements. Dylan watching an eye-tracking recording states: “it all doesn’t look 
very Touretty, I think”, but he cannot quite put his finger on what it is that makes 
movements particularly ‘Touretty’. In line with Dylan, Tomos invokes his compulsive 
sensibilities as entirely self-contained biological process when he explains his daily 
struggle with: “then Tourette’s really takes power over me I’m afraid” (see also 
Wilensky 1999). The Tourette’s diagnosis seemed to have become an amalgamation of 
a broader experiential set of bodily movements and urges for almost all participants. 
The analysis thus necessarily negotiates the compulsive elements in participants’ 
vocalisations largely through the diagnosis and the clinical rendition of their body. As a 
consequence, invocations of compulsivity through Tourette’s might also include tics 
and acts that do not instate an interaction with surroundings materiality. 
Some participants struggled with the failure of the clinical striation of the diagnosis to 
capture their bodily urges and acts. For Mina, being diagnosed became a very difficult 
process as she felt that it did not satisfy her requirement for appropriate support at all. 
She recalls her frustrations in filling in the diagnostic tests at the specialist department 
of a hospital. The urges to do compulsive acts that are self-damaging were not 
enquired after, whilst her painful and injuring chewing compulsions had been her main 
reason for becoming diagnosed. It led her to think that compulsive self-damaging was a 
rare occurrence, and as a result of not being asked for it, she refrained from 
“demonstrating it [the chewing compulsion], or telling them [clinical professionals] about 
it”. For Mina, this study’s focus on compulsive interactions did allow her to discuss 
these experiences with a non-medical vocabulary that fitted their communication.  
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Dylan did not want to find a non-clinical language to convey his experiences. He only 
expressed his urges and compulsions in highly clinical and technical scientific 
language. During our meetings he constantly questioned and endeavoured to 
categorise all his movements and sensations on their accuracy, and purpose; even the 
way he reached for the tap during an eye-tracking session was clinically assessed in 
detail. Having initially been content with the capacity of the TS diagnosis to explain his 
experiences, later on, he had started to experience urges and compulsions that he 
could not relate to the diagnosis. As this was a distinct lack of the diagnosis and 
identified a gap in the scientific literature he found he needed to challenge the 
diagnosis to make these experiences fit: 
“Ehm… I actually did make up a new category that makes me think 
like… yeah… these are indeed motor tics, only it doesn’t consist of 
the movements that we know of, and I miss a category with a normal 
description which I named ‘passive tics27’ 
Ok 
Passive motor tics… Can something like that exist? Yes of course it 
can exist, I mean, I am a patient, I feel that, that is what it is.” 
As such, Dylan required the clinical vocabulary to explain all his experiences, but it did 
not, and therefore had to be expanded, otherwise he felt unable to acknowledge and 
discuss his bodily experiences. Indeed, commensurate with the clinical vocabulary, he 
discussed his compulsive interactions and negotiations almost exclusively as 
biologically produced acts, struggled to recall differences in compulsion kind and bodily 
environment, and often sought to provide health-related reasons for compulsivity. 
Mina elaborated on similar experiences with the TS diagnosis not covering her 
experiences in a satisfactory way. Her medical education and former job as insurance 
doctor, and commensurate familiarity with clinical vocabularies and diagnostics had led 
her to rethink compulsivity through challenging the TS diagnosis. Getting more and 
more frustrated with how her drawing of the lion emerging on the paper in front of her 
during the second eye-tracking session, she speaks slowly and deliberately relating her 
compulsions to psychosis and addiction: 
“Psychotic disorders are so organic… I thought it really wouldn’t 
surprise me; it’s rather psychotic, I think, those compulsive 
complications (…) [It’s] something that drives you…. I mean…. It’s 
                                               
27 Passive tics refer to Dylan’s experience of not moving his body compulsively when feeling urges, but 
rendering his body still, and effectively suppressing them. 
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outside your control… if you have a psychosis… and without having 
any say over it, is, you have compulsive complications… and that it’s 
also something that you almost can’t… eh… then addiction… is also 
Yes 
It’s also something that just gets worse all the time.. so it’s 
something… I would say, that it’s outside yourself… and controls you, 
and that’s also in psy-, maybe that’s why I keep thinking it…. I think 
it’s really just a kind of psychosis, maybe they should see it more like 
that.” 
Later on, she remarks her struggle with the difference between the clinical language 
and her everyday experience by calling the comparison “unscientific”. Nonetheless, by 
feeling the need to question the diagnoses, she struggles to commit to the prescribed 
treatment that stems from the Tourette’s diagnosis. In turn, this refrains her from 
making sense of her experiences in a, for her, satisfactory way. Also, such strong focus 
on diagnoses omits any necessity of considering the situation of compulsions. 
Experiences not ‘matching’ diagnoses is a shared element in the medical histories of 
the research participants. Before being diagnosed with Tourette syndrome, many 
participants required measuring and expressing their experiences of their urge 
sensations and bodily performativity through other clinical vocabularies and diagnoses. 
Nora’s struggle to be diagnosed in “the way [she] saw it” took a whopping 25 years of 
having been misdiagnosed with manic depression, ADHD and others. Eventually, she 
managed to obtain a reference letter to a neurologist who finally aligned her 
experiences with the “correct” diagnosis: 
“And within five minutes, he immediately said ‘you’re a typical 
Touretter’… yeah, not because of my tics, but because of my 
expressions [vocal] and, and, and my way of being really, yes” 
As such, for a long time, her experiences seemed not to fit with her diagnosis. Through 
being diagnosed later in life, she had not received suitable treatment and had therefore 
been forced to develop negotiations of her urges and compulsions in ways that would 
render them harmless to her and invisible to others (see Section 4.2.1 for elaborations).  
This subsection demonstrated the affective presence of the medicalisation of the bodily 
performances in the lives of people with compulsive tendencies. Not only does the 
diagnosis and clinical vocabulary resound in the ways the participants express 
experiences, it alters their very understanding of their body and its compulsions. This 
subsection and the chapters to follow demonstrate how the adoption of such 
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vocabulary sees the diagnosis reified in experience. As a consequence of the lack of 
contextual sensitivity in this vocabulary, the situation of compulsive performativity 
articulates far less in the retrospective accounts of participants who adhere more to the 
clinical vocabulary in expressing their experiences. The remainder of the analysis also 
demonstrates that in retrospective accounts the medicalisation of the compulsive 
interactions can be argued to articulate in the subjectification processes at the expense 
of a conception of spatiality. With the conduct of methods that emphasise the spatial 
expression of compulsive interactions and their negotiations and that could be 
narrated, this articulation changed.  
The subsection also demonstrates that studying medicalised performances in 
geography – e.g. disability and health geography – requires critical engagement with 
the practice and conceptualisation of diagnostics before claims can be made about 
potential underpinnings of spatial processes. Indeed, translations from experiences to 
invocation of complex medical constructs such as compulsivity and diagnoses is 
riddled with ambiguity, reductions and inflations. Indeed, this study’s deconstruction of 
the medicalisation and diagnostisation of compulsive interactions requires reflecting on 
the ways in which geographers with an interest in performances similar to compulsivity 
have spatialized them. The next section ‘reclaims’ it from its medicalisation and traces 
its expression as related to awareness, as distinctly compulsive and forceful 
articulations in daily life. It does so to explore the particular conditions upon which 
subjectification processes emerge, that, in turn, underpin the particular situation with 
which particular compulsions unfold. 
 
4.2 COMPULSIVE EXPRESSIONS  
The previous chapter demonstrated that compulsivity has been articulated through 
diagnostics, which had the effect that compulsions were mainly rendered through the 
diagnosis or tics in experiential articulations of the participants. This section ‘reclaims’ it 
from its medicalization, and reconceptualises it on its performative terms. As such, this 
subsection traces compulsivity in individual interactions as human performance. It does 
so to locate compulsive expressions as different from and taking place rupturing other-
than-compulsive life. This also helps to identify conditions upon which negotiations can 
take place. Subsection 4.2.1 traces compulsive interactions in human awareness, 
Subsection 4.2.2 elaborates on the distinctiveness of compulsive expression in 
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knowledge and feelings. Subsection 4.2.3 explores the experiential and spatial ways in 
which compulsive interactions disrupts other-than-compulsive life. 
 
4.2.1 (Un)awareness 
According to the conceptualisation of the compulsive condition in the clinical literature, 
identifying the interactions would be relatively straightforward for those performing 
them. Whilst this is the case for most compulsions captured in this study, the 
subsection demonstrates that not all compulsions happen in full awareness, do not all 
produce a memory, and cannot always be distinguished from other-than-compulsive 
interactions. It elaborates on the effects of this, and suggests that compulsive 
engagement requires a new nuance in the clinical literature. The subsection also 
demonstrates the relation with habit and its geographies, and has consequences for 
compulsive subjectification processes. As such, they shape conditions upon which 
compulsions may be conceived to have spatial connotations. Clearly, for all participants 
compulsivity was a distinctly demarcated aspect of their lives, and the comfort and 
certainty with which they spoke of it permeated this study. At the beginning of the 
recording of her first eye-tracking session Elisa (35) is fairly confident that she is aware 
of all her compulsive interactions when we watch the footage. She would drive us to 
her home, which was her idea because: 
“That’s when you see it most obviously 
Yes, you are aware of this  
Yes, yes, yes 
Many people are less aware of them 
Oh, I am aware of my compulsivity, I would eh… I would rather not 
have that, it would be easier if you wouldn’t have to do it” 
Nonetheless, after further discussion and towards the end of the recording, Elisa 
reconsiders her certainty of being aware of her compulsive acts: “well, I think I wouldn’t 
be able to recall everything, but ehm... a lot of things I actually would, yeah”. Whilst the 
compulsive condition as such thus might be remarkably memorable; it seems to be less 
straightforward for the unfolding of individual compulsive interactions, despite their 
conceptualisation as being preceded by urges and requiring the conscious decision 
(see also Section 4.1). Sage struggles with my questions on what kind of compulsive 
interactions she performs: 
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“Like ‘ah, I never do that!’, and then you start thinking and then you’re 
like ‘ehhh, yeahhh’. That will start when [researcher] have left later 
on, and that I’m doing something and then think ‘ooh, I actually do!’” 
Sage’s account also suggests that some earlier compulsive interactions only surface 
when residing in the same bodily situation and less outside these situations. Indeed, 
the examples participants provided recalling them were often performed in the room 
the interview took place, or had had memorisable effects, such as humiliation, 
awkwardness or pain. This supports my concerns about the viability of the laboratory 
conditions and immobilised body in clinical methods for studying compulsive 
interactions (see Section 3.2.3). The eye-tracking method that confronted them with the 
actualisation unfolding of the interactions elsewhere as well demonstrated that they 
could not always recall all of their compulsive acts. When discussing the recordings of 
her first eye-tracking session, Sage thinks “it’s also funny that I can’t, that you’re not 
conscious of it. Talking about it is quite funny.” Much like Elisa, Sage had expected to 
recognise and recall all her compulsive interactions in the recording. Nonetheless, for 
Elisa, Sage and other participants, watching the eye-tracking recordings more often 
than not superseded the amount of compulsive interactions many had expected. This 
already implies that a situational approach to capturing compulsive interactions is 
already confirmed to be successful. 
In contrast to Elisa and Sage, Nora was one of the few participants who said to recall 
no compulsive interactions recorded during eye-tracking at all. Watching the recordings 
of her eye-tracking sessions, she responded to her movements with slight 
apprehension:  
“When you see this, you get all restless because of yourself. Then 
you think ‘do you always do that, making these movements?” 
Not entirely sure what to expect of her bodily appearance and compulsive interactions 
performed, she seemed as unexpecting as I was. Watching the recording then almost 
turned into a game of spotting compulsive interactions, which seemed to reduce her 
anxieties as to what the recording would ‘reveal’. Some compulsive interactions 
showed on the recordings with her husband elsewhere in the living room. He could 
overhear us discussing the appearance of her body on the recordings, when I think I 
see her do an act: 
“Was that something? 
Well, I was looking at that as well… I think I do this *glides her index 
and middle finger along each other* 
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Yeah, for a moment 
*Astonished* But I do that the whole time... you [husband] have said 
that before, that I do that constantly, but I don’t know, gliding those 
fingers along each other 
Husband: Yes, the whole time, yes.” 
During the meeting to get to know each other and later on during the interview, she had 
proclaimed being a “secretive ticcer”, explaining that she is very sensitive to her bodily 
appearance, and that she attempted concealing movements that could raise questions 
from others. As such, she strongly renders the expression of her compulsivity in terms 
of visibility from the outset, and negotiates doing them accordingly. Nonetheless, she 
knew that others have noticed her doing tics and compulsions, and that these had 
become part of the body others knew and recognised her by:  
“I just think like ‘yes, I’m like that’… it does surprise me eh... it 
surprises me because I do the same things all the time.” 
The compulsive interactions that escaped Nora’s immediate awareness thus seem to 
be those she did on a (very) regular basis, and which in other moments are more 
actively engaged with. This demonstrates that awareness of compulsive interactions or 
the lack thereof cannot solely be situated as a problem of memory, as Nora is highly 
sensitive to particular compulsive acts, but seems largely insensitive to others. Also 
Sage speaks of the shock of becoming aware of compulsive interactions not previously 
registered:  
“Lately I’ve been more aware also, because then I’m practicing 
Exposure [and response prevention therapy]… and then... eh… I am 
focussing so strongly on suppressing the exclusively bodily tics that 
I… but then in the meantime, I’m doing something else because it 
helps distracting me. 
Yes yes 
I do that for instance whilst I’m tidying the kitchen or something, and 
then I’m suddenly aware of all the things I… touch 
Just to touch? 
Because of the touching 
Not because of// 
//For real! You know, what I told you the other day – sorry – what I 
told you the other day, being focussed on particular… shapes ehm… 
but actually also when I clear the dish washer; everything I put in the 
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cupboards I touch once more… and that’s how I notice more of 
them... because when you’re suppressing, you suddenly realise that 
that is also a tic! And… I’m more aware now how irri- yeah, I’m more 
conscious of it, how, yeah how… much… I’m doing it… that it’s 
actually continual…” 
A lack of awareness might seem to juxtapose their sensitivity of their body’s 
compulsive movements. Nonetheless, in the clinical Premonitory Urge for Tics Scale 
(PUTS) test Sage and other participants suggest that some compulsive interactions are 
performed without active involvement of the increasing urge sensations and deliberate 
timing of act performances. In other words, the compulsions that escape awareness 
seem to be performed without relating to the ongoing other-than-compulsive 
dimensions of life. Whilst the likely absence of the urge reflects clinical research 
findings (Banaschewski et al. 2003; Verdellen 2007), this study brings an additional 
nuance to these findings as demonstrated with the following findings.  
In clinical studies, increasing ‘complexity’ of tics is correlated with increased likelihood 
of being preceded by urges (Eapen and Robertson 2015); compulsive interactions are 
always already categorised as complex28. Nonetheless, rubbing fingers along each 
other, or briefly touching objects ‘once more’ can be regarded as less ‘complex’, or at 
least less elaborate than aligning a group of four objects into a system that is just-right 
from multiple angles. The latter act is a recurring one for Ginny, which is preceded by 
an urge, which she is aware of during the performance and recalled during the 
interview prior to the eye-tracking sessions. A less elaborate compulsive act slipping 
into a participant’s awareness also occurred during a research meeting with Dylan, 
when he suddenly becomes aware of performing one: 
“Some things thus go completely unnoticed (…) And the longer you 
actually... talk about it, the more severe that tic comes back at you... 
ehm... now I’m stroking the desk with the back of my hand! (…) I do 
lots of movements that I’m not even registering.” 
Although elsewhere in the interview and during other meetings he expresses more 
concern about this apparent lack of awareness, he raises a point more poignantly 
worded by Nora. Like Dylan, Nora is very concerned about the visibility of her 
compulsive expressions and negotiates them accordingly, but when interactions have a 
compulsive appearance but are, in fact, not compulsive, she is less concerned:  
                                               
28 Complexity of Tourette symptoms is generally identified as the involvement of multiple muscle groups. 
‘Complex motor tics’ serve as antonyms to ‘simple motor tics’ such as blinking and eye-rolling. 
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“Oh! That was one, wasn’t it? 
*laughing* Yes! But one push too many! 
Because it should have been two? 
Well, I had three. And that’s not right 
Ok, and did you do something to counter it [the effect]? 
No, but I see this now, I think ‘that’s wrong, that’s three *laughs* 
see?! Count them!” 
No, indeed, and in that moment you didn’t think ‘oh, it’s one too 
many’, you think? 
I don’t know, no I don’t know… and sometimes I just don’t even want 
to give in to it, and then I think ‘no, this is fine, there you go – done’, 
you know? 
Yes ok, but then you do have to know in advance like ‘oh I’ll feel that 
proclivity to do it, or currently have that proclivity and I stop’? 
Yes, but that’s automatism, what I did there” 
Whilst at first instance she recognises the movement of three pushes as compulsive, 
discussing it makes her recognise it as not compulsive. This suggests that compulsivity 
differs from automatism, and that the third push would have been the latter. The 
compulsive touches thus seemed to be preceded by a sensation and perhaps even 
deliberation, whilst the last push was not. Indeed, despite the same engagement with 
the same object, noticing that it cannot be compulsive because the pushing act is 
‘wrong’ produces entirely different embodiments (after Fleissner 2007). This may be 
indicative of a separation between compulsive and other-than-compulsive subjectivities 
that might be experienced in similar ways whilst engagements are unfolding, but which 
serve very different purposes (see Leder 1990). Also, categorising the third touch as 
‘automatism’ at the end of the discussion then eradicates any concern for appearing 
compulsive. As such, the possibility of compulsivity being understood or recalled as 
automatism and emergent with a non-compulsive subjectivity could be considered a 
form of negotiation of compulsive tendencies. They might consider not being aware of 
one’s compulsive engagement as automatism, which may take away concerns about 
visibility of compulsivity, and may therefore also erase the need for negotiation through 
bodily performativity.  
Invoking automatism in this way may also allude to habit. With curious amazement, Bill 
(50) watches himself do compulsive interactions without remembering doing them 
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during the recording: “Well, I do see quite a lot, aye (smiles)”. He continues watching in 
silence, often visibly amused. In a lull between interactions on the recording I ask him 
after it: 
“Yes, I do see quite a few things, what I just said, more like... than I 
eh... normally… 
…Am conscious off 
Yes very conscious of. You do it for such a long time, and what you 
said just now on the parking lot, lots of things happen in a flow, and 
now you really see it 
Yes, yes 
So that eh… yeah… 
So a flow with little bumps? 
Yes! Yeah!” 
For Bill it seems that the compulsive interactions that his comments pertain to, such as 
ordering an assemblage of a cutting board, cutlery and glasses according to each 
other, have become part of the larger practice of clearing the dishwasher. The ordering 
exercises were not experienced to break up his other-than-compulsive interactions 
when they unfolded as the recording made it seem.  
“[the compulsions] slipped in, I think eh… that if I don’t do it that I, 
that I’d notice it… I think, yeah 
So these aren’t things you necessarily sense you have to do? 
No, I really do have to do them 
Yeah, so you can’t just think ‘oh, then I won’t do them’? 
No, I do really check, I saw myself properly watching like ‘oh, turn 
that around, get the loop out’ 
(…) 
But it’s not like you can do it in advance if you suspect you won’t find 
it correct… that you can do it in anticipation if you will? 
If I do it in advance… pfoo… no, that, that… no I don’t think so, no.” 
Indeed, whilst increasing complexity – or elaborateness – of compulsive interactions 
can imply greater disruption (see Section 4.2.2), Bill’s account suggests that some 
compulsions dissolve into or feel like automatic other-than-compulsive acts, or what 
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Dylan describes as “normal” “compulsifying”. As such, compulsions might be more 
prone to take place outside one’s awareness when they have become more habitual 
through being performed in similar situations (see Ravaisson 2009; Dewsbury and 
Bissell 2014). As also Sage illustrates  
“I think that generally speaking, it’s so ingrained in my daily life that 
it’s not annoying. (…) When you start noticing it more, then it 
becomes annoying all of a sudden.” 
Hence, both Bill’s and Sage’s accounts suggest that compulsivity can go unnoticed as 
the compulsive interactions can become part of daily life in an other-than-compulsive 
way. This demonstrates that both automatic interactions or habits and compulsive 
interactions may take place outside awareness and outside the intentional subject 
(Bissell 2011), and that compulsions can become habitual. Nonetheless, compulsions 
should not be conceptualised as habits, as I suggested in Section 2.3.3. and unlike 
habits, compulsions do not instate a devitalisation of sense (Malabou 2009). Indeed, as 
Karp and Hallett (1996) argue, some people with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis 
remain aware of all bodily contact with the extracorporeal. For instance, Van Bloss 
(2006) states to never stop feeling the chair against his back, and this sensitivity is 
shared by some participants in this study. Remaining aware of bodily contact can be 
conceptualised as a ‘compulsive corporeal field’ that might always be latently present, 
which therefore reduces or absorbs the shock compulsivity can invoke when performed 
alongside non-compulsive acts. Sage illustrates this during one of our interviews on the 
basis of the eye-tracking recordings. I had just asked her if it was just me seeing a 
certain very short and very easy to miss ‘lag’ between her picking up an object and 
putting it in its new place. Noticing this as well, she considers this out loud: 
“I have that very often that when I touch something I feel I’m not 
treating it in a special way, but that I hold on to it just that little longer, 
or put just that little extra pressure on it, but that happens in such a 
fraction of a second that I often don’t... at least, maybe if you were to 
ask me in the moment. Then I’d know, but looking back at it now, 
then I think… 
Yeah, so then it’s not necessarily a choice, an active choice to do it? 
No, more like [inaudible], more like ‘I am laying my hand on the table 
now and I feel now… very much the sensation of the table beneath 
my… tip of my index finger’ because with that one I feel all those 
pointed edges. So I sense that very explicitly, so I can… eh... I can 
experience that in the moment I just touch it briefly, so it’s most 
definitely a tic because I feel that sensation, it is just preceded by a 
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less eh… elaborate performance or something, you get what I 
mean?” 
Sage thus argues that the sensations of compulsive interactions cannot be ignored, but 
the interaction itself might only be realised upon unfolding. Such a lack of conscious 
involvement can suggest that these kinds of compulsive interactions lack purpose 
beyond the compulsive requirement of a sensation. Therefore, these interactions can 
escape awareness or fail to produce a memory precisely because of the strong 
separation from other-than-compulsive acts. The lack of contribution to the intended 
task at hand might be explain how compulsive interactions could be performed during 
non-compulsive acts. As they do not require special attention and thus do not halt the 
other-than-compulsive ‘flow’. Therefore, these accounts suggest that immediate 
perception of the performativity of the body as underpinned by the ‘corporeal foci’ can 
fail to capture compulsive interactions (after Leder 1990). Only when awareness is 
shifted from the intended practice, such as unloading the dishwasher, to the actualising 
body’s engagements, compulsivity could be traced.  
Compulsive interactions thus demonstrate that perception of bodily performance upon 
which geographical scholarship on intended practices are based (e.g. Nash 2000; 
Valentine 2002; McCormack 2002; 2005; Saldanha 2005; Wylie 2005; Roe 2006; 
Spinney 2006; Laurier et al. 2008; Anderson 2012) may not be sensitive to the 
actualised bodily interactions with the nonhuman, despite claiming the equal 
ontological involvement of the nonhuman. In addition to delivering a critique to practice 
theory more broadly (see Lefebvre 1991; Mol 2002; Simonsen 2005; Schatzki 2010), it 
means that in taking place outside awareness, and in failing to produce a memory, 
compulsive interactions broaden our understanding of what person-place relations as 
unfolding with corporeal interaction entails. 
This subsection set out to explore the identification of compulsivity in the flow of 
everyday life. Compulsivity might escape awareness in the moment, but that does not 
mean that compulsive interactions are not performed. Rather, it suggests a fluid 
relation with other-than-compulsive interactions in the sense that they can become part 
of and happen alongside each other. Some compulsions fail to produce a memory 
because they are not preceded by urges, but seem to have become habitual. Which 
suggests that complexity is not the only indicator of urge presence (Eapen and 
Robertson 2015). This provides new insight into how intended activities are laced with 
compulsive interactions (see Silva et al. 1995; O’Connor et al. 2003). Indeed, other-
than-compulsive life seems to create the situations upon which compulsive 
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engagement can take place on a very momentary basis, whether they are performed in 
full awareness or escape it. This, in turn, has spatial connotations. Indeed, it may be 
possible to consider that in compulsive situations that remain unregistered, the body is 
‘hijacked’ in its interactions with objects and spaces. Although not exhaustive, this 
renewed understanding of how people with compulsive tendencies are aware of their 
compulsions also demonstrates that the combination of methods captures crucial 
nuances in these performances, and allows distinguishing in kind. Nonetheless, when 
performed in full awareness, compulsivity is being recognised as distinct experience. 
The next subsection explores the particular compulsive quality to these interactions 
that allowed the participants to distinguish between compulsive and non-compulsive 
acts. 
 
 
4.2.2 Knowing / Feeling compulsivity 
In understanding in what ways compulsive interactions are affected by the bodily 
environment, and how this is an articulation of difference in kind, compulsivity needs to 
be explored beyond conceptual expressions. Rather, it should be engaged with on its 
distinctiveness and how that informs processes of subjectification, and on the basis of 
that, can inform configurations between bodies, objects, and spaces. Therefore, this 
subsection explores compulsivity on the quality of its experience when participants 
were aware of them, and in particular on what makes compulsivity recognisable as 
such. Most participants comfortably discussed the experiential characteristics of 
compulsivity in general terms, and were all adamant to allude to the feeling of the urge 
as distinctive. Additionally, they added that these experiences are unknowable to 
people without diagnosis. Indeed, for most participants could pinpoint most compulsive 
interactions on the eye-tracking recordings without a problem. Ginny explained that she 
recognises compulsivity in the added ‘feeling’ when she sees something. It is in this 
addition that the compelling element expresses: 
“For me it often starts… it… that I see something and that evokes a 
feeling. And then I want to do something with that feeling if it’s a bad 
feeling, you want to order things or something, for instance. And if it’s 
a good feeling, then you want to pick it up or do something with it, 
pinching it or something. That is, that’s the compulsiveness, that it 
evokes a feeling.” 
Sage builds on the addition of this ‘feeling’ that can be ‘bad’ or ‘good’ to sensing a 
particular object as retrieving a quality, by describing it in terms of ‘intrigue’ and ‘strong 
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appeal’ outside functionality or aesthetics. A few months before the interview, she and 
her partner had bought a fryer, and elements of this object became involved in 
compulsive interactions in particular situations. Especially its capacity to become very 
hot incited urges: 
“I really get… batshit crazy because of that thing because I’m so 
incredibly intrigued by that hot frying fat 
Uhuh 
I shall and must touch it. I must! Yeah… you know it’s superhot 
Yes, painful and everything 
But I shall and must know, and I can withstand it, but just being in the 
kitchen where we have the fryer is absolutely awful, and I think I 
rarely have had anything that has such strong appeal to me, and that 
really scares me because I’m afraid I might give in to it at some 
point.” 
As such, Ginny, Sage and others alluded to the experience of compulsivity as an 
intensity articulating in everyday non-compulsive encounters and – potential – 
interactions. Sage’s elaboration explains that it is not necessarily the fryer, or frying fat 
itself, but her touching it that is intriguing. Indeed, this description resonates with most 
other participants, and reflects experiential accounts of Bliss (1980), Kane (1994), and 
Van Bloss (2006). This intensity is distinctly different from how compulsivity is 
conceptualised within the clinical framework of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). 
With OCD, its emergence connotes a fear for a particular event, which striates it only in 
the direction of an obsession. Sage asserted the difference it makes in her experience: 
“I do have compulsions [vis-à-vis obsessions], but these are more like 
compulsive acts, so more like, what you do with your research, with 
objects and all, but it’s not driven by fear anymore 
No 
It really has to do with…. The bodily sensation, like ‘hey, I like 
touching that’, or ‘I have to touch that’,  
Yes  
And not anymore like ‘if I don’t do that, then…’” 
Compulsivity as response to fear, rather than related to urges, only corresponds with 
objects involved as coincidence or providing initiations of acts, and refrain from 
understanding objects on their own material terms (after Harrison 2007; Ash and 
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Simpson 2016). Discussing compulsions on these terms would render them acts 
instead of interactions. Compulsivity as related to urges then seems to incite a 
deepening of these mundane experiences with a strong affective resonance with the 
extracorporeal element becomes involved in the interaction. Rather than a purely 
negative experience, Sage experiences the urge as unqualified emotionality that does 
not extend beyond that affective resonance29. Unlike in contamination compulsions 
analysed by Segrott and Doel (2004), this intensity does not precipitate into other-than-
compulsive life occurring before, alongside and after it apart from its implications, such 
as potential pain from acting on the urge. As this intensity does not extend beyond the 
affective resonance between the human and nonhuman involved, knowing compulsivity 
and recalling it as sensation as such, and recognising the feeling after the moment of 
unfolding was more challenging. During the interview Ginny struggled with recalling the 
actualised feeling of becoming compulsive: 
“I can’t analyse it properly now, but in the moment it’s, you wouldn’t 
notice, then, then you just do it… kind of… when I think about it now, 
that’s how it kind of happens, that’s how it feels.” 
For her and others, the feeling of compulsivity as it unfolds is very distinctive but also 
fades very quickly (also see Bliss 1980). Even the ‘thrust’ of being compelled into 
acting out an urge seems difficult to recall, as illustrated by Dylan when I ask him to 
explore how touching his nose compulsively feels different from other-than-
compulsively: “I really just can’t distinguish between… I can’t give a straight answer to 
that”. As such, urge-driven compulsive interactions remain largely unrelational (see 
Harrison 2007; Anderson 2014) and constitute a sensory category on their own in. As 
such, compulsive interactions could be conceived to “resists being drawn into and 
subsumed by relation'' (Dillon 2000, pp. 5, cited in Harrison 2007). Theoretically, this 
makes negotiating compulsions incredibly difficult. Even when recalling the 
“manifestation” of an entirely new kind of elaborate compulsion, Alan cannot quite put 
his finger on it when describing the situation: 
“It [unknown object] is in the shed, this height, that’s placed on a table 
or something, and at some point I’m having a drink and do this… 
touching all those small characters… a few times back and forth (…) 
So at one point I think ‘why am I doing that?’ and the next day I did it 
again, so I’ve been doing that for a week now or something.” 
                                               
29 I elaborate on this distinction in conference paper “Writing Compulsive Corporeality: 
Postphenomenological methodology and Tourette syndrome”, Session Post-phenomenological 
Geographies: methods and styles of researching and writing the human (1): Subjects, RGS with IBG 
Annual International Conference 2016, London 
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This description purports an interaction in which Alan almost seems to ‘take part’, as if 
he is made to and does not protest, constituting the almost unsurmountable separation 
and lack of communication between compulsive and other-than-compulsive 
subjectification processes. The ‘de facto’ character of his testimony of the compulsive 
performance remains entirely unquestioned, and reminds of a purely biological 
process. Indeed, rather than expressing the need for overcoming this separation, Alan 
renders his compulsive interaction with the unknown object with the small characters 
as utilitarian as he does interacting in other-than-compulsive manners with objects 
such as the glass that holds its drink. In Fleissner’s (2007) terms, Alan describes his 
involvement in the compulsion as through being a körper, rather than leib. As such, 
compulsive interactions can be experienced as a necessary evil, for which kinds no 
negotiation is needed.  
The absence of emotional engagement with Alan’s interactions, Sage’s invocation of 
appeal and Ginny’s distinctive ‘addition’ emphasize an unpredictability, and as such, 
unknowability of compulsivity. By extension, any spatial expression beyond the 
immediacy of unfolding compulsions then do not seem to pervade in subjectification 
processes. This sets up compulsivity as a spatial process that cannot be known by the 
human, which confirms the minimal governing role for people with compulsive 
tendencies30. Compulsive interactions could, therefore, possibly not be experienced as 
forming a spatial collective of sorts, and as such would be impossible to negotiate on a 
structural spatial level. Despite or in lieu of their non-relational character, the urge to 
compulsively interact seems to emerge in an unprecedented manner and can cause 
major disruptions. The next subsection explores this in light of subjectification 
processes, as well as the change such event can constitute in the relations between 
bodies, objects, and spaces. 
 
4.2.3 Disruption 
In order to understand how understand how compulsive interactions can emerge with 
bodies, objects, and spaces through the forcefulness experienced to pervade them, his 
subsection turns to the situational difference with which they emerge. Understanding 
the kinds of forcefulness with which compulsive engagement is produced – when it 
                                               
30 I elaborate on the diminished role of the human in compulsivity in conference paper “The Nonhuman 
of and within the Human? An embodied geography of compulsivity”, Session Becoming Geography’s 
others: thinking through antonyms (2): Constructing Opposites, RGS with IBG Annual International 
Conference 2017, London. 
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unfolds in the awareness of the person involved – may provide more insight in 
negotiations. This subsection puts forward the ways in which compulsive interactions 
can more or less violently disrupt other-than-compulsive life. Interactions manifest as 
shorter or longer and bear no reference to unfolding other-than-compulsive acts; 
neither during, nor before or after. According to Sage, in order to resume non-
compulsive acts, these compulsive acts need to be performed as soon as possible, to 
avoid what she calls “stagnation in your normal activities”. Summarizing the interview 
with Bill straight after it took place, as the recorder failed to record it, I recall how he 
had explained his compulsivity in these terms: 
“It happens throughout the day, that’s why it means that they are kind 
of short interruptions in movements he… makes, because he walks 
for instance through the door to his living room. Well, he has to touch 
the door knob in a certain way and kind of tap it for a bit when he 
walks away.” 
When he prepared for leaving the house to do grocery shopping for the observation 
session, the extent to which the non-compulsive activities would be interrupted, taking 
him out of his ‘flow’ became markedly clear during the observation. In addition to taking 
one puff from a small cigar in the kitchen, and checking if the back door is closed, he 
has to completely open and close the dishwasher upon walking past it. Leaving the 
house thus becomes an often interrupted process. This continued in the supermarket 
where he had to carefully position and pinch all items he put in his basket for a few 
seconds. This prevented him from continuing walking through the supermarket, looking 
at other items on the shelves, or checking his grocery list. Nonetheless, larger 
movements leave possibilities for uninvolved body parts to become compulsive. In the 
non-compulsive act of moving a candle holder, Sage’s fingers retain the possibilities to 
engage with it compulsively, as they are restrained in the ongoing non-compulsive act. 
Disruptions can therefore be evaded by planning them in accordance to bodily 
capabilities, object capacities and spatial organisation. This creates a multiplicity of 
quickly shifting micro-geographies produced by the capacities of the body, varying in 
the kind and totalitarianism of the body’s involvement. 
Dylan understood his compulsivity mainly on its disruptive aspect in the sense that he 
felt compelled to repeat certain interactions in a way that is just-right, because the first 
time he did them was wrong. As such, the disruption compulsivity caused him 
expressed with making sensations just-right again, such as walking through a door 
again. As mentioned in Section 4.1, Dylan sought to explain his experiences mainly in 
biological terminology: 
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“I have this idea that ehm… Tourette’s often… disturbs the 
processing of a signal, and that this means that it has to happen 
again… (…) and because it’s not right in your neurotransmitters, the 
signal has to go again and again. (…) sometimes a signal comes 
from somewhere else; you bump your elbow into a door, because 
you walk through it with your hands full. You touch the door, but 
then… there’s a stimulus you hadn’t caused yourself, or something 
No 
Ehm… and that means that it has to happen again… otherwise the 
stimulus doesn’t dissolve.” 
During our meetings he regularly had to repeat interactions that are intended and part 
of planned activities, but were not performed just-right. They stopped him in his tracks 
on multiple occasions, and interrupted his ‘flow’ of intentional acts, which in his words 
are an “overlap of the normal and abnormal”. Every time Dylan was involuntarily 
encountered by object matter31, it incited violent compulsivity.  
Some interactions have a violently disruptive urge thrust as they have a strongly 
situated character; for instance Elisa’s compulsivity that urged her to look at lampposts 
whilst driving. These interactions could not be postponed as this would endanger her 
and others around her, because she felt compelled to look at them. Driving on streets 
and junctions with many lampposts thus required her to interrupt her driving activities 
for longer. Additionally, she explained that if she would feel she had “missed” one, she 
would have to turn her head and find it behind the car. These compulsive interactions 
therefore had to be performed immediately, which made them very disruptive. This 
situation thus caused ongoing turbulence (see Serres 1995) for Elisa, as compulsions 
directly impeded her driving the car. The lampposts cannot be avoided to be looked at, 
and are crucial elements to both compulsive and other-than-compulsive life, and 
therefore multiplicitous (Anderson and Wylie 2009). In relation to her body and the car, 
the lampposts thus created ongoing friction (after Deleuze 1991; Bennet 2001) 
Such object multiplicity can also help understanding the turbulence of cleaning small 
objects for Sage. Dusting one small object after the other on display presented her with 
fast changing situations of different objects passing through her hands. During her 
second eye-tracking session she picks up a statue of a Greek god and dusts it, and 
when clean goes to put it back in its place. She does not bat an eye when suddenly her 
                                               
31 Having established that compulsive interactions are not performed by the human with less human 
dominance as in other-than-compulsive engagements, I use a more passive language in the text to indicate 
the diminished human involvement in compulsive performativity.  
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hand holding the statue stops mid-air. Her right index finger forcefully presses in the 
hollow of its back. Rubbing it a good few times, her hand brought it back to ‘its place’, 
because it distinctly had one in that section, she would clarify later on. My fieldnotes 
mention her having argued that when the urge has little time to arise, it grants her even 
less to decide whether to suppress or not, which gives the compulsive act to follow a 
strong sense of immediacy. Nonetheless, in the urge to compulsively reorder the 
cushions on Siôn’s sofa, is very disruptive, despite having had longer to decide 
whether to ‘give in’ or not. During his third eye-tracking session he set the table for 
lunch in his living room, and had to do this three times. He elaborates:  
“It’s not that I decided to do it an hour in advance, like ‘this isn’t good, 
I still need to do it’, It really just pops up in my head or something 
Yes, indeed  
I’m repositioning these things now 
Whilst you hadn’t entirely finished setting the table.  
No, indeed, certainly not!” 
As such, any task in his living room is interrupted very often, which causes him to 
sometimes forget what it was he was doing, which was visible on the eye-tracking 
recording. He hesitates where to go next and this gaze switching between the kitchen 
and the lunch table, before he continues setting the table. Also Lowri explained that 
she had to put everyday activities on hold because an engagement with particular 
objects could become problematic as it could suddenly turn compulsive: 
“It’s more like from getting up [in the morning] until going to bed, and 
by chance I see something, ah… then I have to touch that for a 
second if I, if I’d have to… or I’d have to… like… I’m putting the 
laundry up ehm… I pick up two clothes pegs, then I have to…. then I 
have difficulties with choosing these pegs. There’s always something 
like… that continual getting stuck, I always have to, like, interrupt, 
like, hold back…. Then you’d have to get over that barrier.” 
‘Getting stuck’ caused her to always have to prepare for non-compulsive activities to 
take extra time, because she found it difficult to ‘get over that barrier’ and continue the 
activity she had been doing before. This suggest that the interference of object-matter 
with the body in ways that are not planned, intended and even predicted or foreseen 
has a capacity to become compulsive. As such, as any object can incite a compulsive 
urge as they have ‘complex presence’ (Mol 2002), which means that in practice 
compulsive interactions can always occur. In a similar way, certain kinds of spaces has 
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complex presence in the sense that they are always evocative, and urges to 
compulsively interact are always experienced. Museums had come up as incessantly 
creative of such embodiment. Joe reflects: 
“But, you know, it’s just what, eh... Where you are and with whom you 
are 
Yes. For sure, yeah 
Look, for instance when I walk in a museum or wherever, then I’d just 
like to handle everything, what I had told you before as well.”  
Compulsive interactions can be anticipated to a certain extent. For instance, having a 
chronic condition because of which he had been in constant pain for a number of 
years, Bill was not very mobile, and on the occasions he is, he very often finds 
intended activities interrupted by having to stop to put objects “back in their place”, and 
(re-)align, touch or handle others. Spending most of his days in the living room, the 
urges are not as pressing that he has to get up from his chair immediately to make a 
situation just-right again. However, he could not escape having to engage with the urge 
sensation the moment he stands up from his chair. During the interview he pointed 
towards multiple objects that had been ordered correctly before he sat down. 
Nonetheless, with the presence of others this situation often changed. Every time he 
stood up from his chair, he had to make the situation just right again, before continuing 
with intended tasks. As such, getting up from his chair may be conceived of as 
resulting in anticipated disruption. This does not mean that they can be avoided, as 
Mina argues: 
“A ritual of waking up in the morning, drinking coffee, checking up on 
what happened… is not really a… that’s more like a habit. (…) 
Rituals are more innocent (…) but… for example absolutely having to 
sit at the right side in the train 
Yes 
Is a ritual… but with a mandatory character.” 
Hence, she knew these mandatory rituals would happen, and could plan for becoming 
compulsive and slipping into a compulsive act. Such interactions should therefore not 
be conceived of through the shock of immediacy, but more as disruption in terms of the 
strict demands it poses to particular intended tasks. As such, they have the capacity to 
disrupt when these demands cannot be met. This implies that compulsive interactions 
somehow have to fit with ongoing situations.  
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Exploring inflections of compulsive disruptions to other-than-compulsive life, it might 
seem that these kinds of compulsions constitute body-object-space configurations that 
the human is required to produce. In other words; having to sit on the right side of the 
train could be seen as not causing a disruption of travelling by train, but a situation that 
needs to occur, otherwise the train trip may disrupt the experience of further life as it 
should unfold. As such, compulsive interactions might be considered to be experienced 
as immanent guidance on the transcendental unfolding of life (after Rose 2006; Wylie 
2009). By extension, not-just-rightness might then be conceived of as the turbulence 
that is experienced before a situation is just-right again. As argued in Section 2.3.4, 
having the right sensations when walking through a door, and Dylan feeling disrupted 
being touched by the frame could then be argued to be inconsistent with the 
‘compulsive culture’ that the materialities and spatiality of the situation give rise to (see 
also Romanillos 2008; Simpson 2009).  
Negotiations in such invocations would be aimed at making sure that the violence with 
which compulsive interactions have to be performed are kept to a minimum, by 
attempting to anticipate them. As Bill does before he sits down in his living room chair, 
he makes sure all objects are in their rightful place, which is a negotiation to minimize 
future compulsive engagement. Also, anticipating having to touch all kinds of objects, 
such as chestnuts, the wool fur of sheep and tree bark during the participant 
observation, Joe’s pace was high, he had his hands in his pockets, he mostly looked 
down and held conversation with me. These can be understood as multiple ways to 
shut his body off to environmental affect that could incite compulsive urges. Also, 
negotiations could be aimed at having all kinds of strategies in place to make certain 
situations happen (further elaborated on in Subsection 6.2.1). 
These considerations demonstrate that the rigidity of boundaries between compulsivity 
and other-than-compulsivity are more fluid and sometimes absent than clinical theory 
purports. Also the clinical interactional categories can be questioned on their 
usefulness as compulsive engagement more often than not invoke combinations of 
‘touching’, ‘ordering’ and ‘symmetry behaviour’ categories (see Cath et al. 2001). 
These categories thus seem to too reductionist, do not reflect the breadth and strong 
differences between the interactions and do not capture all compulsive interactions. 
The dominant discourse in clinical literature pervades that compulsivity is understood 
as a phenomenon that requires eradication when the increasing urge becomes too 
uncomfortable. This implies that with the performance of the compulsive act, the urge is 
satisfied, and the compulsive ‘moment’ passes, after which a completely non-
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compulsive state is reinstated. Sage’s experiences in this study unsettle such 
invocations. She and others suggest that a partial dissolving of the urge is acceptable 
as well: 
“If I’m cooking, I know that these hands will touch the pan, so I do 
it beforehand for a bit// Oh! //If I light the gas, I go to touch the 
edges like so… ehm… and it’s not enough because when it’s on 
the stove they’re hot and I still want to, but then at least I got to 
satisfy it a little bit without getting hurt 
Ah ok… because you’d still have a recent feeling in your fingers?  
Yes, yes, and I have done it at least, just… I still want to, and 
especially because it’s hot, but at least I got to satisfy it a little bit. 
That’s better than not touching at all.” 
For Sage, performing an as yet non-compulsive compulsive act helps retaining a less 
uncomfortable urge sensation when it would intensify with the heating of the pan. 
Negotiations such as these thus involve performing the interaction without the urge, 
and enduring the ongoing urge sensation until the situation changes. 
This section set out to distinguish compulsive from other-than-compulsive interactions 
in terms of quality of sensation experienced. I argued that compulsivity can mostly be 
understood as largely knowable but uncommunicable in terms of quality, and at times 
untraceable. What seems to distinguish compulsive from other-than-compulsive 
interactions is the intensity of the sensation, and immediacy with which it requires body 
engagement with objects in spaces. Additionally, such engagements with objects and 
spaces can be violently disruptive of intended tasks, and some can have the potential 
to be anticipated. Compulsions do not seem to be distressing as such, but rather their 
potential are negotiated on the basis of their visibility, and when potentially painful. 
Indeed, negotiations or the impossibility of negotiation have identified the potential for 
objects to invoke urges for compulsive interaction, causing dangerous situations, 
stalling ongoing daily business, or pressure spatial possibilities. Objects can thus evoke 
an immediate consciousness of one’s bodily situation. As such, compulsive tendencies 
demonstrate to be intimately caught up with everyday other-than-compulsive activities 
(e.g. train trips, driving, putting up laundry), and as such add a new dimension of 
spatial tensions. This section also suggests that when studying medicalised 
performances similar to compulsivity a discrepancy between anticipated and 
actualising situations could be considered to create tensions in experiences related to 
ADHD, ASDs, and OCD. 
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4.3 BECOMING COMPULSIVE 
In order to understand in what ways compulsive interactions may be affected by the 
bodily environment, this section explores how compulsivity emerges in experiential 
terms. This provides further insights into the spatiality of the subjectification processes 
with objects and spaces. As also suggested in Section 2.1.1 and the earlier sections of 
this chapter, in the constitutive processes of compulsivity the kind of negotiation may 
also be decided on. Indeed, experiential accounts argue that this is the most important 
aspect of the condition, as it involves managing the discomfort of the urge (e.g. Bliss 
1980; Kurlan et al. 1989; Kane 1994). This was in part reflected by the participants of 
this study. This section explores the experience of becoming compulsive as a spatial 
phenomenon by ‘placing’ an increasing sense of urgency and interrogating how the 
assemblage of constitutive elements to the compulsive interaction can be understood. 
After this, the section turns to the recurring experience of compulsivity enlacing the 
body with the extracorporeal through flows of energy. 
 
4.3.1 Urgency 
The urge is the strongest experiential indicator of compulsivity unfolding, and 
announces the complicity of the body, as well as the extracorporeal elements that 
become constitutive of the compulsive interaction (Patel et al. 2014). Sage expressing 
“that [she] actually can’t not do [the compulsion]”, the sensation moving from “just being 
interested” to feeling compelled to do “a real touch tic”. The distinction articulates here 
more in terms of intensity then as a particular quality (Cavanna et al. 2017), such as in 
increasing “itch” according to Sara. Dylan added that it could also feel “as if there’s 
something wrong in your nervous system”, and that it can even being painful when not 
“giving in” to the urge, when the “pressure builds” in the body part compelled to take 
part in a compulsive act. For some participants, like Ginny, the urge sensation located 
in her chest and would spread throughout her body: 
“It feels like you’re head over heels in love, that’s how it feels, pfff…. 
When you’re in love you also feel like ‘wooh’! (…) I find that feeling as 
such terrible! Yes! (…) You can be in love and wholly enjoy it or 
something, but it’s also… If I only just think about it, I’m getting itchy, 
you know, like ‘pffffr!’ 
You become anxious 
Yes, then that just gives me itches all over, that comes out of my 
ears! (…) like someone’s touching your ears like that [tickles her ears 
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and shudders], or like with your nails scraping a chalkboard, like 
‘wooh’!”  
This is mirrored by Turtle (in Turtle and Robertson 2008, pp. 451) as he described the 
urge sensation as a “feeling [that] lies somewhere between somatic sensation and 
imagination.” Later that day, when we drive back to her home from having been 
grocery shopping for her second eye-tracking session, she explained that for her the 
direction of travel of the becoming compulsive of the situation develops with the 
increasing tension: 
“…because if you have a thought… or a feeling, or you have a feeling 
you couple with a thought, or you have a thought you couple with a 
feeling… but if you thus speed up, you only have time for the feeling, 
and the rest of it, you know, then you can’t perform them, those acts.” 
Thus, between the emergence of the urge and adopting a direction of travel, the 
becoming compulsive of the situation can be averted, according to Ginny. Furthermore, 
Sara invokes a spatial dialectic between her hands and two small stuffed animals: 
“If I’d have my hands off them now, or something, I don’t feel the 
tingling, but if I’d lie down for a while, I would want to pick them up 
again.” 
Picking up the small stuffed animals, the tingling disappears, she argued, which sets up 
the urge as invariably responsive to the object. Hence, despite the urge not specifically 
appointing how the body should act on the object, the urge does seem to qualify in the 
direction of the object matter to interact with, in addition to the body parts that would be 
involved. Indeed, participants communicated their experience of the urge emergence in 
a sensory fashion, rather than a sensation fashion. In other words, the urge is 
experienced to arise in the enlacing of a sense organ and an extracorporeal element. 
For instance, Sage explains how vision plays a very important role in becoming 
compulsive:  
“Yeah, so Yesterday suddenly with that coat of [partner’s name], I 
thought ‘ooh, that’s interesting!’ (…) so now it’s indeed more so that if 
my eye falls on something, like that element of his coat that I think 
‘ooh, I really have to touch that for a second’.” 
Hence, for this compulsive touch act, the urge comes into being when her eye contacts 
the coat element, which ontologically releases the urge from Sage’s body and into the 
relation between the corporeal and extracorporeal. In other words, the urge sensation 
is co-constituted by the object, and does not forego it; the involvement of the object 
does not seem to be a coincidence. This argument thus confirms clinical scholarship 
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that provides agency to the extracorporeal (e.g. Leckman and Riddle 2000; Miguel et 
al. 2000; Swain and Leckman 2005; Crossley and Cavanna 2013; Specht 2013; Cox et 
al. 2018) in the constitution of the urge.  
Whilst all participants explained that they performed an act in order to get rid of the 
urge, the direction of travel of the immanent compulsive interaction differed between 
interactions. Urges to touch very often seem to project a particular sensation of a 
particular intensity that would constitute the dissolving of the pressure behind the 
compulsive interaction. Mina, for instance, explains in great detail what is required of 
her in an act in which she handles her own uvula:  
“Then I wanted to touch it up to after the point of having to throw up 
(…) that it just about doesn’t happen (…) but not… touching it softly 
(…) these don’t count.” 
In contrast, in urges that invoke a (re)ordering of object materiality, their adequacy only 
seems to become apparent with or after the act performance. As such, it does not have 
an a priori implication what precise interaction will end the compulsive interaction. This 
lack was voiced by Ginny: 
“See this jar? Well, I see it’s not correctly positioned, and if I place it 
in the centre – my motivation is that if I place it in the centre I will get 
a pleasant sensation, and that’s why I position it correctly (…) but it’s 
also that I get the itch… but… the motivation… You see, if I get the 
itch, that doesn’t mean I need to straighten it, you understand? 
Yes, yes 
By way of speaking it’s the reason that I have to do it, but it’s also 
because it feels pleasant, when I do it.” 
As such, she feels that there is a causal relation between the urge sensation and the 
act that is outside reflection and even experience. Rather, the lack of knowledge about 
the direction of travel of the urge, and the causality seem to situate beyond the urge, 
and can be thought of to be dispersed over the compulsive situation. This, then, opens 
up an ontological gap in the assemblage of causality if it is assumed to sit entirely with 
the corporeal human (after Glas, forthcoming). Instead, the nonhuman extracorporeal 
fills this gap. In this sense the urge experience is not connected to the self, because no 
personal significance had been mobilized by any participant. Therefore, the urge 
should be regarded as the articulation of the becoming-compulsive of the situation, and 
not just the person. This develops the urge as a distributed phenomenon, which maps 
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onto the compulsive interaction as a coming together of the body with particular objects 
and spaces in its constituencies.  
A dispersed becoming-compulsive of the situation and the location of the urge can be 
further interrogated in a series of compulsive interactions that are performed over the 
course of Siôn’s eye-tracking sessions. He compulsively re-places empty and crumbled 
milk and juice cartons six times before they are permanently binned. The cartons can 
be seen to (1) be placed on top of the fridge after having been emptied, (2) placed on 
the kitchen table top, (3) thrown in the kitchen bin, (4) taken out and placed back on the 
table, (5) placed on a book case in the living room, (6) be put on a small table outside, 
and then (7) binned in the large container in the garage. This takes place in between 
various other non-compulsive acts, and happens over the course of 30 minutes. 
Compulsive subjectification processes underpinning this might then be considered to 
only have immanent value for the person involved, and not invoke any futurisms. As 
such, like pain, becoming compulsive can be conceived as an irrevocable pull to the 
here and now (Leder 1990). 
It seems that rather than compulsive interactions accomplishing the cartons reaching 
the new place – i.e. a result of the compulsive interaction – these interactions seemed 
to accomplish the removal of the cartons from their current situation – i.e. a cause for 
the compulsive act. In other words, the urge to compulsively re-place the cartons 
incited an interaction to change the current situation without immediate reference to 
any future situation other than its difference. Nonetheless, the urge seemed to have 
dissolved enough with Siôn re-placing the cartons, making the situation less 
compulsive until it had changed to such an extent that it became compulsive again. 
The urge concomitantly emerging again with the cartons in the new place compelled 
Siôn to help creating a new situation again. This example demonstrates again how the 
situation, and not the person, creates the spatial circumstances under which 
compulsive interactions can come to fruition. 
Some situations becoming compulsive have an immediacy to them that makes the 
requirement to attend to the situation becoming compulsive resemble a realisation. For 
instance, Sara’s first eye-tracking video shows her turning around the cleaning cloth in 
her hand because “it didn’t feel right in [her] hand”. Sage explained this immediacy as 
an intense awareness of the fabric of fresh laundry she puts on a washing rack during 
her first eye-tracking session: 
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“It’s a kind of conscious feeling what you’re feeling in that moment, 
like with meditation exercises, you know. This, that sensation, that 
conscious feeling, that’s what I think I do a lot in the moment that I 
hold an object with my right finger tips. (…) It can be that I was very 
conscious of those other clothes pegs, but that I just didn’t emphasize 
it (…) so it can be that in your eyes I just re-place an object, whilst I in 
that moment definitely… whilst I have that focus on that feeling.” 
As this ‘focus on that feeling’ interrupts other sensations, the urge as a becoming-
conscious incites an acute awareness of the materiality, spatiality and embodiment of 
the situation. It is a focal demand that cannot be resisted (after Ricoeur 1966 in Leder 
1990). This acuteness of becoming-compulsive also shows with clean clothes that are 
picked up from the laundry basket and transferred to the laundry rack to dry. When 
wrapping around the curves of Sage’s fingers when she picks one up, the path of the 
cold, damp, soft flowing fabric of a number of socks to the laundry line is immediately 
subverted to her upper lip, tongue and underside of her nose. After the shock of the 
touch with the compulsive moment being most powerful, and the warmth, form and 
dryness of the part of Sage’s face that touches the sock overflowing in the sock and the 
cold, damp fabric of the sock overflowing into her face, the urge and the compulsive 
element of the interaction have dissolved.  
The immediacy with which this situation becomes compulsive thus merits 
understanding the becoming compulsive of a situation as micro-violence bestowed on 
the body, because other-than-compulsive touching has the potential to reign the body 
into compulsive touching. This becomes markedly clear during the observation of Bill’s 
compulsions, where I saw him handling doorknobs compulsively every time he needs 
to touch one in a non-compulsive fashion. The cold, hard metal of the door handles in 
the palm of Bill’s hand invariably required being pinched and their pointy ends pressed 
with his thumbs. This demonstrates how the situation becoming compulsive does not 
need a build-up of discomforting tension, but can also happen in a flash. As Joe 
expressed: 
“I get the tic or feel compelled to do something – then I do it. But I 
don’t really feel it arriving. It’s just… ‘You experience it: you feel 
compelled to touch it: you do it.’” 
Hence, whereas in some situations that become compulsive the involvement of the 
human takes place not in the realm of the visual, but in that of tactility. Across 
participants and situations, touching extracorporeal matter for other-than-compulsive 
reasons ‘escalated’ into compulsive interactions. After having taken laundry off the line 
and before folding it and dropping it in the laundry basket, Cai brings socks and 
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underwear to his upper lip and nose. These particular items seem to be held for a 
longer duration than the ones in the same series that did not result in compulsive 
engagement. This is also the case in Sage cleaning small items during her second eye-
tracking session. After having held a conversation with me whilst holding a small statue 
of a Greek goddess, she brought it to her upper lip and nose a few times. As such, 
perhaps with expanding tactile knowledge of the object, or attuning to its synesthetic 
textures more finely (after Morton 2013; Clayton 2016) the situation becomes 
compulsive, granting her very little time to suppress the urge.  
In such compulsive entanglement, one is not only at once a body (Leder 1990), but 
becomes the skin, its bouncy fleshiness, the hardness and ‘stoneness’ of the statue, 
the weight and pressure of their conjoining. As Lingis (2000) argues, in such 
compulsive moment the statue’s stoneness reverberates in her muscles, and her upper 
lip becomes the soft roundness of the statue’s head when it becomes pressed in it. The 
becoming compulsive of the situation then seems to happen with the body, not by the 
body, and leaves the reflexive human witness to the act. In turn, this confirms having to 
think the body not as driving force, but as catalyser of a situation becoming compulsive. 
Negotiating such processes is then incredibly difficult, as especially in terms of 
(re)ordering objects, it is not quite sure what is required of the body. As Ginny attested, 
recognising the process of becoming compulsive as soon as possible seems to help. 
Not holding on to objects seems to be another successful way in which the body can 
be retrieved from compulsive engagement. 
The body’s presence, perceptive and sensory capacities, as well as capabilities to 
interact then allows the compulsive pressure to dissolve with the interaction actualized 
with the body. This radically reconfigures the human involvement to the compulsive 
interaction, and takes away its ontological primacy. In contrast to the way medicalised 
conditions have been mobilised on the terms of the human in disability and health 
geography (e.g. Parr 1999; Coyle 2004; Davidson 2007; Chouinard 2012), this study 
opens up the possibility to understand them on more post-human terms. The next 
subsection explores the lack of human dominance over the becoming-compulsive of 
the situation through participants’ invocation of ‘energy’. It does so by mobilising the 
subjectification processes this section has unearthed, and mapping out how they might 
be constituted in accordance. 
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4.3.2 Energy 
For gaining insight in the spatial processes with which compulsive interactions are 
associated, this section takes serious and develops the experience of becoming 
compulsive through energy. This concept has been invoked by a number of 
participants and sheds further light on their understanding of the human position within 
compulsive interactions. Indeed, a supporting, rather than controlling involvement of 
the human resonated with many participants. This may be related to the neglect of 
compulsive interactions in the medicalization of their condition to date. As a 
consequence, they had not been offered clinical vocabularies to express their 
experiences this aspect of their condition through. Ginny, Sage, Tomos and Dylan had 
developed similar, non-hierarchical ways of thinking about having to perform 
compulsive acts. Unprovoked by me, they talked about having to do compulsive 
interactions in terms of ‘energy needing to leave the body’, otherwise this energy would 
remain in the body as a tension. This situates compulsive interaction as sustaining a 
fluid ontology, which subscribes to what O’Connor (2002, pp. 1134) calls a “hydraulic 
model of tic management”. Sage speaks of “a pleasurable release of something that 
builds up”. This situates the body as ‘conductor’ of energy to come in, flow through, and 
come out again, in which the becoming compulsive of the situation resembles the 
energy building up in the body to release it in a compulsive interaction. Ginny argues: 
“That itch needs to be satisfied, it is a kind of orgasm in a way; then 
you feel that itch very strongly, for example, and then you crave that 
orgasm. That belongs together. 
And there is also, say, a point of no-return? 
Yes! That! That’s also the case with Tourette’s: you constantly deal 
with a kind of energy that has to do with a kind of orgasmic energy. 
*laughs* And that is just a very powerful energy that’s there, and you 
can canalise it, or, ehm, that that current becomes weaker, or say like 
‘well, we’re not going to that point’, but that energy does have a 
direction. It wants to go there.” 
Hence, Ginny understands the involvement of her body in compulsive interactions as 
supportive of the through flow of the energy current, which direction she can alter to a 
certain extent, but cannot block. In fact, blocking it is regarded “counter-natural” by 
Sage. When the energy would be stopped flowing through a body because it does not 
cooperate, it becomes stuck. Moving things around in his room to clear his bed tidying 
his room during the eye-tracking session, Dylan recalled that the night before the 
medication did not seem to work as he expected. It resulted in his body feeling restless: 
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“Then you notice that you do have tics, but that it doesn’t come out. 
(…) Often the tics don’t reach my legs, to call it that, and then it just 
stays, indeed, then it keeps bubbling a bit and can’t find a way out.” 
Although he relates his experiences at this point to purely bodily tics, it demonstrates 
that in these situations, the discomfort of the urge becomes unresolvable. By 
extension, the becoming-compulsive of the situation seems to require the body to 
perform particular interactions to release the tension, but somehow the body cannot 
quite find a movement that allows for the energy to ‘find a way out’. Not knowing how to 
get rid of it, Dylan immobilises body parts affected by this pain or pressure to let them 
go numb, and he does not feel it. It only helps him temporarily, as he argues: 
“And that’s fantastic in behavioural therapy32, it’s just that you get 
stuck with all that tension. 
Yes, yes, exact. Exact! 
Yes, and that’s what I told my therapist, like ‘we’re not doing that 
therapy’, I couldn’t take it, I noticed that I had to try and suppress all 
my tics, and it didn’t diminish, it actually got worse, or at least all 
other issues got worse.” 
Sage shared Dylan’s idea that the tension of the urge needs to be developed into a 
compulsive interaction – or tic – and that therapies, such as Exposure and Response 
Prevention prohibit “just a bodily reaction”: 
“Ok, there’s something that needs to leave your body and you are 
blocking it… and that sounded to me, you know… that’s like with 
sneezing and stuff… those are things that just need to get out.” 
Even when a body would be trained to endure the discomfort of the becoming-
compulsive of the body, and develops a resistance to become involved in the 
compulsive interaction, Ginny argued that the energy reduced to a “small ball” “is really 
only temporary”, and that any situation that is demanding in other-than-compulsive 
ways, enlarges it: 
“And then that’s the problem – that you don’t know what to do with 
the big ball, because you learned to makes it small (…) but the 
difficulty for everyone is when that big ball is there again.” 
Hence, Ginny, Sage and Dylan refer to their urge sensations that signal them to 
‘release’ and ‘channel’ energy as a body purpose, and inherently part of the way in 
                                               
32 He refers to Exposure and Response Prevention, which is based on learning to endure the discomfort of 
the urge, that, with time will diminish in intensity. 
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which they relate to the extracorporeal world, rather than as an incapacity, a fault, or a 
failure of the body’s function. This understanding of the involvement of the body in 
compulsive interactions subscribes these interactions to a larger system that does not 
confine to the material thresholds of the body.  
This ontology can be developed further by invoking the machinic system by Deleuze 
and Guattari (2004). This machinic system relates phenomena through their linkage to 
the assembled reproduction of desire-energy, the body can be understood to assemble 
extracorporeal affects. However, as the body does not have ‘receptive’ or reproductive 
organ-machines to house, process and ‘release’ the compulsive energy, it can be 
thought of to ‘echo’ through the bodily flesh – limited by the outer layers of the skin – 
and not following a distinct path. This echoing can be felt as burning or tingling 
sensation in the chest or head. Escaping the flesh would then only be possible by 
finding resonance in extracorporeal materiality and consequent conjoining of the flesh 
with affective materiality. In the moment the sensory registers would resonate with such 
element, the situation would become compulsive, and the energy would start locating in 
the sensory tissues capable of making physical contact with the element. With this 
locational exercise, the energy enters human experience acquiring the quality of the 
direction of travel of the immanent compulsive interaction (Beljaars, forthcoming33). 
This section thus demonstrated that the invocation of energy allowed relating 
subjectification processes to the spatialities of the corporeal in relation to the 
extracorporeal. With this, it supports and contributes to more-than-human arguments 
that challenge “radical discontinuity” between the human and non-human (Murphy 
1995, pp. 689). Compulsivity as energy system thus sets the boundaries of these 
subjectification processes, which situates it as a postphenomenological concept in the 
analysis of person-place relations (see Wylie 2006; Lea 2009; Yusoff 2013; Ash and 
Simpson 2016; McCormack 2016). 
 
4.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter demonstrated that the way compulsive interactions have been 
conceptualised in clinical categories provided in Section 2.1.1 (e.g. Cath et al. 2001; 
                                               
33 I elaborate on energy enlacing bodies with the extracorporeal in conference papers Beljaars, D. (2016). 
“Compulsive Geographies and Desire” Spaces of Desire: Remembrance and Civic Power, Cardiff, and in 
Beljaars, D. (2015). “Geographies of Compulsive Bodies: Reimagining the nature of Tourette syndrome” 
Critical Dialogues on Psychology, Behaviour and Brain Science. Graduate and Early Career Summer 
School, Aberystwyth 
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Worbe et al. 2010; Robertson and Cavanna 2007) does not sufficiently reflect the 
experiences, embodiment and contextual embedding within other-than-compulsive life. 
Indeed, the chapter suggests that exploring compulsive interactions on and through the 
experiences of their situated occurrence allowed for developing an understanding of 
the influence bodily environments have on them. It is able to do so through its analysis 
of qualitative difference between interactions and from their interweaving with other-
than-compulsive life. The distinctive but indeterminate sensations of the urge to interact 
gives rise to a geography of spatial affects in which the body is involved, but does not 
dominate.  
The chapter demonstrates that bodies with compulsive sensibilities then seem to 
become enlaced in the affective landscapes constituted by their situation with particular 
objects in particular spaces. In part, this resonates with Segrott and Doels’s (2004) 
compulsive-obsessive zoning of the house, Callard’s (2006) and Davidson’s (2007) 
geographies of fear, as well as Chouinard’s (2012) and Parr’s (1999) manic and 
delusional bodily ‘entrapment’ by objects in a place. Nonetheless, in these 
geographies, the medicalised condition detects a particular experiential ‘addition’ to the 
objects and spaces that invokes violent responses, whilst this is not the case in urge-
driven compulsivity. Indeed, as the processes of subjectification explored in this 
chapter indicate, affective landscapes that are constituted by bodies, objects, and 
spaces can only be known partially, and depend on non-relational feeling (after 
Harrison 2008; Romanillos 2008; Wylie 2010). Here emphasis is places on the 
importance of the haptic (Gibson 1966; Dixon and Straughan 2010) and somatic 
sensations (Paterson 2009; Paterson and Dodge 2012). 
Not all compulsive interactions are consciously performed, or are performed with a 
particular material result in mind. Rather, the urgency with which compulsions need to 
be performed and the partially experienced bodily ‘conduct’ of energy seemed to urge 
the person to engage with objects and spaces in particular way. Radical immanence, 
as associated with pain (see Leder 1990), rather than transcendence thus seems to 
constitute compulsivity. This incites thinking the extracorporeal as dynamic force field 
(see Thrift and Dewsbury 2000; Anderson and Harrison 2010) that pushes and pulls 
the body in accordance through its sensitive flesh, echoing Hoel and Carusi (2015). It 
might even provoke considering the interruptions of the body’s other-than-compulsive 
engagements when it does not comply with this extracorporeal force field. 
As this chapter sought to map the subjectification processes through tracing the spatial 
experiences that are involved in compulsive interactions, it demonstrated how the body 
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responds and on what experiential bases what kind of negotiations are employed. The 
affective landscapes that bodies diagnosed with Tourette syndrome are enlaced in 
seem to be negotiated on the basis of visibility to other people when present, which 
confirms earlier research on the body (e.g. Goetz et al. 2001; Van Bloss 2006; 
O’Connor 2002; Davis et al. 2004; Buckser 2008). Nonetheless, it also found that 
situational knowledge is mobilised by participants finding the least discomforting and 
interruptive ways of accommodating anticipated compulsive engagement. Wellbeing in 
place is also negotiated by finding ways to ‘channel’ the energy through the body and 
not block it, and developing knowledge about the interchangeability of compulsive and 
other-than-compulsive habits in situated activities. The next chapter takes these finding 
forward by exploring them through body-object-space configurations constituted 
through the compulsive urge and interaction. As such, it seeks to establish what bodily 
capabilities and object capacities invoke compulsivity, and how these configurations 
are resisted. 
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CHAPTER 5 COMPULSIVE 
CONFIGURATIONS 
In uncovering how compulsive interactions emerge and are negotiated as spatial 
processes between bodies, objects, and spaces, this thesis explores how compulsivity 
can contribute to our understanding of people-place relations. This chapter interrogates 
the demedicalised conceptualisation of compulsive interactions through a further non-
hierarchical spatial exploration of its constitutive elements. Building on the previous 
chapter, this chapter situates compulsive interactions as accomplished, and folds this 
accomplishment back onto the corporeal and extracorporeal. In this conceptual move 
the human body and the nonhuman objects and spaces emerge from their 
configuration towards the compulsive situation, and are reflected back on their 
difference with their reconfiguration towards other-than-compulsive life. This allows 
analysing the particularities of the bodily existence of the human and nonhuman kind in 
the constitution of compulsive interactions. Such analysis provides a shared ontology 
which allows analysing the way in which the human negotiates compulsive interactions 
beyond their reflective capacities. The development of such shared ontology then also 
allows reconceptualising the emergence of person-place relations from compulsive 
human/world engagement. 
Tracing the human and nonhuman in the compulsive interaction also allows 
interrogating the value of an ontology of immediacy; where the compulsive interaction 
is so momentary and so fleeting, that its intangibility could be regarded futile. 
Therefore, this section demonstrates how the compulsive interaction is affective in 
itself, and in what ways the constitutive elements retain their affectivity beyond the 
interaction. Rather than seeking to return to transcendentalism in order to open up 
compulsivity to psychoanalysis, such move explores the possibilities for its 
spatiotemporal legacies. First, the chapter turns to the emergence of the human 
corporeal within the compulsive interactions (Section 5.1). Thereafter, the chapter 
explores how objects and spaces emerge as the nonhuman extracorporeal and how 
this informs negotiations (Section 5.2). The chapter conclusions (Section 5.3) 
elaborates on how these findings present human/nonhuman configurations upon which 
compulsive geographies unfold. 
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5.1 COMPULSIVE BODIES 
This section analyses how the body comes to appear in the compulsive interaction, 
how it becomes mobilised through its sensibilities and materialities. Herein, the body 
figures as spatial and affective element itself, moving in accordance with the affective 
landscapes of its constituencies. Analysing the body and its capabilities in the 
compulsive interaction then allows exploring what it means for our understanding of the 
corporeal between and beyond these compulsive moments. Do these interactions and 
their negotiations overflow in new – non-compulsive – situations, and do they leave 
marks?  
 
5.1.1 (Re)configuring bodies 
This subsection answers to the following questions: how does a body become involved 
in compulsive situations, and what affects linger before and after these volatile 
interactions? How does being a situated body reflect back on and map back onto 
performing compulsive interactions? What affects emitted from compulsive interactions 
last beyond the moment, and in what ways does that inflect on the bodily experience of 
a situation? Finally, how do affects that escape the compulsive situation render the 
corporeal relations with the extracorporeal?  
Sage recalled not feeling comfortable in her jeans or trousers and that she kept pulling 
on them to make the uncomfortable sensation go away. However: 
“Then I was in the sauna *laughs* and I wasn’t wearing anything, and 
I still had that feeling, and then I thought ‘ok, so it isn’t the clothes’ 
(…) that every time I just had that feeling like ‘there’s something on it 
[clothes]’, but the other day I wasn’t wearing anything, and then I 
thought ‘hey, my skin just doesn’t fit comfortably!’” 
Whilst the sensory registers of the body are assumed to have a coherence onto which 
experiencing lifeworlds are being mapped, Sage’s experience of skin of her leg pulling 
says otherwise. Besides not quite being able to understand what her body was 
required to attend to, it called into question how her bodily sensations provide a 
trustworthy account of her corporeal situation amongst extracorporeal entities. For 
Sage and others, this marks an ambiguity to what sensations mean to them and how 
they come to constitute sensibilities. This ambiguity is enough for Lowri to ‘get stuck’ at 
 153 
 
what she was doing, and have to try out what she is required to do, as the sudden 
realisation that certain sensations may just have produced compulsive sensibilities. 
This sudden realisation then marks a violent shift of the terms on which the body is 
situated, through a sudden diminishment of pre-existing rationality, goal-orientation, 
and meaning which seems capable of stilling the body. 
I have witnessed Ginny’s body ‘shifting’ in the supermarket whilst wearing the eye-
tracker. During the entire time we were in the supermarket she appeared to require all 
her concentration for the task at hand. This articulated in her methodical pacing and 
lack of general interest in the supermarket environment, barely even noticing other 
people – including me – around her. In concentrating on the boxes of chocolate 
sprinkles in front of her, she remains unaware of a woman who wants to pass her as 
both her cart, and her body blocks the aisles. The woman has to ask twice before 
Ginny can withdraw herself from looking at the chocolate sprinkle boxes. Immediately 
after having made space for the woman, she stares at the boxes again for a while 
before taking a box off the shelf. The sight of the chocolate sprinkle boxes on the shelf 
requires so much of her attention, she seems completely captivated by them. As such, 
her situated body shifted into deciphering what this sight required of her, leaving her 
unable to maintain an awareness of a corporeal situation beyond it. 
Experiencing life slowed, body stilled and being completely immersed in a particular 
element in one’s surroundings is an experience Ginny shares with Alan. When we were 
walking on a country path leading through trees and bushes, he remembers having 
helped a group of scouts searching for a small red plastic triangle once. Proceeding to 
show me, he recalls finding the triangle as follows: 
“It was as if that triangle was completely visible as if it was lit up, and 
the surroundings faded away. That’s how I envisioned it. I always 
have that, when I search hard for something, and I can’t find it. When 
I find it, then it just seems like the vision freezes.”  
This element had been so captivating that the ‘surroundings faded away’, and he 
became completely immersed in the ‘frozen vision’. As such, the triangle in the forest 
and the boxes of chocolate sprinkles in the supermarket seemed to configure Alan’s 
and Ginny’s bodies in accordance to the specified intensities, which blanked out all 
else until something or someone broke the affective tension. In other words, the 
‘attunement’ to these objects had been so immersive that it impeded on their bodies’ 
ability to attune to anything else (after Brigstocke and Noorani 2016). 
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Such an immersive or totalitarian experience resonates with Bissell’s (2009, pp. 911) 
invocation of the chronically pained body, in which “chronic pain is presented as an 
undesirable affective intensity that has no recourse to intentionality and meaning but 
territorialises the body in ways that prevent other intensities from taking hold.” Here, 
Bissell (2009) invokes the Deleuzean category of territorialisation, which is based on a 
Bergsonian image that locates difference between two entities. As argued in Section 
2.4, in territorialisation processes, entities are always in processes of becoming-other, 
which has an origin in a former state and a destination when the former state has 
morphed into something else (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). However, such theory does 
not capture the shifting of the body – or its becoming compulsive – as the body does 
not ‘become-other’. Instead, it reconfigures towards a compulsive situation, but is not 
entirely captured by it. Hence, the corporeal and the extracorporeal enlaced configure 
towards a compulsive situation. For instance, in compulsively pressing one’s finger into 
a tip of a table, the body does not become-table and the table does not become-body. 
Rather, the body and table34 become the compulsive situation in which the table and 
body become enlaced in the compulsive intensity. Bodily configuration allows for a less 
radical and more (post)phenomenological ontology in the expression of such 
difference. 
Recurrence of such bodily configurations towards affective intensities became apparent 
in particular situations for Sage. She mentioned going for a walk in the rural area 
outside her previous home35, and feeling her gaze being drawn towards pointed edges. 
Whilst she clearly finds it annoying, it also has repercussions: 
“That I don’t pay attention to what I actually – where I actually am, 
you know (…) I miss it sometimes, that I can’t just look around me for 
a bit, because I’m always focussed on those pointed edges.” 
With having to make a conscious effort to divert her gaze from pointed edges to ‘pay 
attention to where she is’, she is reminded of the compulsive situation of her body as 
she has difficulties resuming an intended ‘just looking around’. As these two states 
situate the body differently in relation to its constituencies, articulating this difference 
can be captured with the concept of bodily configuration. Configurations of the body 
                                               
34 Here, speaking of a table would not even be appropriate, as it invoke thinking the object as performing 
a functional unity, whilst the object is not compulsively engaged with on this function, but on its sharp 
tip. This critique is made possible through taking Bergsonian images forward, which I do in Section 5.2. 
Therefore, from this point onward, objects as enlaced in compulsive configurations are either invoked as 
objects or a extracorporeal materiality. 
35 During the study she moved: from an old farm building in a rural-agricultural area 2 kilometres outside 
a town/small city where the interview and second observation took place to a flat on the third floor in a 
residential neighbourhood in this town/small city where the eye-tracking sessions took place. 
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reflect the kind of emergence of the body with the corporeal situation. Compulsive 
configurations of the body then reflect how the body becomes enlaced in a compulsive 
activity; with the becoming-compulsive of the body, it seizes to be configured in 
accordance to the wishes of the person. After the completion of a compulsive 
interaction could be understood to ‘shift back’ from a compulsive configuration to a 
configuration that is helpful to the person. 
The eye-tracking sessions capture the reconfigurations of Sage’s body: walking around 
in her flat as well as during talking to me, her gaze flashes to pointed edges of objects 
and corners of the room on a regular basis. Especially when she walks from her 
kitchen to the living room, Sage’s gaze meets a few particular points in quick 
succession. Having to look at things compulsively might not be an interaction that 
incites corporeal and extracorporeal matter meeting. Nonetheless, it does demonstrate 
that elements that constitute affective environments present themselves as a 
patchwork of intensities and demand particular engagements in accordance with 
particular corporeal situations (after Dewsbury 2000; Massumi 2002; Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004; Thrift 2008). As such, with changing bodily constituencies, the body is 
required to reconfigure. 
Whilst these instances configure the body in accordance with a visual enlacing, other, 
more proximate configurations that involve touch also seem difficult to break. Elisa’s 
body seemed to easily ‘stick’ in compulsive moments, as anything that touches her 
body tended to remain in her awareness. Therefore she does not wear underwear and 
glasses, and does not wear piercings as she would play with them until she tears her 
flesh. Also, she could sleep in 100% silk bedding, but not in synthetic silk bedding. 
Indeed, the human body being touched without explicitly moving to seems to have a 
similar effect as the human body moving towards extracorporeal materiality. As the 
human can often not escape such interactions as one needs to wear clothes, these 
interactions retain the body in its compulsive configuration in accordance with the 
extracorporeal materiality that touches it. For Alan, this feels like his body is hijacked 
and leads him to prefer being naked. 
Heightened sensitivity (see Section 2.1.1) (Bliss 1980; Kane 1994; Crossley and 
Cavanna 2013) can be understood as bodily configurations ‘sticking’ in compulsivity, 
and refraining from assuming ones that allow other-than-compulsive life to proceed. 
Such terminology implies this configuration as locating in and being solely a problem of 
the body. This conceptualises the body as an epistemological constant, whilst this 
study suggests that bodies become reconfigured to accommodate compulsive 
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moments in accordance with situations that articulate their beginning and end. In other 
words, the conceptualisation of this phenomenon should be stretched to reflect the 
spatiality of the human body amongst nonhuman bodies. This invokes an onto-
epistemological shift towards an articulation of a bodily engagement with its 
constituencies. Alan’s bodily sensitivity exemplifies this further. 
The spot where Alan’s body is being touched immediately starts itching: “really quickly I 
need to – well quite short really, a few minutes or something (…) then I just scratch for 
a bit”. It articulates particular clothes he wears, as well as particular activities he 
engages in, which, in turn, have a particular geography. The itching also occurs when 
his hands are tied in a position that refrains him from scratching: during the 
observation, he held the leashes of the seven dogs we walked. Every now and then 
when the itching sensation was too strong, he stopped walking and transferred all 
leashes to one hand to free the other for scratching his cheeks and nose. Here, the 
itching does not differ from urging or the becoming-compulsive of the situated body. 
Hence, the division between Alan’s body and its constituencies is violently reproduced 
through the immediate itching of the contact point and through the immediate 
vulnerability of the body when the hands are unavailable for scratching. In other words, 
certain bodily situations, especially those that impede possibilities make the body more 
prone to become compulsively reconfigured. Sage remarked that indeed my presence 
had such effect when I visited her place for the eye-tracking sessions: 
“The itch is there the whole time, because that’s always the case with 
you here. I don’t want that, so sometimes I suppress it.” 
In these situations, my bodily presence become part of Sage’s bodily constituencies 
which she experiences as catalysing her bodily reconfigurations towards compulsive 
engagements. 
In order for the body to reconfigure and to experience for it to be more or less prone to 
become reconfigured, it carries an ongoing anticipation to be affected by extracorporeal 
materiality. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004) argue, before metaphysical bodies can 
affect each other, they need to anticipate each other’s presence. In anticipation they 
are always already implied in each other. Hence, for the body to reconfigure into 
compulsive and non-compulsive emergence with its environment, the extracorporeal is 
implied in the corporeal. Ginny put this anticipation in words when discussing the honey 
jar she had just removed from the table we were sat at for the interview. She had 
difficulties concentrating as its presence was distractive and she kept feeling the urge 
to touch it: “now you’re talking about it, then I immediately get… then I see that jar and 
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then I feel that jar”. It is not the honey, it is not the aesthetics of the jar, it is not the 
practice of drinking tea with honey, scooping honey out of the jar or even putting the jar 
in a new place, nor the social occasion; rather it is the virtuality of the jar in her hands 
(see Massumi 2002). Instead of an extracorporeal presence that itches, this 
compulsive situation marks the absence of extracorporeal materiality. Ginny’s hands 
are anticipating the jar and her body has reconfigured in accordance, eagerly awaiting 
the actualisation of the sensation of the jar. The anticipation of the object with the body 
might then only be an affective intentionality rather than a cognitive intentional 
tendency (after Levinas 1998; Bissell 2009; Ash and Simpson 2016).  
An implication of the extracorporeal in the corporeal also resonates with Sage’s 
memory of her teenage years when she was unable to sleep without certain objects on 
the carpet next to her bed. These objects could be anything, ranging from stuffed 
animals to coasters, to small statues; “anything that caught [her] eye” that evening. 
They had to remain in close proximity when she slept, to refrain her from lying awake 
feeling anxious. Sage’s body then seemed to be configured towards these proximate 
items in the situation of going to bed, and the only way to break it and continue non-
compulsive life would be to present the anticipated nonhumans to stop the yearning. 
The spatiality of her body in her pyjama’s amongst the bed, certain but not all items in 
the room, as well as a state of tiredness, bed time, closed curtains, and the fresh taste 
of toothpaste in her mouth in addition to an exhaustible list of elements that produced 
the situation becoming compulsive in this particular way. Only with the right collection 
of objects in her bodily proximity the compulsive element of the situation could dissolve 
and her body reconfigure for sleeping purposes.  
The unpredictable and incessant potential for the body to reconfigure with compulsive 
situations, and thus the extracorporeal always already implied in the corporeal may be 
a way to understand the participant’s resonance of Nick van Bloss’ (2006) experience 
of feeling overwhelmed by his environments. According to Siôn “your senses are 
constantly open (…) that you’re always aware of what happens around you”. Sara adds 
that for her “it’s all more intense” and Elisa asserts that “what comes in does so way 
too powerful”. This is then experienced as state of an unchosen bodily openness to the 
world. Ginny associates her experiences of asthma with this openness:  
“I’m just hyper sensitive, it’s a complete package (…) I respond 
violently to everything, you know. ‘Too much’. So my controls are just 
wrongly adjusted there.” 
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Whilst most participants argue that they feel overwhelmed by their environment for 
most of the time (see also Gerland 2003), particular bodily states are experienced to 
exacerbate this openness or catalyse the ease with which the body become configured 
towards affective extracorporeal materiality. For instance not getting enough sleep or 
not sleeping well is associated with feeling “even more alert” according to Ginny. “Then 
[her] shutters have opened even wider”, and “it seem that [she] receives even more 
stimuli, or something… yeah, then they just come in more forcefully”. In addition, when 
she her menstrual cycle starts, the organisation of the spaces in her house, and the 
living room in particular, becomes affective – or incites turbulence (Serres 1995; 
Anderson and Wylie 2009), and she is compelled to change it. Furthermore, Bill’s 
experience with having chronic pains makes him feel particularly easily affected on 
‘bad’ days when the pain is more intense. Hence, this experienced radical openness of 
the senses in accordance with certain biological processes can be understood as 
people being more aware of the object affects passing through the body and 
configuring it compulsively accordingly.  
Although compulsive configurations are not argued by participants to become more 
frequent in these moments, the anticipation of the extracorporeal in the corporeal do 
remind them of their radical passivity in the processes of corporeal enlacing (after 
Harrison 2007; 2015). The biological processes could therefore accommodate the 
awareness of the vulnerability of bodily configurations to compulsive situations, which 
can be experienced as a violent nonhuman lifeworld. As such, conceptualising the 
body in compulsive situations as configured in accordance with extracorporeal affects, 
channelling them with compulsive interactions helps understanding some of the 
experiences of the body in compulsive situations. Herein the body perpetuates and 
catalyses the affects of extracorporeal materiality (see Section 4.3.1). With the body 
moving to interact with an object and bringing the compulsive moment to fruition (after 
Lingis 2000; Wylie 2002), the corporeal can be thought to ‘slip away’ in a compulsive 
configuration, whilst lasting interactions keep the body configured as such, not allowing 
the body to re-engage in non-compulsive life. Becoming compulsive is then 
experienced as the slipping away of the body from alignment with one’s goals towards 
a serviceability for extracorporeal affects. This slipping away of the body into a 
compulsive configuration has a number of consequences for the person involved, to 
which the next subsection is dedicated. 
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5.1.2 Bodies not fitting/shutting down 
The potential for and incessant threat of a reconfiguration of the body to attend to the 
compulsive situation instead of a chosen one articulates in the ongoing mobilisation 
and experience of the body outside compulsive situations. For instance, Ginny recalls 
not being able to configure back to non-compulsive life when she leaves the house for 
work knowing that objects are not in the right place: “sometimes I get an acute error, 
and I can’t think anymore”. Failing to configure back to a non-compulsive state before 
leaving a compulsive situation can result in difficulties aligning the body with tasks at 
hand. Such experiences lead some to stop assuming that they have their body ‘at their 
disposal’ in non-compulsive situations. Dylan reflects his difficulties relating to living a 
body during his first eye-tracking session. When reaching for and turning the tap valve, 
he narrates his actions and sensations in relation to his hands: 
“Here as well ,’flop’, and at once it has opened… You would miss, 
with such a fluent motion, you’d miss… then you’d have to calibrate 
that whole fluent motion again 
Ah yes 
That’s the stress that’s just always there when I do fine motor 
activities… my hands, they…. Water flows over my hands… it’s even 
a bit painful… painful is not even the right word, but it feels strange… 
something flows over your hand (…) This fine motor bullshit, and then 
having to wash your hands all the time 
Ah yes, like that 
How tired that makes you – terrible!” 
Dylan talked about his body in terms of calibration here, and repeats this terminology in 
other moments. When invoking such terms, one might argue that Dylan has alienated 
from his body and feels the need to actively steer his body at any time it might start 
reconfiguring in accordance to extracorporeal affects. Indeed, stopping such 
configurations might be especially strenuous when he needs to interact with 
extracorporeal materiality in an other-than-compulsive way; the object might become 
so affective that these interactions require a very deliberate and careful approach. Also 
during the eye-tracking sessions he often had to resume doing the task he set himself 
(i.e. clearing and cleaning his bedroom). Picking up objects to put them in a new place 
often resulted in him getting stuck into dealing with the object in his hand and playing 
with it and talking about it and his condition in general. After such episode, he would 
remember the task and pick up the next object. As such, this series of movements 
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starting with a non-compulsive task required Dylan’s body constantly having to actively 
retrieve it from its compulsive enlacing with extracorporeal affects.  
Activities that cannot permit Dylan’s body to reconfigure towards a compulsive situation 
because it would put him in danger, such as driving, are negotiated through a 
deliberate focus on the body. For the observation driving us to a supermarket, he 
utilised a special rubber mouthpiece onto which he bit down during the trip. This biting 
down helped reminding him of his body in the sense that he actively retained it into the 
configuration necessary for driving. Such interaction has also worked for people with 
autistic sensibilities (Cowhey 2005; Lawson 2005; Davidson 2010). During the 
interview he explained: 
“I also wear it when I have to concentrate. I was just vacuuming: I am 
wearing it. (…) At the point you can shove eh… tics out in the 
mouthpiece, the storm in your nut stops.” 
During the observation in the supermarket, I noticed him pushing his cart, walking past 
it, standing in its path and letting it bump into his backside upon which he continued 
actively searching for the items on his shopping list. Hence, it might be possible to think 
of such non-compulsive interactions as purposefully incited to reduce the requirement 
for the body reconfiguring into compulsive situations when the person needs their body 
to be configured for non-compulsive activities. In other words; such interactions might 
help channel extracorporeal affects in such a way that for a short duration the body is 
freed from affects pressuring it into compulsive configurations.  
If compulsive enlacing cannot in a way be predicted or perhaps even regulated, such 
as Dylan does, one might have difficulties relating to one’s body. Ginny seems to have 
such difficulties. She regularly goes to have a massage to “get back in [her] body”, and 
situate her body as belonging to her, reconfirming its materiality and capacities. This 
seems necessary as configuring her body into non-compulsive movements does not 
work, or its constant compulsive reconfiguring itself is affective to such an extent that 
her corporeal existence does not always appear distinctly different from the 
extracorporeal: 
“I have to experience matter. I don’t experience matter, that’s how it 
is I think. (…) then I just have to touch everything, you know, like, 
then I’m just all over everything, like… if I let myself do it yeah 
And what did you mean with not experiencing matter? 
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Well, if you a lot – if you experience yourself in unity and as very 
large, not limited to a body, then you surpass the dimension of 
matter, then you’re in a different kind… (…) I’ve always been, I used 
to be homesick to there [an unknown faraway place] then I had a kind 
trauma, thinking like ‘Jesus, what am I even doing here? It’s so 
boring here and everything is so slow, and I have to walk everywhere 
myself, and I can, in my, with my soul or with my everything I’m there 
in a second!’ In matter everything is so slow, so matter has always 
been a kind of… negative thing for me, because it was my resistance 
and it withheld me from going fast, you see (…) For example, when I 
go to get something I’m already upstairs and then I walked – then I 
often walk into the edge of a wall. I get stuck because I am there 
already. 
You can imagine it 
But my body isn’t! [laughs]” 
In Ginny’s experience of some situations, her body does not only attend to 
extracorporeal materiality but ontologically dissolves in it by becoming a different ‘kind’. 
Becoming other-than-body – and even other-than-matter – overcomes the 
configuration conundrum in which the body requires constant reconfiguration in 
accordance with non-compulsive life. As such, Ginny negotiates having to perform 
compulsive interactions with a denial of corporeal existence, which, in turn, produces 
all kinds of other difficulties, including an inability to differentiate between corporeal and 
extracorporeal matter, and an inability to configure back into non-compulsive life. 
In addition to the performance of compulsive interactions, the becoming-compulsive 
and unbecoming-compulsive of the body then reconfigures it such ways that it plays an 
important role in how the interactions are performed and how they are negotiated. 
Indeed, the bodily reconfigurations present major difficulties for those experiencing 
compulsive interactions; feeling overwhelmed by certain bodily environments, having to 
face the body ‘slipping away’, alienating and being unable to function in certain 
situations, and actively having to retrieve and reacquaint with its movements, mass and 
situation. Despite lacking meaningful relations to the self, compulsivity emerges with an 
emotional geography. As such, understanding the body in these terms when it 
becomes enlaced in a compulsive situation might explain why the urge provides the 
human as little guidance to the interaction as is experienced (see Section 4.3.1). 
Regarding the relations between people and place, during these reconfigurations 
perceptions of the both the corporeal and extracorporeal change, which creates a 
violent rupturing and therefore fragmentary affective environment. The next subsection 
lays out how negotiations of performing compulsive interactions hinge on managing 
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these ruptures, and negotiating the compulsive configurations of bodies and 
perception.  
 
5.1.3 Assembling corporeal unaffection  
Participants have tried to negotiate reconfigurations of their body as it becomes 
enlaced into compulsive interaction with its constituencies, as well as the perceived 
fragmentation of the corporeal environment during configurations. In theory, they could 
do so by altering a number of ontological elements that constitute the compulsive 
interaction assemblage. The current medical conceptualisation of and ontological 
responsibility over compulsivity is situated solely with the body, which reflects in the 
available professional support. Negotiation strategies offered roughly map onto the 
brain through medication, and bodily movements and sensations via behavioural 
therapy. This subsection elaborates on the ways in which professional support affects 
bodily configurations to compulsive situations. 
No medication on the market that has been developed specific to what is considered a 
Tourette’s specific brain malfunction (see Section 2.1.2). As a result, many people, 
including a number of the participants, have a history of trying different medication, and 
either finding one that works for them at that point in time, trying another kind, or 
resorting to behavioural therapies. Having met with Elisa whilst she changed 
medication, I noticed strong differences between her being easily affected and having 
to perform many tics in a short amount of time with a rather grim outlook on life, and 
being a less ‘busy’ body with a more positive outlook on life. She explained that with 
her previous medication she became performed fewer compulsions, but was 
emotionally “flatter and sombre” and required 12 hours sleep. With the medication she 
tried after that, she experienced less compulsivity and required only 4 hours of sleep: 
“So I had 8 hours extra per day! Yeah, that was fantastic! 
An entire working day almost!  
Yes, that’s even a full working day that I had for spending. Yeah, well, 
it’s great, and I also felt very comfortable in my own skin, that 
sombreness dissolved because that other medication had stopped, 
so that was just ideal!”  
As such, the new medication did not stop Elisa’s body from configuring towards 
compulsive situations as much as the previous tablets had required from her. Instead, 
with the new medication that made her ‘feel very comfortable in her own skin’, 
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compulsive configurations became less bothersome and took away the emotional 
labour attached to having to do compulsive acts. 
Also for others medication seemed to do reduce the way they experienced their 
susceptibility to be affected by extracorporeal materiality. Ginny explains the effects 
medication she had before the study: 
“Then it’s being muted, those senses, the neurons are just being shut 
down 
Yeah, exactly (incomprehensible speech) 
And that had the effect that I felt that I was in the room one my own 
behind glass, and it all happened there [points behind virtual glass], 
and I couldn’t feel anymore; I could see it, but not feel it. It was really 
very strange. 
Yeah, so sight wasn’t enough 
Yes, it was as if you’re just not involved in the world (…) It made me 
very depressed, I felt very out of touch with the world (…) I thought ‘it 
doesn’t even bother me whether I’m dead or alive’, and I have 
children, you know! Then I just had – then I felt entirely disconnected, 
from the earth or anything.” 
Hence, it seems that Ginny’s body remained unaffected by the extracorporeal 
materiality that she could have interacted with compulsively if she had not taken the 
tablets. Ginny’s experiences here allude to anonymised sight; pure sensation without 
feeling. Instead of only taking away the experience of becoming compulsive, this 
medication seems to completely obliterate all her sensibilities to become affected by 
any element of her body’s constituencies. ‘Feeling entirely disconnected’ alludes to her 
body not configuring in accordance to neither non-compulsive nor compulsive life. As 
indifferent to the swarms of affects that has previously enlaced her into attending to her 
surroundings, perhaps this configures her body as object among objects. Such a 
medicated compulsive body might be conceived of having been brought in a state of 
numbness as materiality without sensibility, quite literally deprived of a vitality assumed 
inherent to a humanity (see also Verdellen 2007; Shprechter and Kurlan 2009). Indeed 
affirmative of such loss of vitality, Sage described being prescribed medication with 
“increased chances of suicidal tendencies”. The psychiatrist arguing that “[she] already 
had them anyway, those suicidal tendencies” left her perplexed by his “logic”, but she 
hastened to add that “it was closely monitored”. Medication as powerful element in the 
compulsive interaction seemed to affect the rupture of the reconfiguration as such. In 
effect, it reduces the burden of compulsive reconfiguration and therewith partly 
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dissolves the difference between compulsive and non-compulsive life, or reduces the 
bodily capacity to configure towards any situation. 
As the medication did not have the effects Ginny had hoped for, she tried tea of 
cannabis leaves, which had the following effects:  
“It’s as if there’s a veil over ehm… a balloon coming over me, a kind 
of protective layer that stopped those stimuli from coming in so 
violently.” 
The cannabis tea thus seemed to affect the fragmentary perception of the 
extracorporeal, and not necessarily the bodily configurations. Dylan feels that with 
medicinal cannabis, he can “instantly breathe again”. He recalls having switched from 
publicly available “coffee shop36 weed” and waking up the next day: “boom, space in 
my head, I functioned, I slept fantastically, and I could walk again”. With the medicinal 
cannabis Dylan’s body seemed to improve in ability to configure towards non-
compulsive life and not reconfigure towards compulsive situations as often. In other 
words, the body could still be affected, but it was less vulnerable to become enlaced in 
compulsive interactions.  
Retaining this effect requires meticulous management. The dose of the active 
ingredient needed to be exactly 0.16 gram for Dylan, and when he inhaled the smoke 
he held his breath for precisely 5 seconds. He recalled running out of cannabis, and not 
being able to walk the day after. Therefore, having to rely on cannabis in order to 
function as well as he does taking the drug poses risks, as he regularly has to find 
alternatives of coping because “the pharmacist had been too late, got its order wrong 
or hadn’t received it [the weed] yet”. As such, the process of chemical alteration of the 
sensibilities becomes affective in itself. Also, Nora takes medication in anticipation of 
noisy situations or those prone to evoke social anxieties, such as choir performances 
on stage would fall about this threshold. Therefore, in these situations, she would take 
medication, accepting that she would not be “her happy self anymore”.  
Negotiating the performance of compulsive interactions through these management 
style chemical inductions striates the body in two ways. Chemical constitutions of the 
‘acceptably’ compulsive body appears to be a finely tuned balancing performance. 
Firstly, it requires an understanding of one’s own body in mechanical terms; it needs 
very regular and meticulous additions to have the desired effects of being experienced 
                                               
36 In the Netherlands, coffee shops are cafés where citizens over age 18 can legally buy cannabis for 
private consumption.  
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as just sensible enough. When the balance is off, the body comes to a grinding halt. 
Secondly, it striates the body through a lack; without the right kind or amount of 
chemical addition, it cannot conform to its wanted performativity. Understanding the 
body as such purports it as fundamentally dependent and unruly (Philo 2007; 
Chouinard et al. 2010; Schillmeier 2010; Hall and Wilton 2016). In turn, such a notion 
feeds into ablest models of embodiment following medicalised traditions that see 
bodies configured in accordance to normative standards and employ hierarchies of 
bodies (Duff 2011; Andrews et al 2012). Extending this critique from disability scholars, 
this notion makes the body that becomes compulsive enlaced vulnerable to economic 
rendition, and ill-performing at that (Hansen and Philo 2007), only being understood as 
whole when chemically balanced in such a way that it is most productive.  
Another way of coping with the compulsive enlacing and fragmentary appearance of 
the bodily environment is through alcohol. Mina experienced more problematic than 
helpful effects trying different medication, and could not arrange medicinal cannabis. 
As a result, she uses alcohol to “dampen the effect” “when it’s too much”, despite 
finding “it not very smart, of course”. During the conversation we have whilst she draws 
during the second eye-tracking session, she explains her predicament arguing: 
“At some point you have an alcohol problem. Then you have to get to 
rid of that!  
Yeah 
I’ve never taken a sip and eh… now it’s eh… kind of eh… become a 
proclivity… to eh… at least at one point in the day eh… to just, 
yeah… be able to relax, but yeah, this is not a solution.” 
Similar to Nora’s habits of taking medication, Mina using alcohol ‘when it’s too much’ 
negotiates situations in which the body refrains from retaining a configuration aligned 
with one’s wishes. However, whilst Nora took the medication to avoid others from 
noticing her body performing compulsive acts, Mina might be understood to take 
alcohol to not have to experience her body at all, including becoming compulsive 
enlacing. Nonetheless, most participants taking or having taken medication at the time 
of the study did argue that their medication had a transition period of up to six weeks 
during which it has not yet reached full capacity. Recognising that Nora is the only 
participant who was able to use medication incidentally, chemical addition to the body 
does not cater for the support needed for the momentary occurrence of compulsive 
interactions. 
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Behavioural therapies such as Habit Reversal Therapy (HRT) and Exposure and 
Response Prevention (ERP)37 do have a momentary effect, and can be mobilised when 
the person requires it. Neither therapy does specifically address compulsive 
interactions, as they target the movement of the body (HRT) or the sensation of the 
urge (ERP). Additionally, these techniques are designed to be acquired in therapy 
rooms, and as such do not address the situatedness that is required for negotiating 
compulsive interactions. In case of HRT body parts involved in the compulsive act are 
positioned in such a way that they cannot be performed, which only repositioned the 
problem for Dylan. In deliberating treatment options with his therapist, he asserted that 
he “noticed that [he] needed to stop [his] tics, and it didn’t get less. In fact, it became 
worse, or at least, [his] other issues got worse”. Nonetheless, during another meeting 
he shows me how he prevents compulsive arm movements by immobilising his arm in 
such a way that the blood circulation halted and he would not feel it anymore. Apart 
from the unhealthy consequences of such negotiations of compulsive enlacing, it 
refrains the arm from performing purely bodily tics that only require arm movement. 
However, Dylan did not mention it to work for compulsive interaction that requires 
involvement of the body beyond the arm – even just to bring the arm ‘in position’.  
In the case of ERP, people are trained to not be bothered by being affected, and 
through not following up on the urge sensation stop becoming enlaced into the 
compulsive interaction. Unless patients specifically bring up the persistence of 
everyday objects that fit ERP treatment sessions (e.g. a glass) and can become 
affective in that therapy situation, ERP does not include compulsive interactions. 
Nonetheless, having to focus on the urge sensation and refuse to become enlaced 
seemed to instil an acuteness of bodily presence in participants in similar ways that 
pain “holds sway” over a person, with “one’s whole being [being] forcibly reoriented” 
(Leder 1990, pp. 73). This reflects Sage arguing that focussing her attention to the urge 
sensation “[she is] successful in registering where it [compulsivity related pain 
sensation] is located because of the therapy”. Therefore, ERP seems to assert a new 
striation of the body through the urge sensation, which might paradoxically intensify the 
experience of body slipping away into compulsive reconfigurations without taking part 
in the interaction. Indeed, whilst ERP does provide people the power to resist following 
up on the urge, it does not stop compulsive reconfiguration, because the person has to 
actively resist until the urge sensation dissolves.  
                                               
37 These are the behavioural therapies used mostly amongst the research participants.  
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How well ERP works for people is then experienced to relate to how well and often one 
“practices” this resistance according to Sage. Lowri finds this one of the most difficult 
aspects. ‘Practicing’ for half an hour refrains her from doing non-compulsive tasks, as 
she feels that all she does has a compulsive element to it. Despite having a list that 
reminds her of compulsive interactions she becomes enlaced in, she struggles: 
“Especially with that water I had to practice, that is super difficult 
because it was mainly a habit to… drink like that. 
Oh 
That water, that way, that I had to kind of unlearn it, be-because I… 
yeah, to drink normally.” 
Such compulsive interactions that are not distinctively different from non-compulsive 
interactions – “random” as Lowri puts it – are not captured by these therapies. 
Notwithstanding, for some participants who had tried ERP, it did alter the compulsive 
enlacing as such. For instance, Rhys argues that  
“With the pressure increasing, I can better handle it [the sensation] 
(...) and that’s a very comfortable feeling. Therefore you have more 
control that I didn’t have before.” 
This feeling of decreasing powerlessness is reflected by Tomos, who had just 
successfully finished an ERP therapy series and was very happy with the results. This 
led him to think about the therapy in more metaphysical ways and regard it as an 
attitude to life beyond compulsive configurations. Reflecting on a period in his life 
during which he could not leave the house or undertake many activities, he argues that 
“It is then that you have to exposure… [sic] I think that you have a 
kind of wealth as human being when you have limitations – when you 
overcome those limitations. Or, perhaps not overcoming the physical 
limitations – I will always have tics – but… can deal with it spiritually. 
Yeah, then you become such a character 
Yes 
That’s what I want to achieve. I’m not there yet, but I want to be 
there, that.” 
Changing the experience of compulsive enlacing by thinking about it in a way that 
empowers one in the enlacing also reflects the workings of Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy (CBT). With CBT, the person is encouraged to think about compulsive 
interactions through functional analysis, thereby disregarding the embodied, sensory 
and situated aspects of these interactions. This disregard was precisely what left Lowri 
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to find it unhelpful, because “that was just merely talking (inaudible) and [she] needed 
physical practices”. 
In conclusion, negotiating compulsive enlacing through bodily configurations towards 
compulsive situations, participants have utilised the professional support offered to 
them. This kind of support affects the performance of compulsive interactions in a 
number of ways. Adding chemicals to the body is a more or less blanket approach that 
can reduce its ability to be affected, which is necessary for configuration towards 
compulsive and non-compulsive situations. As such, it may not always helpful as 
different situations require different kinds of support. Additionally, chemical additions 
are affective on their own terms because they need to be managed carefully, which 
shifts compulsive enlacing from a body/environment assemblage to a 
body/chemicals/environment assemblage. Furthermore, behavioural therapies affect 
the compulsive interaction mostly by altering the experience and increasing the 
masochistic capacity of the body to refrain from acting on the urge sensation, making 
the compulsive aspect making less bothersome. Nonetheless, these therapies are 
invariably decontextualized, and for CBT even disembodied. Therefore, this study 
suggests that the bodily environment can play an important role in mediating and 
increasing the effectiveness of medication and behavioural therapies. 
 
5.1.4 Conclusions 
This subsection analysed how the body is rendered in the compulsive interaction, and 
how this takes place in accordance with its environment. Participants  avoided their 
body to configure into compulsive situations,  through taking medication and 
behavioural therapy. The spatial approach of this study therefore presents a new way 
of understanding what happens in these processes, and how space can mediate them. 
As medical and clinical sciences struggle with grasping ‘environmental influences’ on 
symptom expression (e.g. Conelea and Woods 2008; Woods et al. 2009; Cavanna and 
Nani 2013) (see Section 2.1.2), these findings develop a metaphysics through which 
various dimensions of compulsivity can be understood in these terms. Consequently, 
this demonstrates the gaps currently left to negotiate being enlaced into compulsive 
interactions by the professional support through pharmacotherapies and behavioural 
therapies. Consequently, participants employ other negotiation strategies, which are 
analysed in the Chapter 6. 
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The section also demonstrated that the body can be understood to reconfigure to and 
with extracorporeal materiality, thereby attending to and sustaining the situation 
becoming compulsive. During the moments in which the body reconfigures, non-
compulsive life that requires all attention and similar bodily capacities seems to come 
to a grinding halt, which is experienced by the participants as bodily alienation. Such is 
in line with and further supports perception literature that distinguishes perception in 
corporeal foci and focal demands (Leder’s 1990) as well as geographical scholarship in 
perception in terms of spaces drawing perception in accordance with its affects (e.g. 
Rose 2006; Wylie 2006; 2009; Anderson 2014). However, understanding the bodily 
environment through affect alone cannot explain how the body configures towards 
particular compulsive interactions. 
In line with more-than-human approaches in geography (e.g. Doel 1999; Ingold 2000; 
Whatmore 2002; Thrift 2008; Anderson and Harrison 2010; Castree et al. 2013), the 
nonhuman environment reverberates through their bodies with such violence that their 
bodies can lose all boundaries, and they feel they no longer fully inhabit their own 
body. The body’s reconfiguration in the interaction reflects the ‘witnessing role’ for the 
human, and as such compulsive interactions defy a belonging to the human (Dewsbury 
2003). Indeed, the body is configured in such a way that it refrains from asserting its 
humanity in the becoming-compulsive and in the interactions. The next section 
analyses compulsive interactions from the perspective of the extracorporeal, and traces 
how the bodily environment can be understood to configure towards the compulsive 
interaction. 
 
5.2 COMPULSIVE ENVIRONMENTS 
This subsection explores how the extracorporeal figures in compulsive interactions, 
and in what ways the bodily environment becomes enlaced. To this end, the subsection 
analyses what makes the extracorporeal ‘enlaceable’ in compulsive interactions, in 
order to understand how the extracorporeal should be conceptualised in compulsive 
interactions. To this end, the subsection develops an understanding of space in 
compulsive situations, building on the fragmenting world constituted through 
reconfiguring bodies. The extracorporeal in the following subsections mainly entail 
nonhumans such as objects and animals. Nonetheless, some participants have to 
compulsively interact with other human beings, but emphasize that it is not the 
‘humanity’ of other people that is affective, but for particularly compelling fabrics of their 
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clothes, such as fleece for Elisa. Indeed, other human bodies become purely involved 
on their materiality and form, not socialisation. This proposition cannot be a claim, as 
participants may not have wanted to share thoughts with me that would suggest 
otherwise. Nonetheless, Elisa explained that she had a co-worker who had had 
reconstructive surgery after a mastectomy and “just want[s] to touch her breasts”, 
because she “just want to know how it feels”. I ask if she needs to know the feeling 
because it involves a body part with certain social connotations, to which she answers: 
“No, they could as well be her knees (…) it’s not symmetrical, the one 
is bigger than the other, and that has to be compared.” 
Therefore this section renders the extracorporeal through its inhumanity, as such 
referring to nonhumans, whilst allowing ontological space for humanity potentially 
implied in the enlacing of the extracorporeal. The first subsection (5.2.1) turns to 
objects and their spatialities and the ways in which they forge entrance to compulsions, 
and the second subsection (5.2.2) elaborate on the volatility of the coming together of 
objects and human bodies in a spatial constellation of the compulsive interaction. 
 
5.2.1 Objectness 
This subsection attempts to establish how objects and their spatiality co-constitute 
compulsive interactions. As asserted in Section 2.1, the extracorporeal is absent in the 
clinical understanding of compulsive interactions. This study demonstrates that some 
objects are recurrent in compulsive acts across participants, for instance a glass and 
socks, but the overwhelming majority differed between participants. Remarkably, the 
objects involved in compulsive acts, almost never became interacted with in 
confirmation of their intended usage. For example, during observations and eye-
tracking sessions glasses were pinched, socks were brought to the face to touch the 
upper lip, juice cartons were rolled between hands, tap handles were aligned with their 
mouth pieces, and stones were ordered in a square on a desk. Following Bennett 
(2010), in compulsive interactions, nonhumans do not necessarily retain their 
‘thingness’ or ‘objectness’, and come to appear in accordance to different striations 
once enlaced in compulsive interactions. Indeed, their configuration in accordance with 
other striations than objectness and function could be on their shape and materiality. 
As was a standard question I posed to all participants, I asked Joe to list any 
preferences for particular textures. He responded in similar wording as the other 
participants: 
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“No, no, no, it’s just what I think I need to do, I need, but not anything 
specifically, no. (…) Also in shapes, I’m not picky. That’s with 
everything, seeing something in proportions, I don’t care, I’m happy 
with everything. That’s that, but it’s not conscious like ‘I have to feel 
that shape or that shape’.” 
Also from the observations and eye-tracking sessions, participants interacted with a 
variety of different shapes, suggesting that generalisations of shape and texture cannot 
be made. In similar ways, a diversity in involved materials, such as different kinds of 
leather, wood, plastic, glass, metal, paper and cardboard, fabric, plastic, soil, plants, 
and animal fur, furthers such suggestion. Indeed, as Anderson and Wylie (2009) argue, 
attempts to pin down nonhumans on their shape and texture would be inappropriate, as 
the situational aspect of their involvement in compulsive interactions requires 
ontological dynamism.  
Any similarities between materiality or shape of nonhumans more often than not figured 
differently in compulsive interactions. For instance, mugs have been rubbed and 
pinched in different place, as well as (re)ordered in relation to the shelf, as well as other 
mugs. Hence, from the perspective of the involved nonhumans that have existence 
prior, during and posterior to the interaction, it is not possible to pinpoint if certain 
aspects might be prone to enlace the human in compulsive interactions. In other words, 
the properties of objects outside the compulsive act as such cannot determine whether 
or not it will become enlaced in a compulsive act. By extension, nonhumans that 
become involved in compulsive interactions are irreducible to the category of their 
existence in terms of functionality outside the compulsive act.  
As has been concluded in Chapter 4, the becoming-compulsive of a situation striates 
nonhumans in accordance with their capacities to take part in the act. Nonhumans 
involved in compulsive interactions may thus seem to reconfigure themselves for the 
interaction, and in the process disrupt all other configurations. If at all, configurations of 
objectness, functionality, materiality and shape of nonhumans therefore always seem 
to figure in partial – and non-hierarchical – ways in these interactions. For instance, 
during the first eye-tracking session with Elisa, she drove us to her home, but in the 
moment she turned the key to turn the engine off, she bent forward to the wheel to 
quickly press her chin onto it twice. After this, she shifted the gear stick into neutral, 
picked up the eye-tracking battery, and stepped out of the car. From its functionality to 
steer the car whilst driving and its objectness as a wheel, the wheel reconfigures 
through its hard, leather patterned curved closeness to Elisa’s body. It is a sensation 
Elisa’s hands had been exposed to during the trip, but whilst stationary was suddenly 
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demanded to locate in the fleshiness and skin of her chin (after Hoel and Carusi 2015). 
As such, the wheel emerges in the compulsive interaction through its altered 
appearance to the human in a Hockneyian sense (see Figure 6). The human 
experience of extracorporeal elements reconfiguring towards compulsive situations can 
be articulated in the difference in their appearance (after Seamon 1980; Badiou 2005 
2009; Shaw 2012). Rather than the materiality, shape or function of the compulsively 
enlaced nonhuman, it is its stoneness, leatherness, or glassness. As such, and 
following Harman (2002), whilst configuring towards compulsive and non-compulsive 
situations, the nonhuman retains an autonomous existence outside their appearance to 
humans without requiring essence (Ash and Simpson 2016). 
 
Figure 6: ‘The Desk’ by David Hockney (1984) 
 
Then Joe contended having to stroke taxidermied animals in museums: “then I just 
know that such a beast has super soft fur, and then I just have to touch it, that’s just 
how it is”. In these acts, the animal objects reappear as reachable, touchable softness. 
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Sage interacts compulsively with different damp objects on different occasions; for 
instance the damp fabric of a white sock is pressed into her left index finger into before 
it is being put on the line, and a washcloth that requires being brought to her upper lip 
and nose when she picks it up from the laundry basket during an eye-tracking session. 
One of the small stuffed animals is taken out of Sara’s bag when on the train back to 
her home during the observation. She rolls the sewing thread between her thumb and 
index finger whilst staring through the window. For a moment, it stops being the small 
stuffed animal and reappears as fabric of the right texture with a movable lumpen 
thread. The eye-tracking revealed soup bowls, mugs, and stone statues reappearing as 
flatness when meeting cupboard and showcase shelves, I heard about pans 
reappearing as hot scorching round metalness, and witnessed tomato stems in the sink 
reappearing as “black bits” that divert from the colour of the sink. Objects and materials 
‘shifting’ into their new appearance were interacted with on this basis, and configure 
back to a non-compulsive appearance afterward.  
The way nonhumans reconfigure compulsively varies with the situation. During the 
interview, Bill occasionally picks up his water bottle in front of him to take a sip, and 
every time before putting it down, the round ball-like bulges on the top and bottom of 
the bottle needed to be pressed in hard with his thumbs. In these moments the bottle 
acquires an appearance of press-able, smooth plastic ‘ballness’. Later on, this 
appearance configured similarly, but also through the bulging lower part of the bottle. 
Also, on a Thursday afternoon, I found myself sitting on the floor staring intensely at 
craftwork Mina had been working on. She wanted the thumb-thick square made of 
soap-stiffened raw wool to become a piece that a friend could hang on the wall. Whilst 
pressing the special needle in the wool, putting new wool tufts on or tearing it off, she 
narrated how the piece and its details generally ‘improved’ but usually ‘worsened’ as 
aligned with her sensibilities. I saw and felt the piece invariably reappearing as stacked 
layers of wool, a composition of three figures, and a smooth then bumpy then bulging 
rough surface. This suggests that with compulsive interactions, the dimensions of 
nonhumans acquire a dynamism, constantly adapting their appearance to the 
compulsive situation.  
Despite such dynamism, a meta-analysis of all observation and eye-tracking data 
demonstrated that compulsive ordering interactions with a multitude of nonhumans 
occurred in relation to dimensions sharing size. Similar size might incite easier pattern 
recognition, and demand similar bodily engagement, such as the four pebbles on 
Ginny’s desk that became rearranged into a square, a pile of papers required a neater 
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stack, and the stacked books on Elisa’s windowsill. Nonetheless, nonhumans of 
seemingly different size became reconfigured in accordance to a shared dimension. It 
was along these dimensions that nonhumans suddenly made a reappearance during 
the reordering interactions. For instance, Alan aligns two long and narrow wooden slats 
on and with the edge of a long rough wooden desk in his garage. The length of the 
slats became affective and configured in accordance with the desk edge, as the length 
of the edge appeared similar in length because of surrounding objects. In Shaw’s 
words: “objects reduce each other to caricatures – they literally ‘objectify’ each other” 
(2012, pp. 620). Additionally, the first eye-tracking session shows Ginny closing a 
cabinet drawer with two hands on either side of the drawer, aligning the cabinet with 
the line on the floor through which it moves away from the table it rested against. After 
having circled her index finger around the knobs of the drawer, she then moves the 
cabinet back against the table. In this series of interactions, the cabinet drawer 
configures with the cabinet, which configures with the floor and becomes reconfigured 
with the table.  
Reconfigurations of nonhuman can occur for the briefest of moments. For instance the 
moments lasting less than a second during which the front wheel of Sara’s scooter 
aligns with the long stripes painted on the tarmac when she drives on and off elevated 
junctions. These interactions do not only mark the highly situatedness of the human 
with the nonhuman, but also present how speed and fast changing situations configure 
the human and nonhuman in accordance with each other in new ways. Additionally, 
this interaction does not assemble between Sara’s body and the scooter, but between 
the scooter wheel and the stripe. In these situations, the corporeal overflows into the 
extracorporeal to compulsively interact with another extracorporeal element. Here, the 
scooter extends Sara’s body and reverberates her sensibilities through its materiality in 
constitution of the compulsive situation. As such, the nonhuman resonates in and 
through the human, and in the compulsive moment the ontological difference between 
Sara and the scooter might even dissolve.  
Changing dimensions of the appearance of nonhumans that become compulsively 
enlaced in interactions with the human occurs with their capacity for relations with other 
nonhumans. Compulsive interactions then fold materialities onto and into each other, 
recalling the permanence, or reifying the temporary forms and textures as felt through 
each other (after Lingis 2000; Wylie 2006). Placing a glass on the shelf in a kitchen 
cupboards confirms the flatness of the upside of the shelf and underside of a glass, as 
well as the rigidity and musicality of the glass when bouncing of another already placed 
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there. It redefines the size and roundness of the coins in the figure recovered through 
their place in the brown sand outside the back door to the garden when stepping over 
it. It confirms the texture of the two dried and stiff fabric of the two socks when they rub 
off on the two other socks still on the line of a laundry rack; the absence of a gap 
between the flowy curtains in the bedroom. And it affirms the texture of the paper 
becoming more and more grainy when the charcoal stick glides over it again and again 
and again. As such, compulsive interactions of (re)ordering and (re)placing nonhumans 
seem to open up an affectivity between nonhumans (after Anderson and Wylie 2009; 
Ash 2015) which, in turn, allows the human to see with and according to this 
appearance (Lingis 1998). By extension, ballness, softness, dampness, musicality, 
colour then “solicits their approach, lays open a field of possibility and materialises a 
wave of duration” (Ibid. 1998 28-29). 
In terms of compulsive touch interactions, nonhumans ‘soliciting their approach’ might 
appear through intensities of absence: a pointy edge of a table outlines the lack of 
finger flesh on it. It might be affective through appearing barren, naked, empty and not-
just-right without one’s finger. This affectivity can be experienced as the urging for a 
particular sensation that a compulsive interaction provides. This might reflect the 
Turtle’s experience of sensation occurring to an object (Turtle and Robertson 2008). As 
such, differences in interacting with corners and pointed edges as well as surfaces, 
temperatures and textures produce specific sensations that which serves as a reminder 
of what it means to have this body; to be fleshy here and rigid there. Compulsive 
configurations then fold the human back onto and into itself during the interaction as 
warm when touching something cold, as soft when stroking the grain of rough wood, 
the rigidness of a finger’s bones when pressing the tip straight into a mirror, the 
permeability of one’s skin when pressing into a knife’s tip. It erases the absence of 
one’s upper lip onto a damp sock. Similar to the nonhuman, the human changes 
appearance towards and in accordance with the nonhuman. In this mirroring of human 
with nonhuman appearances, the human attunes to the nonhuman during the 
becoming compulsive of the situation (after Bennett 2010; Brigstocke and Noorani 
2016). Performing compulsive interactions then becomes a negotiation of these 
attunements; extending one’s step takes the body out of the slicing of a corner. Asking 
one’s partner to deep-fry the chips refrains the flesh from searing in the hot oil; wetting 
the book covers to prevent the perfect rectangle of stacked books against the wall from 
breaking, and looking elsewhere to stop the dense blue of the carpet from becoming 
interrupted by white fluff. 
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With movement, compulsive configurations can start developing, as human and 
nonhuman bodies acquire new dimensions, and with those, new appearances. This 
demonstrates in the multitude of compulsive interactions during the eye-tracking and 
observation sessions where mobile human bodies became enlaced in compulsive 
situations. For instance, interactions enlacing Bill’s body were more numerous than 
when he was sat in his chair during the interview. Nonetheless, conceptualising 
movement in relational terms understands both the human and the nonhuman body to 
acquire new appearances in ‘setting up’ the situation to become compulsive. Also, with 
immobile human bodies, nonhuman bodies changed appearance with which they 
ignited a compulsive situation. Indeed, whilst Bill’s body was sat in the chair during the 
interview, multiple objects became enlaced in a number of compulsive interactions. 
Therefore, following Lash (2006) invoking Bergson, the changing appearance – or 
image – of humans and nonhumans by virtue of their relational mobility is affective in 
itself. In turn, this incites the configuration of both towards a compulsive situation. Thus, 
understanding the role of the bodily environment in terms of intensity or affect (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004; Dewsbury 2000; Massumi 2002;), does not suffice, as these 
concepts do not allow distinguishing the dimensions with which nonhumans articulate 
in accordance with the human body. The next subsection takes this further and 
explores how in the ignition of compulsive enlacing the human and the nonhuman are 
mapped onto each other. 
 
5.2.2 Vitality and violence 
Up to this point, I established that both the human and the nonhuman reconfigure into 
compulsive interactions and that these elements become enlaced with and through 
compulsive situations. Indeed, it is neither the human, nor the nonhuman that incite the 
compulsive situation as they anticipate each other, form into each other, and become 
folded back onto themselves. Herein lies an assumption of nonhumans to have 
acquired a certain ontological as well as experiential vitality, which is first and foremost 
entirely absent in current medical and clinical understanding of compulsive interactions. 
Additionally, ontological vitality of nonhumans remains largely unthought in disability 
geography (but see MacPherson 2010; Hall and Wilton 2017), and to a lesser extent, 
health geography (but see Andrews et al. 2014; Gorman 2016). As Sections 5.1 and 
5.2.1 explored on what terms the human and nonhuman reconfigured in the 
compulsive enlacing, this subsection explores how such vitalisation of nonhumans 
takes place, and how the configurations map onto the sensibilities and materialities of 
the compulsive situation. 
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A number of participants had a discourse of nonhumans as rather lively and active. For 
instance, Dylan’s body becomes strong affected by objects its constituencies: 
“I often have this that during intense tic moments I want to grab hold 
of something; a chair or a bottle or a ehm… pillow or whatever. 
Grabbing hold to not topple over? 
No. No, often just because it exerts power over me or something… it 
feels like, kind of, like ehm… but that I just really have to grab hold of 
something. (…) it’s often also that having something in your hands 
often ehm… also helps with walking.” 
Dylan’s experience then reflects a human body violently configuring towards what 
might be understood as purely bodily intensities and nonhuman bodies, during which it 
arguably becomes enlaced in a multiplicity of compulsive situations. At the same time, 
Dylan seems to be able to configure towards walking better with a simultaneous 
configuration towards affective extracorporeal materiality in his hands. Potentially, the 
ongoing configuration of his hands prevents other compulsive configurations to take 
place. Sage pondered this: “I think if it can’t be done, then… it doesn’t happen, maybe I 
register it, but that it indeed immediately…” By extension, she and Lowri confirm that if 
affective materiality are out of reach, they don’t feel affected by it. Additionally, eye-
tracking data across situations does not show compulsive interactions when hands are 
carrying objects other than interaction with the object they carry. Hence, whilst no other 
participant has mentioned or demonstrate such a practice as coping mechanism, it 
offers the potential for further research in the future (see Section 7.4). 
An iron pillar also acquires a vitality when Nora’s body approaches it to “slide her chin 
along it”. She argues that “Those pillars have such an attractive forcefulness over me, I 
just must do it. They even seem to become assertive and appear mobile when Nora 
approaches the pillars: she reflects feeling invitational: “and I’m like ‘come to me, come 
to me’ *smiles*. Whilst such assertions on the basis of discourse (only) might be 
difficult to justify, I have become part of a number of other instances where nonhumans 
demanded such a distinct liveliness in the compulsive interactions that their 
materialities exuded complex sensibilities. During an eye-tracking session, a banana 
had failed to reconfigure towards the fruit and fruit bowl it was normally stored in, and 
required repositioning through compulsive interaction when Ginny walked past it. 
Watching the recordings, Ginny explains that it “needed more space, kinda, otherwise 
[she]’d be sad for it”, continuing that  
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“He’d be more comfortable, yes! *we both laugh* Yeah, I’m just 
happy for that banana! Yeah, I really have that with these things, and 
the reward is then a reason for ehm… that I think they would like it 
better if they, yeah, don’t lie against the other one *laughs* (…) that’s 
it, because I don’t like putting something in just some spot, because 
then I’m like ‘this is what they like’ *smiles* ‘this is comfortable for 
them. I was also delighted that I had them [cans] all there (…) Yeah, 
and I’m quite happy that I have that whole family together, those 
cans.” 
It thus seems like the appearance of these objects have reconfigured in such a way 
that they seem human-like, allowing the sensibilities Ginny described to echo through 
the situated materialities. The immediacy with which such a situation requires 
interaction becomes apparent when the fruit bowl demands attention and Ginny 
glances over it: 
“I look away immediately, because if I look at it longer [she gets up 
and walks to the fruit bowl and rearranges the fruits] then it lies – 
because this has a dent in this, which diverts, and then I have to 
position it like this.” 
In addition to the felt immediacy of the urge sensation that reconfiguring Ginny’s body 
towards the distorted configuration of the fruit bowl, the liveliness of these objects also 
instil an immediacy in bodily configuration articulating in the way she jumps of her chair 
and practically runs to the bowl. Hence, this liveliness might then be understood to 
purport an experiential violence. 
The violence of nonhumans in the compulsive enlacing is overwhelmingly present in 
the encounters with the participants, as compulsive enlacing can be, and indeed has 
been damaging to both human and nonhuman bodies. Violence was bestowed upon 
nonhumans; paper has been pierced by charcoal, dandelions have been kicked, and 
fine liners have had their tip split, tips of the fountain pen nib had split. Violence on 
human bodies involved metal pins being pressed hard in index fingers, closing doors 
had pressed thumbs, metal pans just lifted from the fire had burnt chins. Additionally, 
small red lights had prevented reading, and a multitude of doors had invoked broken 
conversations and put social demands on entering through a particular one. As such, 
things often do not just need ‘touching’ but “pressed hard” according to Sage, which 
makes knives “nasty”. Indeed, the capacity for violence might inform the appearance of 
nonhumans when they become enlaced compulsively. As Rhys explains: 
“It’s more that the glass can… shatter, with the hot thing [oven dish] 
that it’s hot, so it doesn’t matter that it’s made of iron, or an oven dish 
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or whatever. It’s just the fact that it’s hot that makes it interesting, that 
the glass can break, the fact that the door can close… what makes it 
interesting.” 
Nonhuman “fragility” and “brittleness” then becomes “a provocation”, which must be 
pushed “until it’s completely broken”, otherwise “it’s “feeble” according to Mina. She 
continues explaining how the nonhuman acts during interactions that mutilate her body 
as “it really can’t be stopped”. For instance, biting down on tooth picks stuck vertically 
between her jaws softly “doesn’t count, as you really have to reach that maximum point 
[of force]”, because “if it just cracks lamely. Then you’re not satisfied (…) if it doesn’t 
crack painfully”. Not all violent compulsive situations come to fruition, otherwise 
tomatoes would have had pressed holes in them, thin glass would have been bit down 
on until it broke, paintings would have been felt, scratched and poked holes in, and 
glass tables would have been smashed with hammers. Instead, tomatoes were being 
distracted from, thin glasses were replaced by thick glasses, and paintings were 
guarded and made unreachable, glass tables were replaced with wooden ones. 
Other kinds of liveliness and vitality occurs when appearances of nonhumans are not 
distinctly different from nearby materiality, lose an experiential boundedness and 
individuality, and overflow into each other. This phenomenon seems to align with a 
becoming overwhelmed by one’s environment, and one or more ‘senses shut down’ 
(Williams 2005). As such, this phenomenon had been conceptualised as a problem of 
the senses and the brain, as it would fail derive meaning from sensory information (see 
Belluscio et al. 2011). With their distorted appearance, nonhumans violently demand 
their place amongst humans, as Ginny explains: 
“Look, like in this space all is standing still, but when I go to such a 
supermarket, and I’ve just been to IKEA, then I see so many new 
things, but it seems like everything is moving. Whilst it doesn’t 
actually move. But it demands all attention – or something – from me. 
(…) Also, when I don’t do it [give all of it attention] and I’m trying to 
look at one thing, then… 
Are the others still like// 
//then I see vermicelli, and then I get from its sides, to put it like that, I 
get all kinds of thingies *makes crawling motion with her hands next 
to her face*. That’s how it is, I can’t explain it in other ways.” 
This does not only provide reason to question the location of the phenomenon as with 
the senses, but it also explains how nonhuman appearance changes with the 
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becoming compulsive of the situation. The effect of nonhuman movement, and through 
this, nonhuman persistence is as follows:  
“When I’m in a supermarket, imagine you’re in front of a new stand of 
shelves, and at that moment I see everything that’s on display, but I 
also don’t know what it is actually, but I do see all of it. And that kind 
of hurts my eyes. 
Ok, ehm… how// 
//Then it’s as if all those colours, all those thingies, all those little 
patches, that, that just enters me, I don’t know what it is, it just 
doesn’t happen with me. Someone else gets the information 
immediately and sees a bag of liquorice, but I just get those itches, 
and nothing happens. (…) It’s a kind of work of art, blocks with all 
kinds of colours which also move the whole time. 
And then you can’t get enough information// 
//Then I’m just standing there like [freezes and swipes an imaginary 
stand of shelves with her eyes wide open] (…) Six to seven boxes is 
then one block of colours. Somewhere I see a carton, and then those 
squares again.” 
Ginny experiencing singular products on display alternated with blocks of different 
colour may have occurred during the second eye-tracking session for which we went 
grocery shopping. Halfway through the supermarket, she walked into the aisle with all 
kinds of soda bottles, and stopped in front of a particular stand of shelves. It displayed 
all kinds of different flavours, bottle and can sizes as well as various multipacks, and 
she could not find the right bottle. After having searched the shelves by pointing at 
where she was looking, she asked me if it was allowed to tear open a multipack. At this 
point I pointed her at one of the notices disallowing that. She then proceeded to take a 
small bottle from the shelf and moves on. Whilst this situation can be understood in 
multiple ways, one of them might be the in which Ginny does not see singular bottles or 
the notices, but just a plethora of colour in that moment, and the only ones she does 
see are the multipacks and later on the small bottle.  
As the moving flurry of ‘patches’ and ‘blocks of colour’ dissolve any boundedness, and 
‘demand attention’, thereby ‘hurting her eyes’ required her to reacquaint with the 
individuality of nonhumans: 
“Another person sees a box of vermicelli, to put it like that, and it’s 
always the same box of vermicelli. For me it’s an entirely new box of 
vermicelli every time again.” *laughs* 
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It also effectively make Ginny question their location. She explains that “if [she does 
not] see that the table is near, then [she cannot] feel it” which results in her walking into 
it, “making a lot of noise when doing the dishes”, and “plumping down on the sofa”, as 
she “can’t make that judgement”, and fails to “feel the distance from [her] body to a 
thing”. Perhaps the experience of lacking an understanding of object locations can be 
understood as the demand placed on the human by a plethora to configure in 
accordance with them. Consequently, Ginny’s body constantly required to (re)configure 
to the next and the next and the next nonhuman, and cannot ‘keep up’. It is an 
inexhaustible situation of reconfigurations towards a warm roundness in her hands, to 
trailing the path from the hip-high cold metal flatness towards the knee-high softness, 
towards the sharp hard pointed edge, to the barking low behind her, to the small 
colourful patches and curves in wooden frames at eye-height on the right, to the 
rectangle of colourful round shapes at thy-height with the horizontal and vertical lines 
overlapping with every step, ever intertwined with fabric clenching skin that pulls and 
pushes it and rearranges the little hairs of her arms with every next movement.  
An excess of nonhumans then becomes a vitality in itself; so much so that it imposes a 
violence on the human body, demanding too much of it. Lowri elaborates: 
“I haven’t cycled in a long time, which was like, I was so 
overstimulated… 
Ah, ok 
It just didn’t work to cycle in the city; ‘hold up, and that one, and that 
one, and that one’, so busy 
Ok 
‘I have to watch out for that, and I have to stop there, and there’s a 
tram and there’s a bus, and….” 
Fast changing situations constituted by an abundance of elements that all demand 
Lowri’s body to configure in accordance with them then disallowed her to configure to 
anything else, immediately impeding on chosen configurations, such as cycling. Ginny 
commenting on why she sometimes could not enter a supermarket if she had had a 
busy day: 
“For some reason I just had a blockage, and that…. Yeah… I couldn’t 
even just reason through it, it was just as if I was stuck or something, 
as if my brain I needed for grocery shopping had just failed” 
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These and previous situations pervade extracorporeal materiality with a vitality in a 
distinct situation, demanding a compulsive configuration through an ethics of 
immediacy through a few particularly violent appearances. Not all nonhumans 
reconfigure towards a compulsive situation in this way; some retain their vitality through 
persistence beyond one situation. This does not present an anti-geographical 
argument, in contrary, it demonstrates compulsive nonhuman vitality in a stable 
multiplicity of appearance. As such, their vitality is so strong that they seem to be able 
to reconfigure many situations towards compulsive interactions. Their persistence 
might be attributed to an outspoken individuality. Sage’s partner is an amateur 
sculpture artist, and through his experiences of living with her for a few years prior to 
the study, he has observed her compulsively engaging with her surroundings. With this 
knowledge of sensibilities that pervade the interactions, he made a statue out of a soft 
stone for her.  
During the second observation, she picked it up from its place in the living room and 
whilst compulsively interacting with it, she told me that she was astounded by its 
perfection to her. This perfection expressed in her frantically pressing her upper lip, 
teeth and tongue onto the statue, glide her fingers along the sharper edges, pushing 
her thumb into sharp and blunter points. In particular, the cold, slick, curviness and 
edginess of the stone statue evoked Sage’s to configure into a compulsive enlacing. 
This statue was one of the few objects in this study that did not shift into a compulsive 
configuration; always already configured compulsively, as ever extended invitation 
ready for compulsive enlacing, retaining its affectivity over the years and month it had 
been in Sage’s life.  
Whilst this statue’s decontextualized vital individuality situates it as a stability that 
demands the human to configure into a compulsive enlacing (see Lingis 2000), other 
nonhumans acquire a vitality exactly through their difference from context. Manmade 
objects and deliberate situations of objects that pervade a presence of humans in 
‘natural’ areas configured Alan to immediately compulsively look at them, change his 
path, and become very annoyed. During our walks in the wooded area near his home, 
he remarks and points at wooden fencing poles and remarks on their out-of-placeness 
(Cresswell 1996). This can be understood as Alan compulsively reconfiguring towards 
them as they do not ‘fit’ with the woodland around them, and having difficulties 
configuring back to the walk. “Nature is allowed to be messy” according to him, and the 
poles being straight with long lines stand out. Moreover, any crumb participants 
became aware of had to be removed compulsively in a number of situations during 
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eye-tracking and observation sessions. Despite their small size, standing out on 
otherwise smooth, shiny and otherwise uninterrupted surfaces became engaged with 
compulsively. 
In line with this kind of nonhuman liveliness situating in difference between 
nonhumans, compulsive enlacing also seems to take place when two, a multitude or 
even a whole system becomes demands compulsive reconfiguration from the human. 
Plastic tulips in two vases on the windowsill are configured well in a system with the 
books on the windowsill but not with the other tulips in Elisa’s living room, which makes 
the situation compulsive. Hence, nonhumans do not only seem to reconfigure into 
compulsive enlacing with the human on their own terms, they also seem to retain a 
compulsive configuration between them (see Ash 2015). Compulsive ordering might 
then be understood as completing, supporting or stabilising compulsive nonhuman 
‘systems’, to which nonhumans can ‘belong’ because of shared appearance 
dimensions, and ‘travel’ when their appearance shifts and meet other systems. The 
location of the tulips on the windowsill retains affective because the tulips hinge in 
between systems. Potentially a system that is ‘strong’ and stable systems might be one 
that retains its vital configuration from multiple angles. For instance, the spare bedroom 
Elisa constructed from scratch, which is “just right”, or the wall decorated with books 
and other stuff, on which everything “precisely has its own spot”. A weaker system 
might be easier to break in terms of similarity in appearance and mobility of the 
nonhumans. For instance, desks, dinner tables, and kitchen counters, and Bill’s 
carefully organised fridge, which is also frequently ‘interfered with’ by Bill’s partner and 
son. Such systems can require constant (re)configuration through compulsive 
interactions towards sustainable situations.  
This then shapes spaces as ecologies of systems of human and nonhuman 
configurations that always have the potential to explode into compulsively enlacing via 
interactions between the corporeal and the extracorporeal. Although these compulsive 
enlacings then dissolve in terms of energy, they retain their potential through constant 
(re)configurations, as each enlacing and actualisation of system configuration leaves a 
historical mark – i.e. the experiential repetition of becoming enlaced in a compulsive 
system. The collection of potential enlacing and historical marks might then produce 
the terms on which a space, such as a room, allows the human to configure to chosen 
tasks. Chapter 6 explores how such collections of compulsive potentials and systems 
influences situated human life. 
 
 184 
 
5.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter interrogated the emergence of both the human body and the nonhuman 
body from their configuration towards the compulsive situation as reflected back on 
their difference with their configuration towards non-compulsive life. In formulating an 
answer to research question 1, this allowed analysing the particularities of the bodily 
existence of the human and nonhuman kind in the constitution of compulsive 
interactions. This chapter developed the fragmentation and reconfiguration of bodies 
and objects in accordance to the other, and as such dissolve into and articulate the 
formation of the other. Through this, non-representational ‘compulsive topologies’ are 
created (Davidson and Henderson 2010; Dixon and Straughan 2010; Despret 2013; 
Dixon and Jones 2014) As such, compulsive interactions are underpinned by a shared 
ontology of human and nonhuman configuration that contributes to the theoretical and 
empirical development of more-than-human approaches in cultural (e.g. Lorimer 2005; 
Anderson and Harrison 2010; Anderson and Wylie 2010), disability (MacPherson 2010; 
Munro 2013), and health geography (Duff 2011; Andrews et al 2012; 2017; Gorman 
2017).  
With regards to research question 2, human and nonhuman bodily configurations 
towards compulsive situations or chosen tasks can then be considered the dynamic 
fluid foundations upon which compulsive intentionality, goal-orientation, meaning, 
purpose, and form and are negotiated. It is in accordance with the compulsive 
configuration of these elements involved that the sociality, physicality, danger, 
economic, political aspects of the situation become negotiated. Human bodies did not 
only negotiate these situations in terms of speed, visibility and anticipation of 
compulsions, as argued in Section 4.4, but the findings also demonstrated intimate 
knowledge of the form and materiality of objects and their position within spaces. 
These object knowledges as well as knowledges of responsiveness to particular 
environments, such as natural areas, as well as sofa corners provided new insights into 
the negotiation of compulsive performativity. The spatiality of the negotiations thus 
strongly expand the current clinical and experiential knowledges of negotiations (e.g. 
Goetz et al. 2001; O’Connor 2002; Davis et al. 2004; Van Bloss 2006; Buckser 2008). 
This will be further explored in Chapter 6. 
In constructing an answer to research question 3, the findings in this chapter produce 
compulsive interactions as particular person-spaces relation that emerges between the 
body and its constituencies on the basis of shared dimensions. These dimensions 
seem to articulate in material, form, colour, and movement when human and 
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nonhuman bodies situate in concert. As such, these compulsive relations cannot be 
understood as demand of the person to the place, which underpins much geographical 
work in medicalised conditions similar to compulsivity (e.g. Parr 1999; Davidson 2000; 
Mills 2008; Davidson and Henderson 2010; Chouinard 2012). They can also not be 
grasped by practices and habits through object functionality and aesthetics (e.g. 
Bennett 2001; Carlisle 2006; Malabou 2009; Bissell 2011; Dewsbury and Bissell 2014; 
Ash 2015) or even by intensities (e.g. Segrott and Doel 2004; Bissell 2009) and affect 
as such because materiality is situated amongst other matter. Instead, compulsive 
person-place relations seem to be constituted in their dimensional emergence with 
(e.g. Lingis 2000; Simpson 2009; Clayton 2016). 
 
In attending to the research questions, these findings demonstrate how studying 
difference in kind of compulsions can produce an understanding of not only the ways in 
which the interactions relate, but what patterns underpin them, and on what grounds 
objects and spaces fuel compulsions, as well as their negotiations. Indeed, the 
development of the configurational ontology allowed reconceptualising how the human 
and nonhuman came to figure through a chronological appreciation of the compulsive 
interaction. It demonstrated how such configurations were produced by the spatiality of 
the situation. Chapter 6 develops these findings further, by inflecting the spatiality of 
the compulsion to the spatiality of situated objects and spaces, and locates 
compulsions in them. It does this by exploring how compulsive interactions compose 
spatialities beyond them. In other words, it analyses the effects of compulsions on 
particular spaces. Shapes, temperatures, and fabrics are then demonstrated to be 
ungeneralizable. Indeed, with spaces changing with the incoming and outgoing of 
objects, people, habits, bodily processes, they are being reproduced by and with the 
compulsive systems and potentials. 
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CHAPTER 6 COMPULSIVE DURATIONS 
The previous chapter developed compulsive configuration as the way in which the 
human corporeal and nonhuman extracorporeal become engaged in and produce the 
spatiality of compulsive interactions. Both the human and the nonhuman were found to 
become enlaced in compulsive interactions through compliance with the evolving 
situation. This chapter inflects the spatialities with which compulsions emerge as 
located in spaces. It seeks to understand how their ‘mapping’ might produce 
compulsive systems or spatialities and how these are negotiated. From being 
positioned as ‘perpetrator’ of compulsions in clinical accounts, as well as 
anthropocentric geographies of medicalised performances, this chapter situates the 
human as moving through affective environments with which the human can be ‘swept 
off their feet’ by becoming enlaced in a compulsive situation. This does not only have 
severe implications on how compulsive interactions might be reconceived of, it also has 
implication for how negotiations of compulsions ought to be understood. In turn, such 
spatial rendition of compulsive situations that locate body-object-space compositions.38 
Evolving the narrative of the analysis of understanding compulsions are result of 
configurations thus far, this chapter turns to exploring the effects of the 
accomplishments of compulsive interactions that last when other-than-compulsive life 
takes place again. The previous chapters suggest that bodily environments affect 
compulsive interactions through the ‘requirement’ of engagement and interruption of 
other-than-compulsive life this causes. This section analyses the data on the effects of 
compulsive interactions beyond the compulsive configuration. When compulsions have 
ended, the effects last. Indeed, glasses stand in perfect rows in the cupboard, knife tips 
have been confirmed in their sharpness, and finger tips in the soft fleshiness, bodies 
have been brought into balance with the room, and small items have been grouped on 
a desk. Clearly, compositions outlast their configurations. Should compulsions then be 
conceived of only having a momentary effect, in which the dissolving of the urge marks 
the end of the compulsive effect, as medical and clinical sciences suggest through their 
                                               
38 From this point onward, I use ‘composition’ (noun) for referring to the composites body-object-space 
relations create with compulsive interactions, to indicate that they are a system and last beyond the 
compulsive interaction itself. This reserves ‘configuration’ (verb) for the processual constitution of the 
compulsive interactions and their reconstitution to other-than-compulsive life. 
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biological renditions of compulsivity? Responding to these questions, the chapter 
explores the duration of compulsions.  
Section 6.1 analyses the affect of the most powerful moment in the configuration, which 
constitutes the absolving of the enlacing, and the dissolving of the urge. Clinical 
literature and experiential accounts have indicated this moment as ‘just-right’ which 
was echoed by the participants. Section 6.2 develops these just-right compositions as 
spatial systems that order spaces and objects in accordance with bodies into stabilities, 
and Section 6.3 explores how these stabilisations collectively act as compulsive 
ecologies. The final Section 6.4 analyses what spatial strategies participants had 
developed in negotiating life as inextricably tied to these ecologies. 
 
6.1 JUST-RIGHTNESS 
This section explores the ways in which the just-rightness of interactions can bring 
bodily environments into a ‘state’ in which the emergence of future compulsions is 
omitted, or at least postponed. Indeed, the previous chapters imply that compulsions 
have made compositions of bodies, objects, and spaces just-right to the effect that 
other-than-compulsive life can take place. In order to understand the effects of 
compulsions and the moment of dissolving, this section conceives of just-right feelings 
as truths; as experienced indicator of the least turbulence (see Serres 1995; Anderson 
and Wylie 2009), and friction between materialities (Deleuze 1991; Bennet 2001; Mol 
2002). Such a conception allows analysing how just-rightness informs compositions of 
bodies, objects and spaces, and how they may be made to endure. To this end, the 
section explores if just-rightness can be thought to indicate a particular, potentially 
conducive, spatial order of bodies, objects and spaces. 
For the participants, the compulsive interaction itself is understood to unfold with a kind 
of ungraspable “wisdom”, following an incomprehensible “different kind of logic” 
according to Sage. Ginny affirmed: “I do have my own kind of logical balance, but I 
don’t really understand it [laughs]”. This does not only echo experiential accounts that 
assert that compulsions have no meaning (Bliss 1980; Wilensky 1999; Hollenbeck 
2003; Van Bloss 2006), it testifies to the limitation rational thought can inform person-
place relations (Harrison 2007; Beljaars and Anderson, forthcoming). Indeed, Sage 
made a distinction between an “OCD norm” which accordingly requires “everything to 
lay in straight lines or on colour”, and another, which “is more a kind of feeling” that 
alludes to a ‘rightness’. This rightness expresses in a plethora of ways, for instance 
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through a rightness in body/place balance. I observed Sage keeping her body in 
balance with the kitchen. She turned between the dishwasher and the sink and made a 
360 degree turn, froze mid-reach, and made a 360 degree rotation in the other 
direction, before being able to pick up the next object from the dishwasher.  
A rightness also emerged between a small rock and Elisa’s foot when she accidentally 
stepped on it and had to reposition her foot and push it into the rock. Furthermore, 
leather required to feel right to the touch in Mina’s leather mending hobby. My 
fieldnotes reflect her explaining that “she would keep sandpapering the leather until it 
was as smooth as she needed it to be”. Additionally, during the observation Bill had 
right locations for new items in his shopping basket, which all were pinched and 
pushed into their right location. It resulted in a punnet of vegetables to the right, a 
packet of shrimps on top, a drinks carton next to the vegetable punnet, and a bag of 
prawn crackers pushed below the vegetables. Moreover, music volume change on a 
computer needs to be done in the right way as Rhys contends: “if I want one louder, I 
do eh… two louder and one softer.” Also books need to have a right scent, otherwise 
Elisa thinks  
“Oh no, that one doesn’t smell good. I’m not buying that one (…) I’ll 
wait for another version, or I eh… I’ll do the pocket version via 
Bol.com39” 
Rightness thus locates in different aspects of compulsive situations, which defies the 
simplistic way the notion has been taken for granted in clinical psychological research 
(e.g. Coles et al. 2003; Neal and Cavanna 2013). In addition, these particular 
compulsive situations demonstrate how just-rightness is a way forward to reconceive 
particularities of human enlacing in compulsive situations (see Eapen et al. 1997; 
Miguel et al. 2000).  
For a number of participants, such rightness and a potentially favourable outcome of 
compulsive interactions can incite a kind of ‘superhuman’ trust in the particularity and 
timing of compulsive interactions. Lowri argued that during moments in which she is 
anxious because she fears something bad has happened to a loved one, then: 
“I’ll do more compulsive acts because in your subconscious you want 
to make sure nothing happens 
Ok 
                                               
39 Bol.com is a large Dutch web shop similar to Amazon 
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It’s more like… and that can be the exact same compulsive acts that I 
do when I’m more relaxed… and that there’s a lot of tension and that 
it’s more stemming from fear.” 
The experientially close connection between compulsive interactions and fear then sets 
up compulsive interactions as almost ‘god-like’ interventions. As such, it suspends 
willpower as the human ´lets the compulsion happen´, for the urge is trusted to 
constitute a just-right situation. In other words, in experience, just-rightness may only 
be regarded as end (see also Leckman et al. 1993; O’Connor 2002; Capriotti et al. 
2013; Neal and Cavanna 2013), but in a composition of bodies, objects and spaces, it 
may be invoked as mediation. The body performing compulsive acts then becomes a 
neutraliser of pressure and fear with the extracorporeal environment as potential 
assisting element. Nonetheless, fear might sensitise the body to extracorporeal 
intensities, which might make the body more easily configurable towards compulsive 
situations, or less hesitant to perform the compulsive interaction.  
For other compulsive interactions the attribution of ‘god-like’ properties does not 
happen. The lack of comprehension that these produce are then folded back onto the 
compulsive interaction itself, during which the human requires other, non-
representational ways of understanding when compulsive situations have dissolved. 
Ginny describes putting a finger on this as “it’s more or less not right”, with Dylan 
describing pinpointing where the compulsive situation locates exactly: “this you’re 
constantly searching on what level you need symmetry”. Also, reflecting on placing 
lunch items on the table in a particular composition, Siôn argued: 
“Yes, I was just going to say… definitely. That has a kind of order. 
Maybe also a practical order with what the boys would eat and us… 
those salads a bit closer maybe, but also… the bread a little bit in the 
middle at least. A kind of composition eh… 
Yeah and is this a good composition? 
For me it works apparently [laughs] but yeah… I hadn’t thought it 
through to that extent or something… but I do think about where I put 
it 
Yeah, in the moment of putting it down? 
Yes.” 
Nonetheless, even when compulsive interactions involve similar or the same objects, 
Lowri remarks that a compulsive situation dissolving is “very chaotic (…) indeed always 
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very changeable”. Sage affirms this elaborating on the changeability of the location of a 
small owl statue on the windowsill: 
“It can be that on one occasion, it does feel good when it’s on the 
right, and in another time, the other thing needs to be on the right 
side.”  
Such changeability of compulsive situations that have a certain predictability in them, 
such as the statue Sage’s partner made for her (see Subsection 5.2.2), confirms the 
very momentary character of compulsive enlacing. In particular, it demonstrates how 
compulsive configurations of human and nonhuman elements that become enlaced in 
the compulsive situation do so in accordance to each other. In the becoming-
compulsive of the situation, participants reconfiguring compulsively then ‘feel’ their way 
amongst nonhumans to bring the compulsive situation to fruition. As participants have 
argued that the just-rightness emerges with the situation or unfolds with the interaction, 
it becomes a bodily ‘way of knowing’ that helps the constitution of the compulsive 
interaction in qualitative terms (also see Bergson 1911; Seamon 1980). This bodily way 
of knowing resonates with Sara who gave primacy to her body over decisions she 
needs to make over what new product, such as plates, light bulbs or in the following 
instance; bracelets: 
“Then I think like ‘which one of the two shall I take, and which one 
would be the best quality?’ Then I’ll feel it in my hand, and sometimes 
my hand gets warm, and then I’ll think like ‘oh’ and I’ll have that one. 
(…) I have that with many things, so much choice, but if there’s one 
that’s broken, I’ll feel it. When I think ‘this feels good’, or my hand 
gets a bit warm, then I’ll take that one (…) I like bracelets a lot, and 
then I first feel how it feels, or something, and then I think ‘yeah, I 
actually kinds like that one indeed’.” 
In these situations the compulsive potential of Sara’s body acquires power in the sense 
that she understands its capacities to articulate particular values. Indeed, in this 
instance the compulsive potential of the body becomes reified as an other-than-
compulsive bodily capacity which can be explored and utilised outside compulsive 
moments. By extension, this would render compulsive interactions economical. 
In conclusion, the just-rightness follows on to the urge when the configuring human 
interacts with configuring nonhumans in order to bring a compulsive situation to fruition. 
Then, the moment the compulsive interaction has peaked and dissolves, the situation 
is experienced to be just-right. Following up on just-rightness becomes the optimal way 
compulsive configurations can be negotiated, as it marks the best way to dissolve the 
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pressure of the compulsive situation. As such, just-rightness may contribute to the 
analysis of post-phenomenological life worlds, as the composition of bodies, objects, 
and spaces in such moments are very powerful experiences (see Dewsbury 2007; 
Romanillos 2008; Lea 2009; Simpson 2009; Wylie 2010; Yusoff 2013; Ash and 
Simpson 2016; McCormack 2016). 
The compulsive situation can be understood to ‘crystalize’ in this just-right composition. 
This crystallization could then be conceived of as the ‘ultimate’ compulsive percept 
(after Deleuze1994; Colebrook 2002; Dewsbury et al. 2002; Wylie 2006; Anderson and 
Wylie 2009). Just-rightness might then indicate ‘stepping into’ this perception. 
Nonetheless, as implied in Subsection 2.3.4, in terms of compulsivity, the percept does 
not just present a visuality, but a sensibility that intimately entangles constellations of 
body-object-space relations that is felt beyond the sensory. As with the affectivity of 
percepts, even when compulsions last less than a second, their actualisations can 
endure. As a consequence, it might then also be possible to think these ‘renewed’ 
compositions of bodies, objects, and spaces as preventative of new compulsive 
configurations. The next subsection explores how just-rightness has been mobilised by 
the participants to retain a state of just-right in order to stop nonhumans and their own 
body to configure into a compulsive enlacing. 
 
6.2 STABILISATIONS 
As the previous subsection pointed out, in case of the human being aware, just-
rightness can be understood as the most powerful moment of compulsive interactions, 
where humans and nonhumans are configured optimally in that situation. This section 
develops compulsive interactions beyond the dissolving of the pressure that had led up 
to the configurations of the human and nonhuman towards the compulsive moment. It 
analyses the accomplishment and effects of the compulsive interactions. In a number 
of interactions that involve touching between a human and nonhuman, the 
accomplishment seems to have a confirmative aspect. For instance, Joe needs to 
compulsively touch a chestnut upon laying eyes on it to make sure that it is indeed a 
chestnut: 
“Like I said, in that first instance, you think ‘it’s a chestnut’ but before 
you’re convinced, you need to pick it up, and then you touch it, and 
then you need to ensure if it really is a chestnut by looking at it” 
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The ‘chestnutness’ of the nonhuman needed to be established three times in this 
instance. It seemed that only after this interaction it acquires a sense of chestnut 
affirmation to Joe. Only after this series of compulsive interactions he can continue 
walking. Also, during the interview Dylan explained that when his body was 
unintentionally touched: “I bump my ear against the lamp and it’s party time again”, 
because “then it needs to happen again”. Hence, any unprecedented touches instantly 
demanded a compulsive reconfiguration of body and object to confirm that occurrence 
(see Subsection 4.2.3). On the contrary, Sage experiences some compulsive touching 
interactions as unfolding in the blink of an eye. Upon being asked whether a particular 
touch had been compulsive, she responds:  
“No, with regards to touching not really, or it’s a fraction, you know, 
that I hold the material just that little bit longer (…) it’s a sensation I 
do feel, but goes so quickly that I can’t really register it” 
During another compulsive interaction between Ginny and a shopping cart the cart 
seemed to be required to retain the direction it faced. The eye-tracking recordings 
shows Ginny walking around the cart to take out the grocery bags in impractical ways 
and push it backward and sideways in returning it to the stall on the parking lot. 
Remarkably, in these interactions it is not Ginny’s body that seems to be the central 
point of the situation. The cart is. This then requires a radical ontological re-centring of 
compulsivity to the cart in person-place relations that diverts from humanist 
geographical traditions and clinical concepts through which compulsive interactions can 
be approached. In other words; the medicalised phenomenon of compulsivity then 
becomes truly more-than-human.  
A centring of the nonhuman in compulsive interactions is supported by the many 
compulsive interactions that accomplish a securitisation of a number of nonhumans in 
‘their place’. Sara is one of the many who asserts that all objects have their own place 
in her apartment: 
“I find that that chair belongs there (…) I just really like it when things 
have their own place. (…) The other day, I’d been looking for my 
bicycle keys for almost one and a half hour, and I had put them right 
there on that thing *points*, but then I am completely lost where in the 
world they could possibly be, because they’re always there.” *points 
elsewhere* 
She explained that compulsive interactions need to be performed when her flat had 
changed, for instance when objects had moved, which can leave her ‘completely lost’. 
For her eye-tracking session she cleaned her flat, which she had put off doing for that 
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day until I had arrived in the early afternoon. After having cleaned a windowsill with a 
wooden snail statue on it, having walked passed it a couple of times looking at it, she 
repositioned it slightly. Cleaning her flat seems to be a way to ensure that all objects 
are in their ‘rightful’ place, and consisted of a series of interactions she did every 
morning taking about 35 minutes before she was “allowed coffee”. Instead of working 
towards the goal of having a clean flat, she seemed only to take the next step in 
cleaning after having interacted with all kinds of objects in particular way. Her 
movements and the compulsive interactions demonstrate Sara not asserting the 
dominance commensurate with cleaning acts, and the interactions differ amongst 
objects momentarily involved. For instance, when cleaning her upstairs room, she 
picked up a tiny Buddha statue for wiping the windowsill underneath it, putting it back 
and stroking its belly. Thereafter, she very carefully slid the cleaning cloth over the 
entire surface of the windowsill – in convoluted ways – not touching it as to not 
reposition it. Additionally, 30 seconds after, she picked up the cleaning cloth holder 
sleeve, opening and closing it 7 times standing in the middle of the room before 
walking down the stairs. At that point, she had not and would not use cleaning cloths 
anymore.  
In this sense, Sara’s body becomes the measure through which situations and the 
elements that make up such a situation – including both the body and the objects – are 
confirmed in their place. This resonates with Tomos who asserted: “if I have to oversee 
the present and the future at the same time I become very anxious”. The confirmative 
and affirmative aspects of compulsive interaction crystallizing the situation into the just-
right state is an indication of a stabilisation of the situation after the compulsive aspect 
dissolves. By extension, compulsive interactions might then be better understood as 
addressing an instability or a breach of a previous stability in a place. The latter 
emerges from, for instance, Elisa’s house which consists of particular stabilities in the 
sense that some objects are not to be moved. She asserted that the organisation of 
bookcases on the living room wall cannot be changed, and only new books that 
resemble the ones already up there could be added. I asked her if she has this book 
case organisation in mind when buying a new book: 
“Yes, and then I also know *parrot screeches* – for instance Jo 
Nesbø has one book, and I took it to the charity shop; it’s bigger than 
the others (…) 
Have you read it? 
Yes, and then off with it. I couldn’t have that in my house. 
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So that, it never laid anywhere? 
Well, very briefly underneath and it irritated me to such an extent that 
I’d thrown it out.” 
Therefore, this composition of the wall can be understood as having stabilised over 
months and is actively and carefully maintained. This implies that the compulsive 
interactions that had stabilised this situation indeed prevent the performance of new 
compulsions, and, as such, elongates other-than-compulsive life.  
More often compulsive interactions accomplish a stabilisation that endures this long. 
For instance, during his eye-tracking session Cai aligned his shoes with his laundry 
basket that he had just put on the floor in the middle of the room after having folded his 
clean laundry into it. Later during the session he picked up the basket, thereby 
breaking the stabilisation with the shoes. Hence, compulsive stabilisation acts can 
produce dynamic compositions that might only last for short durations. As such, these 
compulsive interactions can produce stable compositions of nonhumans that are 
dynamic as they can move through a space. The mobility of such compositions then 
hinges on the ease with which they can be moved (i.e. a large item is more difficult to 
move than shoes), and the ease with which objects configure into new compulsive 
situations.  
When taken out of a stabilised configuration, bodies, objects, and spaces can be 
experienced to have altered configurations which may change the dynamic of the old 
configuration. Whilst cleaning the book case in her living room, the objects Sage picked 
up, cleaned and placed back often do not end up in the same composition as they had 
been in before as they came to appear differently, and therefore configure differently 
amongst other objects. Moreover, for her and others, the human body can be actively 
part of the stability itself beyond the interaction itself. During the observation Sage put 
the clean dishes from the dishwasher into the cupboards in an elaborate bodily way. 
Either her right thumb, pink or index finger were involved in rubbing and/or pressing 
glasses, cups, mugs, larger cutlery, spatulas and other large items before putting them 
in their final place. She argued:  
“I’m usually still holding items in a particular way. If it’s set, it’s usually 
alright, but it’s especially the process of putting down, or something, 
that needs to happen in a very particular way.” 
In this act, the body, its movements and its weight, tensed muscles and stretched skin 
withhold a stability in conjunction with the clean, still warm object, its trajectory from the 
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dishwasher ending in the cupboard by its pressure on the hard slick surface of the shelf 
next to similar objects. 
Accomplishments that stabilise a situation only very rarely seem to extend into 
compulsive interactions that involve another human being. Sage remarked: 
“Often I like it better when, for example, people… walk on my right 
side, rather than left side. That has to do with a sensation of balance, 
I think, like ‘right is better’. (…) I’m also finding it very difficult, for 
example, to… walk on someone’s right side, so I want them to be 
right of me, and [I] left of them.” 
As earlier chapter have shown, other human beings mainly – if not only – figure in 
compulsive interactions through their embodiment, not so much on their sociality. The 
manner with which other human beings do become involved is in the negotiation of 
how to stabilise a situation in their presence. 
In conclusion, this subsection developed a conception of compulsive interactions by 
studying their accomplishments as situated and emergent stabilisations. These can 
take the form of object compositions that excludes the human body and is compulsively 
interacted with to retain its stability outliving the interaction. This is in line with Ash’ 
(2014) analysis of the affective relations between inorganically organised objects and 
their effects on human bodies (Also see Harman 2002; Ihde 2009). These stable 
compositions, such as through ordering acts, have different mobility and durations. 
Furthermore, compulsive interactions can stabilise the appearance of an object or a 
bodily movement one is involved in, in touching, balancing and aligning acts. This 
produces an enlacing of the body with its constituencies in compulsive interactions that 
constantly require stabilisation or demand a renewal at different speeds and with 
different trajectories (after Mol 2002). In turn, these stabilities influence the emergence 
of future compulsions. This implies that compulsivity as medicalised phenomenon that, 
to date, has been understood as exclusively human, can thus be reconceived as 
ordering principle of the human in the spatial relations between the body and the 
extracorporeal. ‘Distributing’ the condition beyond the body then renders medicalised 
performances truly more-than-human, which pushes theorizations in disability and 
health geography (see Gorman 2017; Hinchliffe at al. 2018). The next subsection 
renders compulsive accomplishments as multiplicity of stabilities of different kind and 
duration, providing a spatial, ecological rendering of particular spaces. 
 
 196 
 
6.3 ECOLOGIES OF STABILITIES 
If compulsive interactions produce and reproduce stabilisations of collections of objects 
and human bodies, spaces become distinguishable by the particularity of the actualised 
or potential stabilities. This section explores how to reconceive of spaces through the 
ecologies incited and sustained by compulsive interactions and the enduring affects 
they produce. As such, this section does not only mobilise compulsivity as mediator of 
space, but also as active producer of space. Cai can be seen to fold back a corner of 
bed linen, which has a particular stability in the compulsive interaction involving the 
bed, the linen, his position of being outside the bed and noticing it in addition to other 
elements. Also, every time another human being touches the big cushion on the chair 
in the living room, Siôn walks over to puff it up. This requires particular human 
presences and absences in that room, the chair and the cushion, daylight, and him 
being mobile, amongst other things. With different durations of the present or potential 
stabilities, spaces come to have particular cycles of stabilities breaking. For instance, 
during the first eye-tracking session, Alan picks up three objects from the garden floor 
and puts them on the garden table, as he and his wife had sat outside enjoying the 
summer warmth the evening before. The plants in the garden do not require any 
compulsive interaction, because they are “natural” and do not need human interference 
to stabilise them. As such, humans come to know and create spaces through learning 
and adapting the patchwork of stabilisations. 
Homes and other private spaces are then spaces that are very well known, which 
seems to have two main consequences. Firstly, having elaborate knowledge of the 
details that make them up seems to produce intricate and complex stabilisation 
requirements, as the observation and eye-tracking data showed. Also, many 
participants explained that residing in a different place from home for a while takes 
away the requirement for a while. Ginny elaborates:  
“Those are all things I own, I see that, that, I see everything as an 
extension of myself (…) then I go to my mum for the weekend. Then I 
decouple from here and completely recharge, because at hers I don’t 
feel the compulsivity and I can’t do anything, you understand? Then 
I’m in another house, because it’s someone else’s.” 
Also, both Dylan and Sage argued that going on a holiday also meant “going on a 
holiday from [their] Tourette’s!” Sage elaborates:  
“When I went on a holiday, a week with my parents and… because 
all my compulsive acts are so related to places, objects, furniture, 
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that the moment I was on a holiday (…) I had lost it all, because all 
those things, like the route from the living room to the kitchen 
Yeah 
These things that I have to touch… those were different there, and 
probably if I’d been there for three months, I would have eh… 
developed new ones at some point, but in a place where you’re not 
residing for a long time eh… you have less time to eh...” 
Alan with strong sensibilities for straight lines and the lack thereof shows me the 
garden shed of his neighbour from a first floor window, which he experienced to not 
adhere to his standards: 
“I look at it every day. Every time I’m upstairs 
Yeah, that’s annoying, yes. 
But it doesn’t irritate me that it’s so strange: that it’s not quite right.” 
As such, both he and Ginny resonate that a lack of specific ‘ownership’ or responsibility 
over situations that could have enlaced them in compulsive interactions. Indeed, I 
observed Bill to mainly pinch, press, and reorder objects that he either would buy later 
on, or is still considering for buying. Nonetheless, this does not say that spaces then do 
not require compulsive stabilisations. On the contrary, it says that stabilisation 
requirements articulate a different kind, which might, for instance, include more 
touching or bodily positioning interactions.  
Secondly, deep knowledge of a place such as the home also provides many 
possibilities to stabilise as the participants have high levels of authority over these 
spaces. Siôn reminisces over the flat he had lived in before dating and moving in with 
his wife. Because he was completely in charge, and perhaps more importantly, the only 
cause for change in his house, he called this living situation “planet Siôn”, and spoke 
about it as a utopian place: 
“Then I would cook, that I’d, that I needed pans and things of course, 
so that changed, but other than that it was always exactly like I 
wanted. Then it was perfect, so when I’d come home, terrific! The 
remote control was still there, the cushion stood like that, always neat 
and tidy, really very orderly. Yeah, just great.” 
Despite thinking about living under these condition as preferable, he also thinks of 
residing in such places as problematic and therefore unattainable: 
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“It’s just like taking to your planet again, that it…. There we also find 
things that aren’t right, you get dead tired of it, you know.” 
Also Elisa’s living room has been arranged and decorated by her with strong ideas 
about the appearance, location and potential for mobility of each element, except one 
small table which is her partner’s ‘patch’. During the observation she cleaned the living 
room, explaining how elements connected to other ones and for what reason, such as 
the before mentioned tulips and wall with bookcases. When she arrived at her partner’s 
patch, she refrained from touching it, despite narrating the frustrations it would conjure 
up. Furthermore, she showed me the extra room upstairs with wood she had been 
drying, asserting that “it was allowed there, because the disorder has a function”, and 
“it [was] an intermediate solution.” As she needed space for the branches for workshop 
purposes, that room became a parameter that was beyond stabilisation, hence she did 
not like going in there. 
Hence, with the collections of stabilities people create parameters of relative anxiety, 
which are produced by often having to reinstate stabilisations. In addition to these 
parameters, spaces come to exist of parameters of relative peace, which are produced 
by sustainable stabilities, ownership, and/or the absence of other people, and 
parameters that accommodate for situations expected to change. An example of the 
latter kind of parameter is the collection of places the remote control can be expected 
to locate in Bill’s living room. He is not fond of the remote control changing location in 
general he explained before the interview started, but as it is an often used and highly 
mobile object, he is happy to find it in another but distinctly designated location. These 
designated locations are limited to the edge of the large cabinet, the arm rest of any 
living room chair, and the coffee table. Thus the remote control can ‘roam’ these 
locations, but cannot leave it, or its absence produces a compulsive situation in which 
Bill is required to find the remote control and compulsively place it on the right arm rest 
of his chair. Therefore, being able to create and negotiate the different parameters that 
produce the appearance of spaces allows people to live their lives as little interrupted 
as possible.  
The sizes of such parameters seemed to differ, with Elisa’s living room, kitchen, and 
back garden seemingly capturing relatively small parameters. The spaces bursting with 
carefully arranged small and colourful patches lead her to assert “it seems all a bit 
messy”, whilst Tomos considering the appearance of his studio flat in accordance with 
larger objects in and off themselves, such as the curtains, sofa, lamp and plants that 
mediate the empty spaces for walking in. The smallest stabilised parameter in the 
 199 
 
spaces of his downstairs flat involves a bulletin board hanging next to the kitchen, 
appearing “just nice and casual” and “as unorganised chaos”. Also Mina’s living room 
has distinct parameters that she stabilises as much as possible, but seem to alter with 
the activities she chooses to do. For instance, she liked sitting on the sofa to watch TV, 
whilst when sat on the sofa to read, she required a particular body posture that allowed 
her to do so: 
“If I’m eh… for example, sat here… this lamp irritates me so much 
when I read my book *points* (…) so I have to get rid of that, then I 
will now (inaudible) because of that blue light *points* – incredibly 
irritating, so that will be turned off. (…) It’s turned off now, but if that 
red light is on… *points* that’s impossible, that needs to be turned off 
as well (…) that little lamp also needs to be off. I can’t read then 
either. (…) whilst needing to look at the page, that little lamp is just 
being irritating 
Yes, and then concentrating on... what you want to read// 
//’Nonsense, just read!’  
Yes but then// 
//but then I’ll just eh… usually I’ll sit in that sofa corner there *walks 
over to the sofa and assumes her reading posture* (…) and that’s not 
even that uncomfortable.” 
During all the meetings with Mina, her living room also has very little colour, and is very 
softly lit, giving all presences a greyish/cream-like hue, as colour, such as “those 
yellows [post-it notes], they, those give a kind of irritation”. The only other colours can 
be found in the painting on the far wall across the table from the chair she usually sat 
at. At times “that also irritates [her]”. Off-record we studied the painting, and she 
pointed out that in particular patches the redness of the gown was too bright for her. 
With it possibly not hanging at the exact height the other paintings in the room had 
been hung, the painting hinges on the threshold of non-conformity with other objects 
with which it requires stabilisations. As such, the painting that is relatively rigid in its 
appearance on that wall can hardly be stabilised, whilst the small bright lights can be 
turned off when necessary. Also, when Mina was about to finish making the charcoal 
drawing during the second eye-tracking session (see Figure 7), she needs me to take it 
with me “otherwise I’ll have to continue with it (…) Yes, then I don’t want to see it, 
because I’m finding it not good, and then it needs to go.” As such, individual objects, 
such as the drawing, can be so powerful that they seem able to overthrow all careful 
stabilisation parameters that produce the space. 
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Figure 7: The lion drawn by Mina. It oscillated between just-right and and very wrong 
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Indeed, individual presences seem to be able to work as a catalyst or as a neutraliser 
of destabilisation throughout spaces. Apart from strongly affective – and therein 
powerful – objects, other human beings can become such presence. Sage recalled her 
mother becoming such presence when her mother feared compulsive interactions 
would be able to predict would harm Sage. For instance in relation to a hot oven dish, 
Sage would have configured herself in accordance with the hot oven dish in such a 
way that she could cope with the urge to compulsively interact with it until it would no 
longer cause skin burns upon touching. Her mother would then undo such 
configurational ‘precautions’ by saying “watch out [Sage], that’s hot”. Sage explained:  
“By saying it [is hot], it just becomes a massive trigger again, leading 
me to keep having to think ‘aaaaah! I want to touch it!’” *laughs* 
Following on from the conceptualisation of compulsive interaction accomplishing 
stabilisation, other human beings are perhaps very difficult – if not impossible – to 
stabilise in combination with the space resided in. Human beings can be very 
unpredictable, have a mind of their own and are highly mobile, which might unsettle 
earlier stabilisations in their changing bodily positions and their ability to alter and 
reposition nonhumans. Indeed, Ginny explains that “if other people don’t participate” in 
compulsive interactions, “the effect is not as strong (…) and then [she] stops them, 
because that person doesn’t share in the energy”. A more harmful co-presence of 
another human being was articulated by Mina. She explained that in part because she 
had to share her office with another person who had different preferences as to the 
appearance and use, she could not work to the desired standard anymore. The level of 
low light, particular door opening, closed cabinets, low phone volume, empty walls and 
desk and special chair provided her with what she recalled as “a truly luxurious 
situation”. Her new office partner, on the other hand, required much more light, the 
door open, open cabinets, regularly had meetings in the others, had put up many 
photos on the wall and stuff on her adjacent desk. Hence, the presence of this woman 
and her preferences completely rearranged, and thus destabilised, the office up to the 
point that Mina had to change office. In this manner, through the presence of other 
human beings stabilisations are difficult or even impossible to maintain. 
Nonetheless, Lowri mentioned that because she did not suppress her compulsive 
interactions around people who she was “very familiar” with, such as her mother and 
partner, and that especially her “mum participated in the bedtime rituals.” As such, 
other human beings can become part of stabilisations and thus part of certain spaces 
in an ontological sense; potentially because of their willingness and malleability to 
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become part of compulsive interactions. However, the presence of other human beings 
with whom Lowri was less familiar could take away the requirement for compulsive 
interactions. She recalled that her ‘bedtime rituals’ took so long that “the neighbour was 
brought in [to put her] to bed because with her, it did work”. With the neighbour 
physically there, she “quickly went upstairs”, and because of whom such “evening was 
one I was at ease at”. The neighbour might have neutralised the ongoing situation by 
potentially taking away all grounds for compulsive configuration of all that produced the 
spaces they moved through.  
Whilst the spaces up until this point in the chapter have mainly involved private spaces 
that became reproduced through their adaptability, other often less private spaces can 
be considered to be more rigid in their adaptability and duration. Nonetheless, any 
compulsive situation that can be stabilised will require compulsive interaction. For 
instance, when turning into the small parking lot next to Bill’s house, three out of the 
four spots had been taken, so he needed to “complete the row” by parking in the fourth 
spot. The requirement for compulsive interaction and stabilisation of a situation in such 
a rigid place can be difficult to negotiate because such an interaction is impossible or 
can be regarded inappropriate to varying degrees and kinds. Prevention of compulsive 
interaction in itself therefore seems to require negotiations by the human involved, as 
Sage pondered: 
“Everything enters but I don’t register it, and that’s why it took such a 
long time for me to realise that I’m suffering from it (…) I think ‘why 
am I so tired every time I get out off the bus?’” 
Becoming confronted with spaces that are unstable and compulsively require 
stabilisation might then also provide an explanation for the experience of easily being 
overwhelmed by the sensory information, as mentioned in Section 5.2.2. 
Through their rigidness and perhaps also the lack of ownership or responsibility over 
such spaces, the appearances of the nonhuman with which such spaces are produced 
need to be negotiated in other ways. In these cases, compulsive interactions are 
performed as avoiding extracorporeal systems to destabilise, and often involve the 
adjustment of other-than-compulsive movements. The observations and eye-tracking 
sessions outside domestic spaces provided insight into how rigid, and therein 
oppressive, structures become stabilised, neutralised or in some cases denied. The 
white stripes of pedestrian crossings and the tiles guiding blind people come to appear 
as structural stability when I walk to the station with Sara. Only the white paint stripes 
were being stepped on, despite it altering Sara’s natural gait, and the ridges of the 
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guiding tiles coming to determine her path along the platform. Unwilling or unable to 
challenge this system, she treats it as a given and performs in accordance with it. If she 
would not, her body might destabilise it, even if this would only be for the duration of a 
step. Also, within her own home such a ‘given’ system exists, as this pertains to the 
rabbit cage. As she regards it as the rabbit’s, it does not require stabilisation.  
Rigid unstable structures that cannot be stabilised through compulsive interaction often 
seem to leave gaps that then do require stabilisation for compulsive interaction. The 
conveyor belt of the counter in supermarkets presented a rigid rectangle within which 
groceries of different size had to be placed. In Ginny’s situation the groceries required 
placing one after another with the widest side to the sides of the belt; and in Dylan’s 
situation same-sized cartons of milk and yoghurt were placed on the belt parallel to 
each other. Later on, Dylan would keep grocery groups based on appearance in the 
same spot in his car, such as the eight packs of chewing gum that were also reordered 
with the same sides up. As such, stable mobile systems consisting of nonhumans with 
shared dimensions then helped to negotiate larger rigid systems.  
Some situations require compulsive interaction so strongly, and reconfigure the human 
body with such vigour that it takes a lot of effort and active reconfiguration towards non-
compulsive engagements to refrain from interacting compulsively. For instance, Ginny 
sat in my car on the way back from the supermarket and could reach most parts of the 
surroundings of the passenger seat. However, during the observation, she crosses her 
arms and presses them tightly around her body to make it physically impossible to 
reach out and interact to resist configuration, despite having ongoing possibilities to 
compulsively interact with. During the eye-tracking session, she pushes her thumb nail 
in the flesh of her other fingers to keep her hands occupied with themselves. This might 
suggest that parameters of varying stability can only be negotiated by actively retaining 
a complete other-than-compulsive configuration of the body that requires all attention.  
In conclusion, this section suggests that corporeal environments reproduce an evolving 
ecology of a collection of nonhumans with or without the body that stabilise or 
destabilise, which is supportive of Bennett’s (2004; 2010) lively compositional 
ecologies. Compulsive interactions can then be argued to ‘mend’ and/or retain the 
stability of these collections in order to enable performing non-compulsive life. The 
parameters within which objects, space elements and bodies have relative ‘freedom’ to 
remain configured as just-right then further informs the ways in which turbulence 
(Serres 1995; Anderson and Wylie 2009) and friction between objects emerge 
(Deleuze 1991; Bennet 2001). Rather than objects and space elements causing 
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turbulence and friction, this study suggests that also the crossing of boundaries of 
compulsive parameters can constitute these tensions. Such an understanding of bodily 
spatiality then also further informs the geographies of medicalised performances similar 
to compulsivity (e.g. Davidson 2003; Segrott and Doel 2004; Davidson and Henderson 
2010; Chouinard 2012) 
Being inescapably connected to ecologies of compulsive compositions might then help 
explain Bliss’ (1980), Kane’s (1994), and Sage’s experience of perpetual urge 
sensations. Also, not compulsively interacting ‘in line with’ with extracorporeal rigid 
stabilities may invoke a compulsive ‘crisis’. This situates compulsions as opposites of 
events, precisely to counter the spontaneity, rupture, and interruption they produce 
(after Dewsbury 2000; Dawney 2013). Remarkably, herein compulsive interactions 
have made a 180 degree turn from being regarded as problematic acts and symptoms 
of a pathology that captures suffering to acts that refrain a person from becoming 
overwhelmed. With the ecology of stable systems that organise in parameters, this 
study thus argues that compulsivity actively produces space that orders bodies and 
objects in accordance with their dimensions (see Matthen 2014). Compulsive 
interactions are then also negotiated through and within these ecologies. The next 
subsection further explores how stabilisations of compulsive situations can retain 
optimal duration, and, consequently, how participants ‘retain sanity’ in the violent 
ecologies their worlds seem to consist of, by turning to habits. 
 
6.4 RETAINING SANITY AND HABITS 
“The art of the matter is that you have control over what compulsivity 
you allow or not, and that works for me, quite well actually.” 
Ginny explained that finding peace in having to perform compulsive acts for her 
articulated in finding the right balance of allowing configurations of the body in 
compulsive enlacing to unfold, and retrieving the body from compulsive configurations 
to perform a bearable amount. In having to negotiate ongoing ecologies of evolving 
stability that reconfigure the human body accordingly, participants have elaborated on 
how environments that imposed the least compulsive demands on them. Such 
environments require little to no compulsive interactions as they would already be 
stable without requiring intervention from them to an extended duration. Ginny presents 
an image of “large grasslands that are not fenced”, with Kyrgyzstan as “ultimate spot” 
because there is “nothing at all, just green hills, you know, where there’s nothing in 
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sight”. She also like the sea, and the desert for being “nice and calm”, although it is “too 
noisy because of the wind there”. Alan prefers walking in a cemetery, and argued to 
like walking in the rain because “that reduces stress better”. Siôn reminisces over living 
in Zeeland40 as he grew up on a farm, and feels the desire to move back because he 
finds it “a nice place, but mainly [because of] the peacefulness, the expanse of the 
polder.” Also  
“The church bells play in a particular way. I became very tranquil 
when I heard that sound. Then I think, ‘oh man, I’m in another world’” 
In the house he lived during the study, he liked residing in warm, light, sunny places, 
something he also did during the interview in the front room. This room incited him to  
“Just stand there, like, very quietly, then I could look for hours. 
Bizarre really, that you can just enjoy a piece of tranquillity (…) I can 
kind of explain it, but that you feel so happy that your eyes are restful 
again – or something.” 
On the contrary, Ginny argued to need to reside in a darkened room when she felt 
overwhelmed by the day, such as after a busy day at work: “after coming home, I’d first 
needed to be in a dark room, curtains closed” to “meditate”. “After an hour or some 
[she] could do cooking or something.” Dylan put his experience of being “calm” in 
words: “I am on earth, I am here”. Hence, in the invocations of spaces that were 
experienced to be or would be therapeutic have an appearance that lacks 
distinguishable systems, or have very few differing parameters of potentially 
compulsive collections. 
 
Whilst remaining in such therapeutic spaces is unpractical for most requirements of 
everyday life, there are other ways of residing in a plethora of spaces whilst not 
becoming enlaced in compulsive interactions. The previous subsection concluded that 
maintaining stabilisations helps postponing compulsive interactions for re-stabilising 
collections of nonhumans with or without the human body. Postponing destabilisations 
would mean causing as little disturbance to stabilised situations. Doing everything the 
same as before, handling objects, making the same movements, approaching spaces 
from the same angle, referring to the body in similar ways, maintaining order and timing 
then might reduce the chance of situational change. Therefore, it might not be 
                                               
40 Southern province in the Netherlands, which is a coastal region, is mainly agricultural, sparsely 
populated and relatively strongly religious. 
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surprising that many participants have highly routinized, habitual, and carefully planned 
their lives. Ginny elaborated: 
“If I thus have a very structured plan, then that is a thick current with 
which I go along, like ‘I’m going to do this and I’m going to do that’, 
and then I suffer less” 
Such routinized ways of going about everyday life conjure up a highly embodied future 
that consists only of the gestures and moves of non-compulsive futures. These kinds of 
imagined futures might help retaining the bodily configuration to non-compulsive 
aspects of life. When Elisa works in the garden for the second eye-tracking session, 
she follows a particular order, which makes the task  
“very predictable and very calming, because I know that then and 
then, I’ll do that and that, and I take a break to do the floor because it 
just irritates me, then it’s ok, if I make sure to continue with the same 
order afterward.” 
Simultaneously, many compulsive interactions recur with particular routine engagement 
with the world. Whilst routines and habits can be regarded a stabilisation of bodily 
performativity in themselves (Seamon 1980), they cannot be understood as a 
thoughtless performance (Bissell 2011). Indeed, the data demonstrates that habits, 
routines and compulsive interactions are strongly entangled, and even seem to 
become indistinguishable. During the observation, Bill explained that brushing his teeth 
in the morning is so highly routinized, he feels unable to alter it, and becomes easily 
distressed when household members do something, such as forget to charge the 
electric toothbrush, which requires him to adjust his routine. Also, before taking a sip 
from a glass, he pinched the sides of the glass twice, and squeezed it before putting it 
down. This and other elaborate compulsive interactions that have a seemingly habitual 
element to them required him to take his time, but upon asked if he cannot do them in 
advance, his response is negative. As such, compulsive interactions resonate a highly 
situational emergence that could only be an element shared with habits as Grosz 
(2013, pp. 217) understands them as: “modes of encounter materiality and life”. As 
such, compulsive interactions and the conceptual ‘effort’ of their configurational powers 
subscribe to or be considered a kind of more vital, creative and futural understanding of 
habits (e.g. Bergson 1911; Deleuze 1991; Ravaisson 2009; Dewsbury and Bissell 
2014). 
The entanglement is also notable with Bill and others who argue that certain 
compulsive interactions seemingly have to be performed before non-compulsive 
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interactions. Almost every time Tomos engages in a non-compulsive task that required 
him to use his hands, he rubbed his face beforehand; for instance before starting his 
laptop and before picking up his cutlery to eat. Whilst these are relatively short and 
‘easy’ compulsive interactions, Mina requires a complex and elaborate series that 
needs to be exactly right before she can close her eyes and sleep. The first eye-
tracking session shows her loosely performing this 4.5 minute “mandatory ritual”. If 
anything would “go wrong”, she was required to “start all over again”, which included 
going to the bathroom. Nonetheless, habits can also be a means of breaking the 
compulsive enlacing and reconfiguring towards non-compulsive life. For instance, 
before Sara vacuumed upstairs, she looked at the bedside clock until the minute 
passes. She later explained that she timed her vacuuming to 7 minutes. If she would 
not count the minutes, she would just have to continue, facing more difficulties to 
reconfigure to stopping vacuuming. Thus, habits and routines thus seem to be 
intimately entangled with compulsive interactions, as they support the elongated 
durations of stabilised situations in a number of ways. 
In conclusion, this section demonstrated that negotiation of performing compulsive 
interactions took place in a spatial manner as well. Places with a low amount of body-
object-space compositions, or with enduring ones that do not need re-stabilisation were 
preferred as well as bodily conditions through which compositions that require 
attendance are undiscernible or unattainable. This is an addition to engagements with 
objects (Cowhey 2005; Lawson 2005; Davidson 2010). Furthermore, mapping 
anticipation of unstable compositions is possible by adopting habitual movements that 
are enforced and not unthought (Malabou 2009). Compulsivity as spatial phenomenon 
may also contribute to explaining why ‘cluttered’ environments require more attention 
when engaging in an intended practice (see Land et al. 1999; Hayhoe et al. 2003); the 
potential for becoming reconfigured into compulsions is then very high, and navigating 
the compositions without having to stabilise, restore, or disrupt any. By returning to 
Lingis (1996, pp. 14), who argues that “we see not shapes but possibilities” (see also 
Bergson 1911), it may be possible to see how this formulates the struggle by those 
struggling with compulsive tendencies. The possibilities for body, object, and space 
dimensions to form an unstable compulsive composition are then oppressive in the 
compulsive interactions they evoke. The anticipation of compulsive interactions (see 
Section 4.2.2) then ought to be regarded as navigating the mapping of these 
possibilities by reducing them. 
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6.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis aims to understand how bodily environments can affect compulsive 
interactions, how this affects negotiations, and if this phenomenon has further 
implications for our understanding of person-place relations. This chapter has 
developed compulsive interactions on their spatial effects beyond the engagement 
itself. Reflecting these effects back onto the place of compulsions in spatial processes, 
I demonstrated how they seemed to fulfil a function of mediating extracorporeal forces 
working on the body. Underpinned by the three sensory phenomena (i.e. urges, not 
just-right feelings, and heightened sensitivity), compulsive interactions can be 
understood through ecologies of stabilization that articulate the formation of compulsive 
configurations between bodies, objects, and spaces. 
Compulsive interactions become a response to an ever-changing ecology or patchwork 
of different kinds of intensities and with differing durations, produced by a co-
emergence of the materialities and sensibilities. As such, they articulate the 
particularity of the situation, despite, or better, in lieu of similarities of the bodily, object 
and space configuration. This renders compulsivity as a disposition of the corporeal 
enlacing and simultaneous violence to retain a sense of corporeal unity. Compulsive 
interactions can then be understood as confirmation of the fleshiness and presence of 
the body in relation to the materiality of the extracorporeal element. Simultaneously, 
they can be understood as slippage from human governance and rupture from the 
body’s assumed raison d’etre; its sustenance of life – biological, cultural, social. 
Compulsive interactions name the ecologies of intensities that enmesh situations of the 
human and nonhuman attuning to a plane of consistency with affects that meet and 
explode in a multiplicity, reverberating through the human body.  
With this meshwork ecology of potentially violent body-object-space compositions that 
reign the body into interacting compulsively, this study has developed an embodied 
geography that sustains and challenges certain spatial concepts. Whilst the 
compulsions arise with the formation of subjectivities that involve the body, they do not 
seem to centre it, such as is invoked in geographies of life world (e.g. Tuan 1974, 
Relph 1976; Seamon 1980; Buttimer and Seamon 1980). Indeed, with moving through 
the landscape consisting of these different compositions of object and space 
dimensions that are perceived to resonate with each other (see Harman 2002; Ihde 
2009; Ash 2015). Subjectification processes are then asymmetrical as subjectivity 
boundaries ‘stick’ to the boundaries of the configurations (see Dewsbury 2007; 
Romanillos 2008; Wylie 2009; 2010).  
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The body navigates becoming part of body-object-space compositions – through which 
they configure into a compulsive interaction – and unbecoming part of them, which 
often means becoming part of one or multiple other compositions, depending on the 
environment. Therefore, compulsivity challenges accounts of human-world relations 
that striate the world in accordance with the human. Instead, this study suggests that 
compulsivity as spatial phenomenon demonstrates how humans are intimately related 
to the world but do not dominate the interactions with it. Rather, for people with strong 
compulsive tendencies, this might be quite the contrary; they seem to live in a world of 
which its composites incessantly tear them away from intended tasks.  
This re-imagines compulsivity as a multiplicity of ecologically situated compositions of 
body-object-space configurations that move with the body and become more and less 
intense with the perception of situation as such. The body with compulsive sensibilities 
can then be envisioned to be drawn into compulsive interactions to instate, restore, or 
not disturb these compositions. Therefore, compulsivity might be regarded as a 
formative and organisational force that does not quite belong to the human or the 
nonhuman, but rather ‘locates’ in between. It can be conceived to emit from volatile 
body-object-world configurations and ‘move’ humans through the flesh (Wylie 2006; 
Hoel and Carusi 2015), and constitute a pre-modal understanding of time and space 
(Lingis 2000; Massumi 2002; Anderson and Harrison 2010; Matthen 2014). The next 
chapter concludes the thesis by providing answers to the research questions on the 
basis of the analysis and the literature review, it reflects on the methodology, 
elaborates on the overall contributions of the study to the bodies of work it draws on, 
and suggests ways to take the implications of the study forward in future research.  
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS 
WE KNOW NOTHING ABOUT A BODY UNTIL WE KNOW WHAT IT CAN DO, IN 
OTHER WORDS, WHAT ITS AFFECTS ARE, HOW THEY CAN OR CANNOT ENTER 
INTO COMPOSITION WITH OTHER AFFECTS, WITH THE AFFECTS OF ANOTHER 
BODY, EITHER TO DESTROY THAT BODY OR TO BE DESTROYED BY IT, 
EITHER TO EXCHANGE ACTIONS AND PASSIONS WITH IT OR TO JOIN WITH 
IT IN COMPOSING A MORE POWERFUL BODY. 
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI 2004, P284 
 
Thinking about the compulsive body, as I am writing the conclusions in June 2018, 
in comparison to how I thought about it 4 years and 3 months ago, made me realise 
how profoundly my understanding has changed. Interrogating the body and critically 
destabilising its medical renditions, then rebuilding it as geographical phenomenon 
has engaged broader debates than I had imagined. This study started off by 
researching how geography affected compulsive interactions, but it has ended up 
with researching how compulsive interactions are creative of a geography and how 
their conceptualisation as a geography of its own kind affects notions at the core of 
the discipline. As I move to a conclusion, this chapter, firstly, formulates answers to 
the research questions as they have evolved both reflecting this shift, and 
embedding it in current considerations in the sub disciplines of cultural, disability and 
health geography, as well as human geography more broadly (Section 7.1). 
Secondly, and in line with these answers, the chapter considers the methodological 
implications and contributions of the study (Section 7.2). Thirdly, it makes explicit 
how these answers and methodological implications contribute to the development 
of broader debates within human geography, as well as to the medical and clinical 
sciences of Tourette syndrome (Section 7.3). Lastly, it considers how the findings of 
this study could be consolidated further in research that benefits those suffering 
from compulsions (Section 7.4).  
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7.1 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
7.1.1 Research Question 1 
 
How are compulsive interactions, performed by people with a Tourette 
syndrome diagnosis, affected by the bodily environment? 
 
It is important to acknowledge that this research question suggests that it is the 
human performing the interactions. Indeed, this is more reflective of the initial 
medical and clinical perspectives taken on compulsions than the co-constituted 
performance ultimately identified by this study. The latter identification, as argued in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6, refutes the position that compulsions are solely attributable to 
the human. Rather than reducing compulsivity to only a dysfunctionality of the neural 
system, as neurological sciences do, or understanding it only in terms of cognition, 
as psychological sciences do, this study demonstrates that the nonhuman 
contributes to the performance of compulsions in unprecedented ways. This 
reconceives the ontological position of neural processes in the constitution of 
compulsions as conditional, in the sense that these might set the human up for 
compulsive engagement, but not as determinative in how they take place. Indeed, 
the compulsive interactions that are part of this study show how their performance 
implicates a specific involvement of the non-human. This does not suggest an 
attribution of consciousness or wilfulness to nonhumans (see Bennett 2001), but it 
does imply the active role of objects and spaces through their dimensions that 
articulate in their encounter with the human in that particular situation. Thus, instead 
of understanding the bodily environment as simply affecting compulsive interactions, 
it needs to be conceived as formative part of the constitution of compulsions. 
 
This thesis has identified that compulsive interactions performed by people with a 
Tourette syndrome diagnosis are performed in a myriad of ways. The categories of 
touching, ordering, balancing and symmetry behaviour formulated by clinical 
research (e.g. Worbe et al. 2010) have been found to be reductive to the extent that 
they remained unproductive in clinical research as well as professional aid to those 
in need. However, the richer and strongly detailed conception this study has 
produced has helped to unveil the intricacies of compulsive interactions to an extent 
that they can be theorized beyond clinical categories. What had been constituted as  
categories should rather be understood as denoting aspects of compulsions, which 
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troubles the simplistic and reductive character of compulsions evoked by such 
categories. Having rendered them performative, this study demonstrates the wide 
variety, and effects of compulsive engagement. Both on the level of the individual 
person performing the acts, and in the kind of compulsion, the research findings 
indicate how the performativity of compulsive body-world interactions ensures a 
perseverance or reinstatement of a stability. Such stabilisations situate in 
consciously pressing bodily flesh in the hard, round, sharp, ribbed, hot articulations 
of object matter, in the affirmation of certain shared dimensions across object matter 
and body matter through aligning them, or in moving body parts and/or objects in 
accordance with other materiality.  
 
To understand how the stabilisation of the organisation of bodies, objects, and 
spaces takes place, the study thus suggests that the particular involvement of 
nonhumans ought to be identified and analysed. The study found that compulsive 
interactions cannot necessarily be grasped through analysing the functionality, 
materiality, or aesthetics of objects and spaces. Indeed, the grounds on which 
elements of objects and spaces affirm their involvement becomes clear only with the 
unfolding of the interaction, as these cannot be indicated before the act, and very 
often also cannot be rationalised after the act (Dalley et al. 2011). Only through the 
unfolding it becomes clear that objects, spaces, and bodies share dimensions that 
had become volatile and required engagement. 
 
This thesis has also identified that the engagement of the body, objects, and spaces 
in compulsions can be conceived as configurations with different durations. 
Compulsive body-world interactions can be swift when other-than-compulsive 
touching and ordering is already taking place. These tend to occur when a person 
with compulsive tendencies undertakes activities that involve much bodily 
movement and many objects passing their hands (e.g. Sage putting damp socks on 
the washing line). Other compulsions can be very complicated and take a longer 
time because of multiple attempts (e.g. Sara vacuuming her bedroom), a multitude 
of materials involved (e.g. Ginny repositioning items on her desk), or require a 
violent interruption of other-than-compulsive activities (e.g. Siôn resituating the 
cushions in the sofa). Compulsive body-world interactions compose presences in 
different ways, such as human body parts with objects (e.g. Sara rubbing of small 
stuffed animals), human bodies with objects (e.g. Ginny handling of the shopping 
cart), objects with other objects (e.g. Bill’s glasses on the cupboard shelf), human 
bodies with spaces (e.g. Lowri stepping over the 45 degree angle of the room 
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corner), objects with spaces (e.g. Bill’s remote control in the living room), and 
spaces with spaces (e.g. Elisa’s spare bedroom within the remainder of the house). 
These configurations seem to ‘inhabit’ distinctive parameters within which bodies, 
objects, and spaces require a particular composition in order not to require 
compulsive engagement.  
 
Certain compulsions can be anticipated, as they take place as built into short, 
unavoidable, and mundane routines, such as walking into or out of a room (e.g. 
Sage pressing her finger into a series of tips within her reach), where the body and 
its environment have strongly familiar relations (i.e. one cannot enter a room in 
another way). Furthermore, compulsive body-world relations tend to develop with a 
deepening of the material knowledge of the space (e.g. holiday homes gradually 
invoke more compulsions), which extends into more and less familiar people (e.g. 
Lowri having to perform less when her unfamiliar neighbour put her to bed), and into 
familiar movements in less familiar spaces (e.g. Sara driving her scooter over and 
between lines on the tarmac). In conclusion, compulsive interactions performed by 
people with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis are not only affected by the bodily 
environment, they are actively co-constituted by them in a myriad ways, and to a 
myriad of effects. 
 
7.1.2 Research Question 2  
 
How do people with a Tourette syndrome diagnosis negotiate performing 
compulsive interactions? 
 
Negotiation of the performance of compulsive interactions takes place in different 
ways, reflecting different concerns that surface with the compulsions. Whilst medical 
scientific research has aimed at and developed the grounds for medication affecting 
the frequency and severity of tics, compulsions have not distinctively been part of 
effect studies. This study demonstrates that medication does seem to inform the 
compulsive interactions, as participants like Ginny explain how they feel that 
everything happens as if behind glass. Such experiences indicate a fundamental 
disconnection between the body and its constituencies, which, in turn, might reduce 
potential for compulsions. Clinical psychological research developed the grounds 
and application for behavioural therapy in which negotiating having to perform 
compulsive interactions is a matter of cognition (CBT), bodily restraint (HRT), or 
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tolerance of urge discomfort (ERP). Again, whilst such negotiating styles can be 
very effective for tics, participants like Lowri argue that for compulsive interactions it 
is less the case. As these therapies are mostly practice-based, the situational 
aspect, and occasional absence of urges troubles this. Additionally, compulsions 
can sometimes be indistinguishable from habits (e.g. Bill’s tooth brushing routine), 
be unavoidable (e.g. Lowri not knowing how to drink water ‘normally’), or even 
enjoyable (e.g. Ginny reordering the fruit bowl).  
 
Furthermore, this study suggests that negotiations are mediated through the 
involvement of other people to make the disruptive effect of compulsions less violent 
(e.g. Nora telling the choir members to expect certain engagements), as well as 
asking others to comply with certain stabilities of objects and spaces (e.g. Bill´s 
organisation of the fridge), and not to move objects or reorganise spaces (e.g. 
Ginny’s reorganisations of the living room). Moreover, objects and spaces can be 
made to lose the affects when they are rendered untouchable through their 
ownership being situated with others (e.g. Alan’s negotiation of his neighbour’s 
garden shed). Such negotiations of conditions upon which compulsions can take 
place do not reflect morality to overrule compulsivity; rather, objects and spaces that 
were not owned by participants could either not grow in familiarity as they could not 
be interrogated, or were experienced to ‘remain indifferent’ to the human. 
Additionally, the diagnosis itself, the medicalised body, and objects were often 
mobilised as ‘wanting’ to do compulsive interactions, which became othered, and 
overruled by the self. In spite of or despite these professional negotiation styles, this 
study demonstrates how there is a plethora of other ways to negotiate performing 
compulsive interactions that have a profoundly geographical expression. 
 
This study shows how the spatiality of compulsive interactions is actively used in 
their negotiation. One of the ways in which spatial performativity articulates is 
through the way the body is brought into contact with the extracorporeal during 
compulsions. These negotiations mainly rely on devising changes to the urge 
sensation, as their increase or decrease would imply a less stringent compulsion. As 
some compulsive engagements with object dimensions can be harmful to the body, 
they are often performed up to the point where they are not too painful or damaging, 
and can be repeated whenever they are not suppressed (e.g. Mina biting down on a 
razor blade between her molars). Also, when a compulsive interaction takes too 
much time or requires too much effort, object dimensions are changed to satisfy the 
urge to the extent that it releases the most uncomfortable tension by putting the 
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object in another place, or touching it lightly (e.g. Siôn placing the milk carton 
elsewhere seven times). Furthermore, on occasions that urges are experienced 
almost incessantly, as they are not followed up on, compulsive interactions that take 
least effort, or are known to have the greatest effect in diminishing the urge 
sensation (e.g. Sage pinching the tips of clothes pegs when picking them up). 
Therefore, negotiations of compulsive interactions upon unfolding seem to involve a 
balancing of discomfort with effort in which the spatial constellation of the elements 
constituting the compulsion is an important aspect that determines effort. 
 
In situations that are not yet compulsive, anticipating the potential compulsive 
interaction became important in the way the body engaged with the violence of the 
compulsive world. Such anticipation ranged from, for instance, through looking 
away, or otherwise occupying body parts that would become involved in compulsive 
interactions (e.g. Sage carrying a tray from the kitchen to the living room, and Nora 
having a piece of paper between her fingers in her pockets when she leaves her 
house). Also placing particularly evocative objects out of sight is found to help 
negotiating being attracted to interact compulsively (e.g. the deep fryer in Sage’s 
kitchen). Perhaps remarkably, obscuring the senses by wearing gloves or 
sunglasses often has the opposite effect, and would give more rise to a general 
anxiety about not being able to feel material satisfactorily. Nonetheless, dulling the 
senses, distracting one’s own attention (e.g. wearing headphones in public) was 
experienced to keep focus on other-than-compulsive activities. Also, wearing clothes 
that did not retain one’s attention was found to help negotiating the effects of 
compulsions. In addition to these strategies for negotiating the performance of 
compulsive interactions, many activities are highly routinized, as routines reduce the 
potential for surprise encounters of objects and spaces. 
 
Other ways in which anticipated compulsive interaction are negotiated entail the 
organisation of spaces and objects in such a way that they are least likely to require 
involvement. This takes place through objects being rendered static (e.g. Elisa 
sticking book covers together by making them wet), objects sharing similarities and 
can evoke reordering being grouped (e.g. Dylan having a ‘toiletry island’), and 
relations between objects and spaces being measured meticulously and organised 
in accordance with these measurements (e.g. Elisa having measured the book 
shelves on a section or the living room wall). Moreover, highly mobile objects can be 
assigned a ‘parameter’ in which they are allowed to locate (e.g. Bill has assigned the 
remote control four places in his living room), and reversely, zones of spaces are 
 216 
 
assigned to comprehend such a plethora of smaller items that no system of shared 
dimensions is dominant over another, which reduces the becoming compulsive of all 
presences in that zone (e.g. Tomos’ pin board of postcards and small, loose and 
shapeless items).  
 
Such focus on anticipation can only capture an experiential and reflective 
perspective on compulsive body-world formation, and is therefore limited in its 
conceptual grasp of compulsive interactions. Nonetheless, the ways in which 
compulsive interactions are anticipated does indicate the kinds of and the extent to 
which humans have capacities to relate to compulsivity, and in what ways they 
understand their body to be part of this. Indeed, using anticipation as a strategy to 
negate compulsive interactions is limited in its success. Many urges are not 
experienced, and often compulsions occur without the active reflexive engagement 
of the human. In other words, some compulsive interactions are only witnessed and 
never deliberated, whilst some do not even permeate awareness by the human 
enlaced in them, and are therefore impossible to negotiate. Nonetheless, the 
possibility of a complete lack of awareness begs the question to what extent 
compulsive interactions are a sign of a disabled, diagnosable or even suffering 
body, and to what extent compulsivity is a more prevalent mode of existence. In 
conclusion, the study provides new insights to the negotiations of compulsive 
interactions, and in particular, the spatial capacities of bodies, objects, and spaces 
that are mobilised for them. 
 
7.1.3 Research Question 3  
 
What can be learned about the relations between people and place from 
compulsive interactions performed with and in negotiation of affective 
environments? 
 
Compulsive interactions performed with and in negotiation of affective environments 
demonstrate that relations between people and place can be understood by 
particular spatial situations of bodies, objects, and spaces. These situations express 
with materialities and sensibilities on an unprecedented and unwanted basis, rather 
than meaning, rationality, and predefined purpose. Compulsive body-world 
interactions seem to articulate distinctive spatialities of bodies, objects and spaces 
on the basis of shared dimensions. These shared dimensions are found to articulate 
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with the taking place of particular (routine) activities, sensory perspectives of the 
human, and capacities of their materiality. With the passing of time and the unfolding 
of space new sets of dimensions shared across bodies, objects, and spaces 
become more and less powerful, drawing in the human to affirm them through 
compulsive interaction. Within systems, it is the affirmation of their shared 
dimensions that accomplishes a stabilisation as and with these dimensions. Such 
stabilisations can be understood as spatial entities that can live prior and after 
human involvement. These stabilisations differ in their ability to become re-situated 
or re-placed (e.g. a set of glasses on the shelf in Bill’s cupboard), and negotiated, 
disturbed, and broken up in parts or in their entirety. Others cannot ‘move’ or appear 
outside particular activities taking place prior and posterior to this compulsion (e.g. 
Mina’s bed time ritual during which she needs to hear the dry ‘click’ of the toilet 
door). 
 
Spatialities of compulsive systems become more and less intensive with their 
enlaced components configuring differently towards each other. Therefore, in 
different stages of development, and in co-existence with each other, the human 
body is surrounded by a ‘patchwork’ of compulsive spatialities in which the body has 
become, is becoming or will become enlaced. The compulsive spatialities that make 
up this patchwork of zones do not just become more or less intensive, but acquire 
qualities of attraction and repellence in particular ways. Attraction varies with the 
ways in which these zones come into being which determines how interactions 
unfold if the person gives in to the attraction (e.g. a particularly sunny spot in Siôn’s 
living room). These attractive zones can overlap, and they can emerge 
simultaneously with zones of repellence (e.g. the hot deep fryer in Sage’s kitchen). 
Pure repellence or the inverse absence of attraction could be the ongoing or 
persistent presence of being touched, or looking into bright light, hearing particular 
sounds and could reflect the experiences medicalised as heightened sensitivity. This 
surrounding of the body by the patchwork can invoke a vicinity but is not limited to 
the immediate sensory ‘worlding’ of the body. Rather, the patchwork has a relational 
existence, in which systems require stabilisation or remain unaltered elsewhere (e.g. 
Elisa’s spare bed room needed to be organised in one particular composition). As 
such, all participants had a collection of systems that required to be in place and 
stabilised at all time, some of which would be situated in relation to the body (e.g. 
some items in Elisa’s bag that she took wherever she went), and some of which 
would be situated in relation to the materiality of a space (e.g. the position Lowri’s 
sofa vis-à-vis a particular corner of the living room). The co-presence and co-
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constitution of systems then shape the experience of the body, objects, and spaces 
in a compulsive sense that distinguishes from any other sense. In other words, 
bodies, objects, and spaces acquire another sense of difference through the 
collections of compulsive systems, on top of concepts such as ‘living room’, their 
aesthetics, or through memory.  
 
Compulsive interactions become a response to an ever-changing ecology or 
patchwork of differing intense durations, produced by a co-emergence of the 
materialities and sensibilities when residing in a place. These compulsive 
interactions then become articulations of the particularity of the situation, however 
many times the same body resides in the same place. This thus produces a tense 
bodily disposition of potentially ‘losing’ the body by becoming enlaced in compulsive 
interactions during other-than-compulsive acts. Additionally, compulsive interactions 
can be understood as both a confirmation of the fleshiness and presence of the 
body in relation to the materiality of the extracorporeal element, and its slippage 
from belonging or rupture from its assumed raison d’etre; its sustenance of life – 
biological, cultural, social. Compulsive interactions name the ecologies of intensities 
that enmesh situations of the human and nonhuman, attuning to a plain of 
consistency with affects that meet, and explode in a multiplicity, reverberating 
through the human body. Such meetings are felt as the urge; an explosion of 
orgasmic immediacy as a compulsive interaction emerges. 
 
Thus, this thesis suggests that compulsivity implicates a new order that articulates 
with instead of from the human, in which it sidesteps the symbolism with which we 
know our world, and with which geography analyses human/non-human world 
formation. As such, they can be thought to run in parallel. Compulsive body-world 
formation might then be regarded as a new kind of undercurrent that supports, 
sustains and sets the conditions upon which symbolic life takes place. These 
currents are in constant mutual affirmation; when the compulsive current is well 
adjusted to the symbolic one, all presences converge and people thrive (after 
Anderson 2012). In these situations, the world is experienced to not vibrate and 
objects remain ‘still’, as Ginny argued. In situations where the currents are 
maladapted to each other the human might experience to fall still (e.g. when Dylan 
cannot do anything he wants to do and lays on his bed room floor), and objects 
vibrate (e.g. Ginny’s experience of produce on supermarket shelves). In terms of 
suffering caused, such experiences could be regarded as aligned with not quite 
knowing what rooms mean in ASDs (Davidson 2010; Davidson and Henderson 
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2010), being unable to locate the self in delusions (Parr 1999) and mania 
(Chouinard 2012), and where bodily boundaries dissolve in anxiety disorders, such 
as OCD (Segrott and Doel 2004) and agoraphobia (Davidson 2000a 2000b 2007; 
Callard 2006), and not feeling ‘safe’ in a space (Coyle 2004, pp. 62). Compulsive 
interactions are then ways to make the currents align; they are emergent from the 
situation where the currents increasingly become problematic, which is felt by the 
human as the urge. The compulsive interactions that follow are then restorative of 
the maladapted currents. Whilst compulsions can be deeply uncomfortable 
engagements, they can also be enjoyable, because the new post-compulsion 
situation allows one to thrive more. The affirmation in itself can then also be 
enjoyable (e.g. Elisa’s organisation of the books and bookshelves in her living room, 
as well as her back garden). In conclusion, compulsivity can be conceived of as 
ordering principle of bodies, objects, and spaces in a number of ways. 
 
 
7.2 REFLECTION ON, CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND LIMITATIONS OF THE 
METHODOLOGY AND ETHICS 
The combination of methods that follow a methodology of the momentary and in situ 
was able to capture qualitatively different aspects of body-world relations: the 
experience of the most prudent, memorable aspects of compulsive interactions in 
the interviews; the ongoing evolvement of the body moving through its environment 
as grasped from the outside in the observations; and the ongoing evolvement of 
body’s enmeshment with its environment as sensed partially from the body itself in 
the mobile eye-tracking. It allowed for developing more understanding as to when 
and with what extracorporeal materialities compulsive interactions took place, and 
how they disrupted, became part of or took place in between ongoing other-than-
compulsive engagements. As such, this study was able to document how particular 
objects and body parts became involved in compulsive engagements, which formed 
the basis for a mapping of compulsive body-world engagement that traced the 
individuality of participants, as well as spaces and objects.  
 
The specificities forthcoming from the study’s focus on qualitative difference 
provided a broader understanding of the intricate and intimate micro-geographies of 
varying temporalities that emerged with these elements, and through which they 
articulated an alternative set of relations to their other-than-compulsive sets. It was 
especially during and after the observations and eye-tracking sessions that these 
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spatiotemporal intricacies emerged. These two methods helped to epistemologically 
situate how, when, and where experience related to compulsive body-world 
formation, and importantly, also how, when, and where not. By extension, this 
helped situate the interview method in relation to the phenomenon, and identify in 
what ways incorporating experience into researching a medicalised phenomenon 
provided valuable insights. Indeed, refraining from interpretation of compulsions in 
terms of meaning, and instead mobilising experience as ‘alternative objectivity’ 
(Blencowe et al. 2015) can be considered to have opened up new possibilities for 
engagements with experiential knowledges in the medical and clinical sciences 
 
Through the combination of interviews with observations and mobile eye-tracking, 
this study contributes to ongoing debates about the merit and development of 
mobile methods (see Anderson 2004; Laurier 2004; Spinney 2009). Whilst Merriman 
(2013) cautioned for adopting mobile methods on assumptions of a failure of 
methods such as interviews, this study demonstrates that in studying bodily 
performances of which human beings are not entirely aware, and/or of which they 
are uncomfortable speaking, mobile methods that capture the taking place of the 
phenomenon can be invaluable. Indeed, compulsivity as phenomenon that is 
performed with rather than by humans, and happens at a certain distance from other 
domains of life, proved difficult to pin down in interviews. Discussing the eye-
tracking videos as well as narrating their compulsive interactions during the 
observations not only helped participants express their sensations and rationalities; 
it also helped to outline what tended to escape their memory, what was 
“‘unspeakable’ and ‘non-rational(ised)’” (Spinney 2009, pp.826) on which interviews 
are based. Additionally, witnessing and at times performing the compulsive 
interactions myself helped to grasp certain sensibilities that were encapsulated in 
them (see Büscher et al., 2011; Vannini 2015). This study then demonstrates that 
geographies of compulsive body-world formation can be theorised without 
signification. 
 
The limitations of the interview method in favour of mobile methods are especially 
articulated in social scientific research on medicalised performances. Research on 
these topics often involves people who are used to be invited to express themselves 
via a medical language, as they are almost exclusively addressed by medical 
professionals. Nonetheless, as argued in Subsection 3.1.1, participants struggled 
with expressing compulsive experiences both in medical and everyday vocabularies, 
which made some encounters rather researcher-led. The eye-tracking method 
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provided them with more agency in determining the ways in which they were 
comfortable with demonstrating compulsions. The possibility of asking me to remain 
in one room and/or not watch the screen, and/or not become confronted with the 
recordings allowed them to distance themselves from being watched (see also 
Spinney 2011). As such, this study demonstrates how flexibility with and within the 
methods helped the research participants navigate their participation. In addition to 
the latter, the set-up of the research allowed for a pick-and-choose participation, and 
ended up with most participants engaging in an intense collaboration over the 
course of weeks, and in most cases months; thus providing a deep insight into the 
lives of those with a Tourette’s diagnosis. Other methods – including quantitative 
approaches – would not have been able to produce similar intricacies.  
 
The methodology could thus largely capture the embodied, contextual and 
experiential aspects of compulsions that fundamentally lack in medical scientific and 
clinical research. Simultaneously, this methodology was sensitive to and helped 
highlight ‘blind spots’ in geographical research, created by structural accounts of 
human/world formation. All methods, but perhaps the mobile eye-tracking most 
prominently, demonstrated how purposeful activities are riddled with unwanted and 
unprecedented interactions, and that these are as much part of everyday life (see 
Beljaars and Anderson, forthcoming). By extension, it demonstrated how such 
situated but isolated endeavours such as compulsions can have such strong 
affective resonances with further life and beyond their occurrence. Additionally, the 
study contributes to diversify the narrative approach currently dominant in disability 
and health geography. Whilst this approach have proven to be valuable in 
emphasizing the meaningful aspects of life with a condition (e.g. Davidson 2000; 
2010; Davidson and Henderson 2010; Donovan 2014; de Leeuw et al. 2017), they 
are less effective in capturing the situated experience (Beljaars and Anderson, 
forthcoming). Indeed, the use of a reflexive haptic videography (Paterson and Glass 
2018) would potentially have been better in capturing the material affects and 
sensory awareness of the data than the written notes I had made during the 
observations. 
 
In a broader methodological sense, this study addresses human geography’s ways 
of ‘knowing’ space. It shares Dewsbury's (2003, pp. 1912) reservations for a "need 
to be attentive to that space before understanding combines with signification that 
‘everything in the understanding comes from the senses’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 
pp. 54)”. This calls into question that spatial understanding necessarily needs to be 
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derived from predisposed knowledge of a space in order to understand body-world 
formation. According to Deleuze, spaces cannot only be explained as internalised 
via the senses, because certain relations are external to the elements in question 
(e.g. A being smaller than B). According to the remit of such external relations, a 
priori conceptions of the senses independent from material configurations cannot 
exclusively be relied on to ‘know’ spaces. Rather, this study suggests that with 
compulsivity, spaces articulate in the simultaneous emergence of body and world 
materialities and sensibilities, and ought to be addressed with a vocabulary that is 
able to capture these shared dimensions.  
 
 
7.3 RENDERING GEOGRAPHY COMPULSIVE AND SCIENCES SPATIAL AND 
EXPERIENTIAL 
The kind and outcomes of the study, as well as its methodology, have a number of 
implications across disciplines, and this section formulates implications for 
geographical scholarship. Subsection 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 expands on the study’s 
contributions to work adhering to more-than-human and non-representational 
approaches in the cultural, disability and health geography, as well as the broader 
theoretical work these geographical bodies of work draw on. Subsection 7.3.3 
identifies contribution to the medical and clinical sciences concerned with Tourette 
syndrome this study draws on.  
 
 
7.3.1 Contributions to other-than-compulsive geographies 
Compulsivity can be understood as a new way of unveiling body-world relations in 
which urgency and a lack of quality, as opposed to deliberation, purpose and 
meaning mobilise human-world engagement. This study puts in perspective how 
geography has understood and conceptualised the human in the spatialities of its 
world, by demonstrating the empirical and conceptual gaps of embodied human 
geographies. The conceptual gap in particular articulates the strong influence of 
liberal humanism, which constitutes a person as an economical, rational, and 
purposive figure (Bridge 2000; Stark 2016). As such, this study demonstrates that 
whilst humans might assumed to be in incessant pursuit of meaningful life, in the 
embodiment of the world such pursuit does not always manifest. Rather, such 
rethinking of human engagement with the world supports the political project of the 
geographical subdiscipline of emotional geographies. Despite a lack of a meaningful 
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dimension, compulsive interactions are aspects of life that may be unspeakable 
(Bondi et al. 2005; Thien 2005; Harrison 2007), but express through violently 
resonating with the situated self as experienced turbulence (see Serres 1995; 
Anderson and Wylie 2009). 
 
One of the implications of the study that builds on the conceptualisation of 
compulsivity is the incitement to make a conceptual distinction between the 
everyday practices non-representational theories place emphasis on (Thrift 2004; 
Bondi et al. 2005; Anderson and Harrison 2010; MacPherson 2010; Degnen 2013), 
and compulsive interactions. Compulsive body-world engagement is markedly 
different from spatial practices in the sense that practices cast an overall goal onto 
the body-world formation (see Bondi et al. 2005; MacPherson 2010; Schatzki 2010; 
Degnen 2013), whilst compulsive interactions are experienced as entirely goalless, 
or at most, serve the goal to reduce the urge sensation. Arguably, it is the casting of 
the practice concept over all body-world interactions that have rendered 
compulsions invisible, as they become reified as sustenance of these practices, or 
are left out of more-than-representational geographical analysis entirely (Harrison 
2009). As such, the body-world interactions that are made to sustain these practices 
lose their status as existing in their own right and on their own terms. For instance, 
Bill choosing a parking spot when arriving back home becomes part of a 
‘commuting’ practice (after Schatzki 2010), which obscures the immediacy and 
affective resonances of the parking act itself. Whilst such an act can be attributed to 
nearness to the house, it can also reflect feeling compelled to close the last gap in a 
row, as Bill contended, to keep a rhythm of free and occupied spots or red and grey 
cars going, or to make the particular turn circle associated with this particular spot. 
In turn, this provides reasons for considering spatialities of the body on other than 
purposive and meaningful terms. 
 
Apprehending compulsive ‘unthought’ acts (after Dewsbury 2003) as creative of 
geographies provides a richer and more encompassing understanding of body-world 
formation than as only rendered through practices or other more structural concepts. 
Indeed, taking seriously acts, such as compulsions, that do not articulate goals, 
purpose, and meaning very well, and even preclude sense-making processes, may 
shape the conditions upon which practices take place and how life is experienced 
more broadly. In embedding compulsive body-world formation, similarities have 
been drawn with habits; for example, could compulsivity be a style of habit? This 
study makes the claim that although compulsions are related to habits in the sense 
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that the body becomes involved with the world in an undeliberate way (Malabou 
2008), they cannot be regarded as habits. Unlike habit, compulsive interactions 
cannot be located within the body-memory (De Certeau 1988) as they are co-
emergent with the appearance of extracorporeal materiality (Bissell 2011). 
Furthermore, because of the urge evoking compulsive interactions, they often 
demand attention and take place in full awareness of the person at its unfolding, 
which is unlike habits (Carlisle 2006). These distinctions between compulsions and 
habit then helps to develop both the concept of habit and compulsivity.  
 
The results of this study indicate new ways to take the extracorporeal more-than-
human serious in an ontologically inclusive manner. The ways in which objects 
through their dimensions play active roles in compulsive interactions, and are 
creative of spatialities that articulate their materiality and their resonance with 
human sensibility, contributes to the development of object-oriented ontologies (see 
Harman 2002; Ihde 2009; 2012; Ash 2015; 2017). Such theories seek to understand 
and map the more-than-human through the ways in which their affects reverberate 
with and articulate through the human. In line with this, the study also furthers 
Anderson and Wylie’s (2009, pp. 332 emphasis original) project to identify different 
ways geography explores how materiality “becomes a question posed: 
simultaneously, a provocation, incitement, enigma, and promise (Grosz 2001)”. The 
spatiality of the compulsive phenomenon then further blurs the conceptual 
distinctions between the human and the more-than-human, thereby reframing how 
they meet and affect the other. To this end, considering compulsive body-world 
relations offers opportunities to reframe the development of speculative realism 
within geography (based on Harman 2005; Morton 2007; Meillassoux 2008; Bennett 
2010). In particular, in its employment as spatial ordering principle compulsivity may 
contribute to further embedding spatial processes of perception through 
postphenomenological thought in geography (e.g. Simpson 2009; Wylie 2006; 2009; 
Anderson 2010; Dawney 2013; Brigstocke and Noorani 2016; Ash et al. 2018). 
 
Compulsivity as developed in this study could be regarded to mark one of the most 
poignant accounts of lively environments with distinctive, ongoing articulation of the 
choreography in which the body takes part. Indeed, this study sees objects claiming 
a sociality, body parts rendered flesh, and intentionality becoming dislocated from 
the human, and rationality emerging from within the interaction, and seizing any 
bearing beyond it. As such, the reconceptualization of body-world formation on 
compulsive terms expands the constitution of the experiential field (see Lea 2009; 
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Wylie 2009; Ash 2015). By extension, in conjunction with ‘compulsive writers’ 
Joseph Bliss (1980), Michael Kane (1994) and Lance Turtle (Turtle and Robertson 
2008), this study suggests that the conditions upon which subjectivity forms requires 
rethinking in order to account for the object and space dimensions with which 
compulsivity articulates. The study therefore sustains and contributes to ongoing 
calls to refrain from assuming an already constituted subject (see Dewsbury 2007; 
Romanillos 2008). Compulsivity should be conceived of as a subjectification process 
with the body (see Lingis 2000), upon which new meanings, nonhuman affects, and 
rationalities may take place. As such, compulsivity can be considered to highlight 
certain conditions upon which spaces and objects are experienced and engaged 
with. With this study’s identification of the shared dimension between bodies, 
objects, and spaces, the immanence of the interactions constitute a transcendental 
compulsive condition. 
 
 
7.3.2 Contributions to geographies of medicalised performances 
Whilst many geographical enquiries into medicalised performances conceive of 
them through prisms of (dis)ability, (ill)health, impairment, and (ab)normality, this 
study does not. Rather, it builds on and seeks to contribute to geographies of 
disability and health by sustaining research that regards the mobilisation of such 
prisms as choice (e.g. Latimer and Schillmeier 2009; MacPherson 2010). This is not 
to say that this study is not concerned with suffering, or unwilling to grasp the 
disabling aspects of compulsivity; it is conscious of and sensitive to the ways in 
which such suffering is constructed (after Schillmeier 2010). This study 
demonstrates how such prisms do not necessarily need mobilising in order to 
conceive of spatial conditions for suffering by having taken more vitalist approach 
(Beljaars, under review). In line with Segrott and Doel (2004), this thesis 
demonstrates that engaging with medicalised conditions on performative, rather 
than psychoanalytical, terms raises different questions about geography’s 
contribution to understanding life with one. Indeed, the employment of an ontology 
of the situated interactions, rather than only the effects of these interactions 
articulate situational conceptions of suffering and disablement.  
 
To reflect its ontological distribution expanding from the body to include the 
extracorporeal, this thesis demonstrates that compulsivity should be re-considered 
as a more-than-human condition to reflect its ontological focus (see Beljaars, under 
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review). This supports similar efforts in Science and Technology studies (STS) (see 
e.g. Mol, 2002; Law 2004; Latour, 2005; Latimer and Miele 2013) As this study 
renders suffering and disability mobile and emerging with the embodied situation, it 
employs those affected as inherently abled, which might be a more empathetic point 
of departure to study human conditions (see Hall and Wilton 2017). Such re-
conception then also requires an expansion of the normative ontology from situated 
between different humans bodies to between human bodies and their nonhuman 
environment. The renewed ethical appreciation that such a shift entails (see Coyle 
2006), then also raises political questions about ownership and governmentality of 
the condition and moral responsibility over the act. Instead of situating all ownership 
with the person performing the act, it would take away any ground for stigma as this 
targets people, not acts. Indeed, any blame that is now casted onto the human, 
would then become diffused over the situation. This acknowledges the 
powerlessness of the experience of having to perform compulsive acts that feel 
humiliating in any way, shape or form. As such, reconceiving compulsivity as more-
than-human condition requires the reframing of ongoing debates on the location of 
stigma and shame (e.g. Woods 2017). 
 
To date, geographical research with an interest in medicalised conditions takes a 
diagnosis or a symptom group as point of departure, and this study challenges the 
necessity to do this. It demonstrates that diagnoses are concepts that do not 
necessarily require mobilisation as analytical tool in geographical research (Beljaars, 
in review). Instead, they impose a rigid structure that might impede the impact of a 
geographical exploration of lived experiences of medicalised performances. In 
effect, such approaches produce geographies of a diagnosis or symptom group. 
Body-world interaction that produces suffering as unmediated through the diagnosis 
could amount to an interactional geography that stretches across diagnostic 
boundaries. This research then produces a compulsive geography that stretches 
TS, OCD, and potentially ASDs, ADHD, Schizophrenia, and anxiety disorders. 
Contending that such approach does not implicate a loss of possibility for cross-
fertilisation between geography and medical disciplines, the study claims that vital 
geographical conceptions can augment medical and clinical sciences. This expands 
the ways in which disability and health geography provide critical reflections on 
psychiatric orderings of bodies and conditions. Building on and sustaining earlier 
activist work (e.g. Parr 2002; Chouinard et al. 2010; Colls 2012) this study produces 
a mapping of suffering that is emergent, rich, and dynamic, rather than fixated, 
bound to bodies, objects, and spaces. The study demonstrates that this approach 
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helps conceive how diagnoses themselves articulate in the realms of everyday life, 
and what ethical issues this produces (see Callard 2014).  
 
If we can accept a new branch of geographical research that ontologically centres 
medicalised interactions instead of diagnoses, new possibilities open up for 
researching not just how performances are shared amongst different diagnoses, but 
also to a wider humanity beyond pathology (i.e. what is considered to be a 
‘subclinical population’). Indeed, Cath et al. (2001, pp.181), demonstrate how 
‘normal’ populations also “exhibit the whole range of repetitive phenomenology 
performed by GTS and OCD patients, and only differ quantitatively from them” 
(emphasis added, see also; Rachman and De Silva 1978; Salkovskis and Harrison 
1984; Kurlan 1994; Muris et al. 1997). In line with the ‘psychological model of mental 
illness’ (Freeman and Freeman 2013) Szatmari (2004) argues that performances 
captured as symptoms occur along a continuum (also see Williams 2005). To 
varying extents, all human bodies would thus have capacities to compulsively 
interact with particular situations and experience the urge to do so. As such, 
compulsive geographies would render visible the tiny in-between acts that people 
‘catch themselves doing’, such as stepping on the middle of the flagstones in the 
pavement. Such interactions often fail to last a memory, but can be useful and 
enjoyable (Goldman 2012). For instance, fidgeting is suggested to sustain bodily 
negotiations of stressful situations (Farley et al. 2013). Rendering these acts 
compulsive would actualise “the inherent and continuous susceptibility of corporeal 
life to the unchosen and unforeseen” (Harrison 2008, pp. 427). 
 
 
7.3.3 Contributions to medical and clinical sciences 
The study contributes to medical and clinical sciences by unsettling rigid structures 
in which urge-driven compulsivity has been located. As raised in the previous 
section and in Section 2.1, the adherence of the conceptualisation of compulsivity 
through diagnoses is problematic and reductive, as its conceptualisation through 
rational prisms and linear causal logic is reductive to such an extent that it may even 
omit the development of a richer understanding of them (see Pilgrim 2007; 2013 and 
Callard 2014 for more general arguments). This study demonstrates how with a 
particular recruitment technique these diagnostic barriers can be circumvented, and 
help soften the sharp delineations between pathologies (after Bankey 2004 on 
agoraphobia). Furthermore, the positivist rejection of the experiential and situational 
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as valid knowledge for medical conceptualisations of compulsions largely leaves 
unanswered why they take place in the way they do, and why they take place in 
particular situations (after Pykett 2017). This study takes up Peterson and 
Leckman’s (1998) emphasis of the importance of recognising that compulsive urge 
and interactions do not occur incessantly. Indeed, this study demonstrates that the 
changing affective situation of the body seems to instigate the process. As such, it 
opens up possibilities to consider compulsivity as conceptualised beyond the brain 
(after Davies 2016). 
 
Arguing that a performative approach can augment medical and clinical research 
into compulsivity, the study produces a much richer account of the life worlds of 
those whose lives are affected by it. This section elaborates on the ways in which 
this augmentation takes place. The outcomes of the study attest that the experiential 
dimension of compulsivity contributes crucial insights into what sensations and 
situations constitute the compulsions. Experiences allow for pinpointing the grounds 
on which the frequency and intensity of compulsivity differentiates over time, space, 
mood, activities, and social situations, (see Turtle and Robertson 2008). 
Additionally, the experiential dimension of compulsive interactions locates how, what 
kind, and where reflection of compulsions situate epistemologically. The study 
demonstrates that when prompted to explain their compulsions, more often than not, 
participants could not elaborate, or express them in accordance with other-than-
compulsive life. This supports claims that there are very few reasons for 
compulsions to benefit from psychoanalysis (Kushner 1999), but that this does not 
mean that experience is not valuable. Such argumentation could be used to silence 
those affected, and sustain claims that compulsivity is an affliction of the brain only 
(see Davies 2016; Pykett 2017 for the concerns such claims raise). The experiential 
geographical appreciation of compulsivity challenges the constitution and 
persistence of rationality, intentionality, and objectivity that clinical psychology 
claims compulsivity to emerge from.  
 
This study demonstrates that an epistemological sensitivity to the experience of 
compulsivity also helps visualising how knowledge of compulsions and bodily tics is 
partial in its decontextualized and disembodied approach. As current research and 
treatment of compulsivity renders the embodied situation static, and of snapshot 
duration in the laboratory circumstances of doctor’s offices, therapy rooms and 
hospital chambers, it lacks knowledge of the phenomenon in other circumstances. 
This study articulates the difference with bodies being mobile in the familiar spaces 
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of the home, classroom or workplace, aligning better with what Turtle (in Turtle and 
Robertson 2008, pp. 451) asserts as the “truly chaotic nature” of his experiences. 
This ‘truly chaotic nature’ is explicitly reflected in the strong differences of motor and 
vocal tic occurrence during activities (O’Connor et al. 2003) as well as different 
places (Goetz et al. 2001), and could be taken forward with the insights of this 
thesis. Additionally, the embodied, contextualised and experiential aspects of this 
study offer the opportunity to start of the development of a new vocabulary that 
better reflects the experience of compulsivity outside medical and clinical narratives 
of the ‘faulty’ brain. 
 
 
7.4 MOVING FORWARD: A RESEARCH AGENDA 
Rendering compulsivity beyond the brain escapes its conceptualisation by medical 
scientific epistemology (Beljaars and Anderson forthcoming; Hall and Wilton 2017). 
This study suggests that an ontological expansion, including the bodily environment 
and experience, might be possible with an epistemology that regards compulsivity 
as a capacity of the brain rather than a property. In accordance with assemblage 
theory that can be used as analytical tool (DeLanda 2006), compulsivity could be 
rendered present and absent when particular neural and environmental forces 
emerge with each other to create a compulsive situation. Such an approach could 
also help demystify the rebound phenomenon – an outburst of bodily tics and 
compulsions after a period of suppression or incapacity to perform them – whose 
existence is avidly advocated by those afflicted (see Verdellen et al. 2007), but 
cannot be captured with clinical methodologies. By extension, if such an approach 
would help broaden insights into the condition that better aligns the interests of 
those affected, medical and clinical scientists and social scientists, similar conditions 
could also be studied in this manner41. This would also carve out a specific role for 
geography in the enquiries that conventionally has been associated with 
neurosciences (Pykett 2017; 2016; Gagen 2006; 2015; Davies 2016; Whitehead 
2016) and theories of the mind (Powell et al. 2018). Whilst for compulsivity such 
thinking might be new, neurosciences have been encouraged to consider system 
analyses. Currently gaining popularity is, for instance, ‘enactivism’, or pluralism 
which seeks to configure neural elements on their capacities in producing the 
                                               
41 I elaborate on this in “A Worlding of Compulsivity: Rendering knowledge of Tourette syndrome 
spatial” Worlding the Brain Symposium 2017, Amsterdam 
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neurological disposition for human conditions (e.g. Gallagher 2017; Glas 
forthcoming; Noë 2009; Thompson 2007). 
 
A step forward on the basis of this study’s conception of compulsivity and its 
addressing of the medical and clinical sciences could therefore include a 
continuation of its vitalist approach and its ontological centring of compulsive body-
world interactions42. In conjunction with an assemblage or enactivist approach, a 
spatio-temporal approach could align different knowledges. Such approach could be 
diagrammatic by dotting different dimensions (i.e. brain, psyche, extracorporeal 
material, spaces, body, the social, the experiential, and the diagnosis) along a 
temporal line, and mapping them in relation to the location of the urge and 
interaction. Interventions, such as different kinds of medication, behavioural 
therapies, psycho-education, and geographical recommendations (see Appendix 2), 
could then be distinguished along these diagrams. An explicit collaborative 
involvement of people who are affected by compulsivity is not only required in this 
exercise, it emancipates their political position in research on human – or indeed, 
more-than-human – conditions (after Callard and Fitzgerald 2015). Understanding 
and situating experience as a leading source of knowledge, and not one for mere 
illustration of scientific or clinical knowledge would grant a much needed voice of the 
people experiencing compulsivity in how it is studied and treated. 
 
In summary, this thesis demonstrates that compulsive interactions should not be 
regarded as articulations and negotiations of a malfunctioning brain, but as 
expressive of the bodily situation amongst objects in spaces. Focusing on the 
performativity and experience of compulsivity, the thesis raises new questions about 
the study of medicalised performances in geography, as well as the contribution of 
geography to the study of medicalised phenomena. In addition, this thesis develops 
new understanding of, and engagement with, human suffering and thriving, through 
the intricate spatialities of the body on other than purposive, rational and meaningful 
terms. In amplifying new voices in geographical research in innovative ways, this 
participative research hopes to raise awareness and build capacity for those 
diagnosed with Tourette syndrome, and affected by compulsivity more broadly. 
  
                                               
42 I elaborate on this in “A Vitalist Ethics and Spatial Imagination of Compulsivity?” Inaugural 
Northern Network for Medical Humanities Research Congress 2017, Durham 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 EYE-TRACKING RECORDING STILLS 
These collection demonstrates a number of different compulsive interactions 
performed by different participants. The red dots represent the locations of the 
participants’ gaze. 
 
Figure 8: Compulsive touching of a table corner with Sage 
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Figure 9: The shed of Alan's neighbour that is not-just-right 
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Figure 10: compulsive ordering of a statue on the windowsill with Ginny 
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Figure 11: A just-right composition of leaves for Alan 
 
 
Figure 12: An overwhelming object collection for Ginny. She experiences everything 
to vibrate 
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APPENDIX 2  PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS: CAPACITY BUILDING  
On the basis of the analysis, this short piece develops short-term and immediately 
implementable considerations on the basis of the outcomes of the study. From the 
analysis of recurring compulsive interactions and the compositions upon which they 
take place, a number of recommendations can be made. These recommendations 
have been formulated on the basis of cross-participant, cross-object, and cross-
space occurrence. Nonetheless, the study demonstrates that these 
recommendations might not work for everyone, at all times, and in the similar ways. 
The study recognises that those experiencing compulsivity as part of their daily life 
have far greater and deeper knowledge about situational effects, which this list does 
not claim any expertise over. Therefore, the following list should be taken as nothing 
more than a potential guideline when in need. 
 
For the purpose of retaining a restorative element in one’s house or room(s): 
- Stop entities from moving by putting the same kinds of products/objects in 
close vicinity. 
- Stabilise compulsive systems by making them immovable, or only movable 
in their entirety (no loose objects). 
- Add natural elements, such as plants. 
- Keep small items out of sight. 
- If possible, have the corners of large surfaces, such as walls, rounded off. 
- Have flat surfaces, such as paintings without small ridges and bumps 
sticking out that create a relief. 
- Don’t choose carpet/flooring with lines or marble patterns on them. Choose 
monochrome or gradual colour change. 
- No small dynamic details like fringes on a carpet or chair or any element that 
is within reach.  
- Assign areas and objects to the ownership of other people. 
- Group objects with strongly vertical or horizontal appearance (in a line to 
prohibit overlap would be best). 
- Ask another person to accompany one to get through activities that take up 
to much time to reduce the amount of compulsions that need performing. 
- Keep routines because of anticipation for encountering spaces and objects. 
More detailed knowledge also helps to recognise when certain objects and 
spaces can become demanding. However, with routines detailed knowledge 
builds up, and with detailed knowledge, new compulsions take shape.  
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- Be aware that it is as much part of one as it is of one’s environment, one 
does not need to own it, or think one needs to be able to govern it in the 
ways other-than-compulsive life often requires of us. 
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